Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 21, 1968, 1935Z.

13634. Subj: Conversation with Kiesinger re Berlin.

1. Summary. Chancellor Kiesinger during an hour’s conversation with the Ambassador this afternoon emphasized in strong terms the seriousness with which the entire CDU/CSU, the over-whelming majority of the SPD and the Federal Government as a whole view the East German passport and visa requirement. He thought that if this step were not met firmly it would be followed by a more serious Communist escalation. The objective must be to bring the East Germans to revoke the requirement whether this would prove possible in the end or not. The Federal Government was prepared to take any steps within its power and while the Chancellor did not feel that IZT constituted a very effective measure, he did not entirely rule it out. The United States for its part must talk directly to the Russians in a “most energetic” fashion. The German people must get the feeling that the Americans are “firm.” The United States must convince the Soviets of the seriousness with which we view the situation. The Chancellor expressed his great hope that the Secretary would visit Bonn after the Reykjavik meeting if his health permits. Such a visit alone would have a beneficial psychological effect for the West Germans and Berliners. End summary.

1. The Ambassador met for an hour’s discussion of the Berlin situation with Chancellor Kiesinger this afternoon at the latter’s request. The Chancellor at the beginning noted that he had just come from a meeting of the CDU Steering Committee where yesterday’s Bundestag debate had been discussed. He wished to express his views on the Berlin situation to the Ambassador before leaving Bonn for the weekend.

2. The Chancellor said that the FRG’s friends must know that we here—all of the CDU, and overwhelming majority of the SPD and the whole government—view the Berlin situation as “very serious.” The Chancellor was particularly pleased that the President in his message had expressed regret that Berlin “was again threatened.” The East German move is in reality a threat, the most serious since the Wall. This may, the Chancellor noted, seem overly dramatic to an outsider but not to those who are familiar with the past history. Access, including civilian access, has always been most closely linked with the continued freedom of West Berlin.

3. The Chancellor said that the passport and visa requirement has undoubtedly been under consideration in East Berlin for a decade. It is interesting that the East Germans chose this particular moment to implement it. They may have felt that the present combination of circumstances—the Presidential elections in the US, the political upheaval in France, and the economic problem in England was particularly opportune. Developments in Czechoslovakia may also have played a part. The Chancellor could not judge whether the initiative was taken by the Soviets or the East Germans. The important thing was that the decision was made to take this “dangerous step.” “It is my strong conviction,” the Chancellor said (switching into English), “that at present the German people feel what will happen next, and then and then?”

4. The Federal Government desired to avoid escalation. It was in any event too weak alone to take strong steps. The FRG is prepared however, to take any measures it can in East Berlin. The Chancellor knew that the three Allies had frequently mentioned IZT. He was ready to do something in this field but he feared that it is not an effective measure as it had been in 1960. The GDR was no longer as vulnerable as then. The Chancellor emphasized that his government was ready to do everything “to strengthen the viability of Berlin.” As he had said in the Bundestag, something must be done to make the other side cancel the new requirement. “We must not put up with it. We must strongly demand that the requirement be rescinded.” Otherwise they will certainly escalate and the next step would mean that the confidence of the German people in Germany’s partners, particularly the US, would be dangerously weakened. For this reason energetic and vigorous steps are required. The Chancellor noted in this connection that the extreme groups on the left and on the right in Germany are both endeavoring to exploit anything they can to encourage anti-Americanism.

5. The Chancellor then said that he had asked Brandt to urge the Secretary to come to Bonn after the Reykjavik meeting if possible. (At this point a news ticker was brought to the Chancellor indicating that the Secretary had announced he would decide on a visit to Bonn next Monday.) The Chancellor noted that the Secretary knows the whole Berlin problem so well and has always taken such a firm stand. The fact alone of the Secretary’s visit would be of psychological benefit in West Germany and Berlin.

6. The Chancellor said that the great majority of the German people are convinced that the US and the FRG must stand together. His own party in particular has fought bitter fights for German-American friendship against earlier calls in Germany for neutralism. He doesn’t expect the impossible from the Allies but he hoped that most of all in Washington the situation was seen as seriously as in the FRG.

7. The Ambassador replied that the United States Government certainly considered the new developments affecting Berlin most serious. Washington was not inclined to say that the German side must take countermeasures before we would do anything. In the Ambassador’s view the key principle was to act “together.” He noted that some effective steps had already been decided upon and that the Bonn Group has proven a useful instrument. The Ambassador thought that the German proposal for an air shuttle service between Berlin and Hannover and perhaps other cities was a very good idea. Whether the East Germans will revoke the visa requirement, however would, in his view, depend on whether the Soviets are really backing them up. Effective countermeasures taken now might in any event deter further Communist encroachments. The Chancellor agreed that this was an important objective.

8. The Ambassador then asked the Chancellor just what he had in mind that the United States should do. He replied that the most important thing is for the US to talk directly to the Soviets. He was asking for a “most energetic US approach.” He had talked with the President and knew our problems—that we must carefully manage crises and not destroy such possibilities for understanding with the Sovs as may exist. We should not think that the Germans were the “last warriors” of the cold war. The German people, however, must get the feeling that the Americans are firm. If together we can reach a common “design” for action and the US warns the Soviets at the same time, this will help.

9. The Chancellor noted that he had made clear to Sov Ambassador Tsarapkin that the Federal Government is prepared to be realistic about Federal activities in the city. The FRG’s legal position must be preserved and he could not say that a political party or the Bundestag would never again meet in Berlin. On the other hand, small questions such as the Defense Committee or police trade union meetings were of no real interest, and de facto solutions could be found. The Chancellor had the impression, however, that the Sovs were no longer interested in such solutions.

10. The Ambassador, referring to the Chancellor’s request for a firm American approach to the Soviets said that for us to be firm there must be something concrete “in sharp focus” to be firm about. The Chancellor agreed that any US démarche must be credible. The Federal Republic, he said, is an orderly and healthy country. There were difficulties with the farmers and there would be further student unrest but there would be no political upheaval in the FRG unless some new source of unrest is introduced. He did not wish a loss of confidence in Germany’s Allies to constitute such an element.

11. The Ambassador, after expressing his admiration for the way in which the Federal Government had so far handled the East German threat stated that he would report the Chancellor’s views to Washington where he was sure they would be studied by the President and the Secretary.

12. Comment: The Chancellor’s failure to be concrete on what he wanted us to be “firm” about leads me to the view that he was “making a record”—putting himself in a position to say that he had “told” us.

Lodge

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, USNATO, USAREUR, EUCOM,USAFE, USNMR SHAPE, and USELMLO.