Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

275. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 20, 1968, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• Alexander Boeker, Ambassador-at-Large, FRG Foreign Office
• Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, FRG Embassy
• Horst H. Holthoff, First Secretary, FRG Embassy
• The Under Secretary
• Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• George C. McGhee, Ambassador-at-Large
• John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Alfred Puhan, Country Director for Germany
• Helmut Sonnenfeldt, INR/RSB
• Alexander C. Johnpoll, ERU/GER

The Under Secretary welcomed Ambassador Boeker and told him how useful it was to have an opportunity to get German thinking on the Berlin problem just before the Reykjavik meeting.

Boeker said that the FRG felt very strongly that the situation should not be dramatized, and is trying to avoid creating the impression of being overly concerned. But everyone in the FRG knows of the great potential for danger in the present situation, and the Government is greatly concerned over the long-range effects of what the “GDR” has now done.

Three facts stand out:

1. The “GDR”; is trying to enhance its prestige and standing as an international entity.

2. The new “GDR” visa and passport measures impose an economic burden and irritating hindrances on traffic with Berlin, but in themselves they do not represent a serious danger.

3. The great danger is that if the “GDR” gets away with this, it will be tempted to escalate the fees and other hindrances to the point where they become prohibitive and highly dangerous.

As things now stand, it will cost the German people about 100 million DM per year. One can easily imagine how the “GDR” can screw this figure upward.

The FRG had tried to look at the situation through the eyes of Pankow and Moscow. It did not seem to be a case of Ulbricht dragging the reluctant Russians along, but rather a long-range concerted plan. Two factors seem to have induced the Russians to let the “GDR” act at this time: various signs of weakness in the Western camp, and unrest, such as in Czechoslovakia, in the Eastern camp.

The FRG does not wish to dramatize and escalate the situation, but neither does it wish to behave like an ostrich. What the FRG has to think about together with the three Allies and with the wider NATO group is, at what point do we really have to undertake serious countermeasures. The FRG especially wants to talk with its American friends about what can be said to the Soviets to convince them that a point will unavoidably be reached, as things are now going, when the situation will have become not merely irritating but intolerable.

The Under Secretary asked whether the FRG has any further concrete steps in mind.

Boeker replied that there were none that the FRG hadn’t already mentioned to the three Allies in Bonn for discussion in Reykjavik. He said that the FRG is open to suggestions for things that might be done together to prevent further “GDR” escalation.

Mr. Leddy pointed out that the major action available to us short of coordinated action in the trade field has now been taken with the imminent NAC approval of TTD measures.

Ambassador McGhee asked whether the FRG saw the purpose of countermeasures as overcoming the existing situation or the prevention of further “GDR” escalation. Boeker replied that it would be good if we could overcome the existing situation, but this would be difficult. He repeated the suggestion he had made earlier today of trying to reach a compromise with the Soviets for the “GDR” to enforce its demand for visas for entry into East Germany but drop the visa requirement for transit to Berlin.

Boeker said that it was useful to compare the situation now with that at the time of the Berlin Wall. The construction of the Wall was a dramatic act but was essentially defensive—to stop the economic hemorrhaging of East Germany. The current move is not dramatic but it is a dangerous and aggressive act because it is aimed against Berlin’s viability. We should all, in responding to Soviet statements that the matter doesn’t involve the Allies, reply publicly that it does indeed involve the Allies because if the “GDR’s” act remains unchallenged, the potential will have been created for the destruction of Berlin’s viability.

Under Secretary Rostow pointed out that we have protested to the Soviets and are looking hard with our German, British and French colleagues at the problem. He said that we are not clear, however, on the FRG position. Is the FRG interested in trying to get the “GDR” action undone? Has thought been given to asking the German people to avoid getting passports for travel to Berlin?

Boeker said “no”, because that would really strangle Berlin. The enormous traffic between the FRG and Berlin would come to a halt except for a trickle of persons by air. The fact of the matter is that there is a power physically in existence which demands passports and visas. In order to keep Berlin alive and keep the traffic flowing, the FRG can only go ahead and acknowledge the existence of this power and announce, as Kiesinger did today, that the exercise of that power to force stamps on FRG citizens does not mean recognition of the “GDR”.

The Under Secretary said that he understood the FRG view that it could live with the “GDR” effort to try to gain prestige from visa enforcement, and could put up with the inconvenience of the “GDR” travel and freight hindrances. It was somewhat more difficult to see how the FRG could handle the psychological problems. How will the Berliners react? How do you choose the point at which you draw a clear-cut line beyond which the situation cannot be accepted?

Boeker replied that the Berliners have over the years shown a great deal of stamina and determination, and they will continue to do so up to a point. Where that point is, nobody knows. It depends on the firmness of the responses and on the continued Allied presence in Berlin.

The Under Secretary asked what the FRG would have us do.

Boeker replied that the Allies in Reykjavik should make clear how high the stakes in Berlin are, and should show solidarity with the FRG. In this connection, Boeker said, it was hoped that Secretary Rusk might visit Germany after the Reykjavik meeting. He anticipated that Brandt would officially invite the Secretary when they met in Reykjavik.

Boeker said that it was important that the Foreign Ministers at the NATO meeting should state clearly and publicly that the situation in Berlin is close to that danger point of intolerability.

Mr. Leddy pointed out that we had discussed this morning the interzonal trade as a possible countermeasure. It is regarded traditionally as internal German trade, and the FRG is approaching IZT countermeasures very cautiously because of this; because it is not easy to reverse; and because evidently the FRG had considered this as an isolated German measure rather than a coordinated Western move. But we had thought of trade measures in terms of a NATO-wide step which could be quite effective. There are some loopholes in “GDR” trade with the West, e.g. Austria and Sweden. But with common NATO action, trade measures could hurt the “GDR” considerably. If it were decided by the Governments involved that some form of trade measures were needed, he was not pessimistic about the chances of getting common NATO action.

The Under Secretary said that he agreed that if some such step were to be taken it would be better to do enough to make it really pinch the East Germans.

Boeker thought that selective trade measures might be useful. He added that IZT is intimately bound up with supplies going to Berlin—Berlin might be badly hurt if IZT were cut off.

Boeker said that there is an isolated danger that people in Germany will acquire a feeling of being left isolated, in the absence of counter-measures. Also, in both the CDU and the SPD, there is a growing feeling that the FRG will have to take another look at the NPT in the light of the “GDR” and Soviet actions. Perhaps there would be some virtue to tying FRG signature on the NPT to a Russian guarantee on Berlin access.

The Under Secretary said that we should look at possible selective measures on a contingency basis, to see that we are in agreement on what would work and what wouldn’t.

Boeker said that another aspect of “GDR” trade that could be examined would be the transit of “GDR” goods through Western countries on the way to ports—Austria, Denmark, Italy and others provide such transit facilities.

Walt Rostow asked where further contingency planning is taking place.

Mr. Puhan replied that this work is focused in Bonn, with the Quadripartite Group there.

Under Secretary Rostow said that it is clear that Ulbricht wants to isolate the two parts of Germany and the two parts of Europe from each other. We in the West, on the other hand, want more and more contact to take place. Our public position is clear that we regard the recent “GDR” steps as illegal, and we have protested against them. We don’t want to take measures that the FRG doesn’t want to do itself or doesn’t want us to do. Evidently, the FRG is searching for a plan that would avoid future escalation rather than addressing itself to the current “GDR” steps. Is there an advantage to waiting? Boeker replied that the FRG is doubtful that serious countermeasures can be mounted, and it doubts whether there are available countermeasures that really would be effective. What has to be done is to make clear to the Soviets that there are limits to Western tolerance.

The Under Secretary said that the Soviets, the Germans, and we are all in the dark as to just what that limit is.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought that the Soviets rather than Ulbricht control the Eastern side of this problem. It is necessary to get the Soviets to put the brakes on Ulbricht by showing the Russians that their own interests would be better served that way.

Under Secretary Rostow said that trade countermeasures could be costly and might interrupt the processes of trying to bring the two parts of Germany closer together. He wondered whether it would be easier to face this early, when a matter of principle is involved, or later when it becomes a matter of the amount of money the “GDR” is trying to extort from its hold on access.

Boeker replied that there is not much in the way of countermeasures which offer much promise of effectiveness. It is necessary to say something to the Russians to show them that their own interests are involved.

Mr. Puhan said that in considering the use of countermeasures it is necessary to weigh their possible effect on public opinion. What will the effect of the situation be on the next elections in Germany, on the political parties, on the German public’s view of the Allies. The U.S. looks to the Federal Republic for answers to some of these questions.

The Under Secretary thought that a significant public gesture should be made by the Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik.

Boeker agreed. He thought that at Reykjavik it would be necessary to convince the NATO Allies that it is not merely a question of visas that is involved but the potential strangulation of Berlin. Mr. Sonnenfeldt said that we would all have to think about some ways to get the Soviets and the “GDR” to stop the process of escalation against Berlin, and even pull back somewhat on implementation of the new “GDR” regulations.

The Under Secretary said that in considering countermeasures we should not give undue weight to the economic difficulties that would be involved for Western countries. Psychologically it might impress the Russians more to see a willingness on the part of the West to undertake measures that hurt us somewhat.

Mr. Puhan said that it was important to point out to our German friends the falseness of various news stories that the U.S. is unwilling to support the FRG in this problem because of our desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union. We have, in fact, supported the FRG and Berlin. The President’s message is an example. Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought that we should be thinking of steps to be taken now to avoid a greater crisis three months from now.

The Under Secretary proposed that we all take a look at specifics on possible countermeasures that the Secretary and Brandt could look at in Reykjavik. We should also do some work on deciding on what kind of statements should be made there.

Mr. Puhan pointed out that we already have the draft text of a Tripartite legal protest to be delivered in Moscow.

Boeker said that in the recent talks with the Soviets on Berlin, the U.S. and U.K. referred to the breach of international agreements, whereas the French had only referred to a violation of established practices. He wondered whether the French are going along with the draft text of the Tripartite legal protest.

Mr. Johnpoll replied that the French Embassy in Bonn had gone along with it, but it had of course been referred to Paris for government decision, which we do not yet have.

Boeker agreed that we should all come up with a few specifics for examination in Reykjavik and that it would have to be made clear there to the other NATO Allies that steps should be taken in order to avoid a later, more serious, difficulty over Berlin.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in U and M on June 27. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s Conference Room.