Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, March 26, 1968, 0454Z.

136255. Reference Bonn’s 9894.² For the Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. I read your message 9894 regarding Kiesinger’s state of mind with amazement. We have reviewed the list of recent German visitors to Washington and whom they saw. It is in our view inconceivable that any accurate report of these meetings could have resulted in the kind of conclusions Kiesinger came to, as reported in your telegram.

2. Since receiving your message, we have had further confirmation of Kiesinger’s concern via Walther Casper. Latter saw Walt Rostow informally, March 24,³ and said that Kiesinger had recently received a circumstantial document in English alleging that Rostow had expressed strong criticism of Kiesinger along lines reported in your cable. It was also alleged that Katzenbach had made similar remarks, although less strongly stated. According to report received by Chancellor, President feels that Kiesinger has “betrayed” the United States on a whole series of questions, including making “secret agreements” with de Gaulle, selling out the UK on the Common Market, approving secret contacts between German Socialists and Communist politicians, passing on to East Germans knowledge derived from contacts with President Johnson, taking a weak position on Viet-Nam, and subverting the Atlantic partnership.

3. Rostow made clear to Casper that views of this kind had not been expressed by him and were not views of US Government. Rostow noted that he had recently seen only two German visitors, Duckwitz and Barzel (latter was here on unannounced and unreported visit),⁴ to both of whom he had expressed quite different views. Rostow told Casper that he could advise Chancellor that reputed views were not his nor those of US Government.

4. Casper had informed us that he was in touch with Chancellor by telephone morning of March 25 and that latter was much relieved to hear his report on talk with Rostow. Chancellor told Casper he would abandon further efforts to seek clarification of alleged views of US Government but that he would attempt to track down source of misinformation, since it was clear that someone was trying to make trouble between our two countries.

5. This whole episode strikes me as very dangerous business indeed and both President and I feel we should get to the bottom of it, if possible. It would appear that report received by Chancellor represented effort to mislead him intentionally about our attitude and we would like to know who was responsible.

6. I believe you should call on Kiesinger and tell him that I was dismayed at the report which he mentioned to you and Schaetzel and which Casper discussed with Rostow. You can assure him that we know of absolutely no grounds for suspicions and that we hope the assurances received via Casper will put his mind at rest. It would appear, however, that someone is deliberately trying to harm the relations of our two countries and we feel it is important to bring this out in the open and find out who is doing it. You could add that if, in the future, there are any rumors which could have the effect of dividing us, we should promptly run them down so that we can clear the atmosphere of any misunderstandings whatsoever.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel, cleared by Leddy and Walt Rostow, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Brussels for USEC.
2. Document 253.
3. No record of this meeting was found.
4. A memorandum of conversation of the Rostow-Barzel meeting is Document 248. Duckwitz visited Washington February 28. No record of this meeting was found.