Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 13, 1968, 0948Z.

8270. Subject: Rostow meeting with the Chancellor.

1. During Under Secretary Rostow’s meeting this afternoon with Chancellor Kiesinger, the Chancellor was primarily interested in providing information and views concerning German Eastern policy, the NPT, relations with France, and the state of his coalition government. These are reported in this telegram. The Chancellor requested that his remarks be transmitted to the Secretary and to the President. The portion of the conversation devoted to the US balance of payments problem is reported by septel.²

1. [sic] Eastern policy—The Chancellor said that the SPD is currently having serious internal trouble. The party membership feels increasingly that they are going to lose the next election. The Wehner school of responsible and constructive participation in the grand coalition has lost out. Real divergencies within the party have developed particularly on the subject of Eastern policy. The Chancellor said that he had talked directly to Brandt, Wehner, and Helmut Schmidt and all three agreed that it would be highly dangerous for the FRG to talk directly with the Sovs concerning Berlin. There is, however, a strong group in the SPD that feels otherwise. The Chancellor expected that within the coalition it will be necessary to “have it out” with the SPD on Eastern policy in general and that this will be done over the next two weeks. Under Secretary Rostow assured the Chancellor of US support for German efforts to improve understanding with the USSR and with the Eastern European countries. He said that we are quite willing to see the German side go ahead with talks with the Soviets as initiated by Brandt and Tsarapkin. Rostow made clear that we are now quite satisfied that there is no difference of view between US and the Federal Govt on the handling of the Sov memorandum concerning Berlin. The Chancellor, while making clear that real trouble was to be expected in the coalition concerning Eastern policy, stressed that he did not wish us to think that it would cause a real coalition crisis.

2. NPT—Still in the context of differences between the SPD and the CDU/CSU, the Chancellor turned to the subject of NPT. He said that the treaty still presents problems. Rostow commented in this connection that it was a good letter which Brandt had just sent to the Secretary on the subject.³ The Chancellor, after consulting with the interpreter said that he thought the letter was “a little softly formulated.” He suggested that this latest letter should be read in the context of Brandt’s earlier letter to the Secretary concerning the NPT.⁴

3. Relations with France—The Chancellor said that de Gaulle obviously poses a very serious problem for him. He had heard that concern may exist in the US about the possibility of some secret understanding between France and Germany. The Chancellor could assure us that this was not the case. He noted that a recent public opinion poll showed that 75 percent of the Germans consider the German alliance with the United States as the most important element of German foreign policy. The Chancellor said that he has explained to de Gaulle in the past and will do so again that by pursuing a strong anti-American line de Gaulle is only antagonizing German opinion against France. The Chancellor added that it is nevertheless of the utmost importance for a positive German-French relationship to be preserved. If new antagonism again arises after this “second effort” to overcome it (the Chancellor was presumably referring to Adenauer’s efforts and his own) this would be a most grave development for the two countries and for Europe. Kiesinger thought that de Gaulle too understood this point. On the question of UK-EC entry, the Chancellor repeated his well-known views that de Gaulle could not be forced to change his opinion. Under Secretary Rostow told the Chancellor that the United States fully understood the importance of the French-German relationship. He said that the last thing which we wanted was to force Germany into any kind of choice between Paris and Washington. This telegram was not cleared with the Under Secretary.

McGhee

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 14. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Berlin for McGhee.
2. The Embassy reported on the portion of the talk dealing with balance-of-payments issues in telegram 8265 from Bonn, February 12. (Ibid.)
3. Dated February 9; the letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Bonn in telegram 113607, February 10. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–6)
4. Apparent reference to Brandt’s letter of Oct 13. A copy is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 14.