Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

254. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, March 25, 1968, 1810Z.

1176. From the Ambassador. Subject: Ambassador’s talk with Governing Mayor Schuetz.

1. I called on GovMayor Schuetz today accompanied by Minister Morris. We talked for about forty minutes on several topics. Schuetz and I had a private conversation about Senat-Allied consultations, which I shall be reporting separately.²

2. Student demonstrations. I complimented Schuetz in the way the Senat and police had handled the March 23 Vietnam demonstration. I remarked that we are sorry that demonstrations against our Vietnam policy have recently caused German officials extra work. Schuetz said that he felt his government and the police were doing better recently in finding the right degree of flexibility in responding to demonstrations. The March 23 episode was not significant; police estimates (3,000 participants) actually were quite high. The disappointing thing was that despite the unimportant size of such demonstrations compared to Berlin’s population, they continued to receive extensive press and TV coverage.

3. Soviet Trade Center in West Berlin. I told Schuetz that in view of the increased Soviet aggressiveness and the rash of spurious complaints that they had been making recently, the US Government was not inclined to favor increased Soviet presence in West Berlin at this time. The things SovAmb Abrasimov and the East Germans were saying about rampant Nazi activity in West Berlin were clearly exaggerated.³ Their protests about Federal German activities here seemed an attempt to turn back the clock. We see nothing wrong with such activities as the Federal Republic has been carrying on in West Berlin, although we would be happier if the Defense Committee did not meet here again (Schuetz indicated full agreement on this point).

I said I would be seeing Abrasimov for lunch and would tell him as well that we are displeased with the present aggressive Soviet attitude toward West Berlin.

Schuetz said he understood our view, but he still thought there might be value in having a Soviet trade representation in West Berlin—under German law, not Allied aegis—since the Senat felt that for businessmen to conduct business through the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin implied that the Embassy was competent for all of Berlin. I repeated that we were not inclined to accept such increased Soviet presence at this time.

4. Soviet flights over West Berlin. Schuetz raised the subject of recent Soviet overflights as another possible example of a harder Soviet attitude. I recapitulated for him the recent incidents and the unsatisfactory Soviet replies to our protests. The overflights seemed clearly to fall into the category of harassment. I said I would also speak to Abrasimov about this matter as well.

5. Berlin economy. I remarked that the Schering Company’s plan to build a large new laboratory in Berlin was a gratifying example of industry’s support for the Berlin economy. Schuetz agreed and said that despite some initial difficulty in acquiring the property necessary for the new plant, the project now seemed well underway. He still had the impression, however, that Berlin would have to keep up pressure on German industriallists to increase their interest in investing here. Berlin also hopes to achieve some results with US businessmen through the help of the German Consulates. I said I was sorry that our balance of payments deficit would restrict US investment here, but that we would still encourage US firms to invest locally-acquired funds in Berlin. Schuetz agreed that this course offered good possibilities. He had received the impression in Washington that despite the moratorium on investments, Berlin might still be able to get US consideration of important specific projects which could not be financed locally. I told him that I could not give him any encouragement on this point.

6. University reform. I noted that the public hearings on the draft Berlin University reform law were beginning March 25, and asked Schuetz what progress he expected. He replied that some politicians still hoped to pass a new university law by the end of 1968, but that most experts were less optimistic. Strangely, the students themselves were now urging that a new law not be passed too quickly. The most important change being considered would be the replacement of the Rector by a professional president, after the American pattern. Since this would bring a significant change to the traditional privileges and powers of professors, the new law would meet with criticism from all sides.

7. Berlin morale. Schuetz said that there still seemed to be a general uneasiness in Berlin about the future of the city. Berliners fear specifically that the Federal Government may be growing less concerned about their problems, “especially since that business at Nuernberg” (referring to the SPD Congress).⁴ I said that we wanted to help as much as possible, and that we would support efforts to have the FRG Berlin aid law extended indefinitely. Schuetz said that extension of the aid law would be a psychological boost for the city, as well as a material benefit.

8. Problems in the Berlin SPD. Schuetz was not too forthcoming about problems in the Berlin SPD. He summed them up by saying “the left wants to dominate the party.” He said personal ambition was mostly to blame, as was the left’s “tradition” of fighting the party majority. There really is little dispute on substantive issues, with the possible exception of policy toward student demonstrations.

9. RIAS. Schuetz raised the subject of RIAS personnel cuts, saying that he had just written a letter to Minister Morris (not yet received) and also had written to USIA Director Leonard Marks stressing the importance of avoiding any hint that the US was reducing its presence in Berlin.⁵ I told Schuetz that we felt it imperative to reduce our costs in running RIAS, but that this did not mean we were reducing our presence or interest. We had discussed the problem with FedRep Minister Wehner, who was now investigating other possible sources of additional funds. We hoped also to streamline RIAS staffing inter alia by means of the normal attrition rate. Schuetz said this was reassuring. He had been very concerned lest a noticeable change in RIAS spark public speculation about lessening US interest in Berlin.

Morris

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn and Moscow.
2. Telegram 1177 from Berlin, March 26. (Ibid.)
3. Abrasimov’s March 13 letter outlining charges regarding the NDP was forwarded to the Department of State in telegram 1109 from Berlin, March 13. (Ibid., POL 28 GER B) The Department of State provided a response in telegram 134324 to Bonn, March 21. (Ibid.)
4. For text of the portion of the March 21 SPD Congress statement dealing with foreign policy and Berlin issues, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 245–247.
5. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1184 from Berlin, March 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US)