244. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Soviet Interest in Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Alfred Puhan, Director of German Affairs
- Governing Mayor of Berlin Klaus Schuetz
- FRG Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
- FRG Minister Georg von Lilienfeld
- FRG Counselor of Embassy Berndt von Staden
After an exchange of amenities, the Secretary raised the question of current Soviet interest in the status of Berlin.
Schuetz said he believed the Soviets were not really interested in changing the status of Berlin. They looked at Ulbricht and his efforts to get a new constitution which might want to do away with the vestiges of World War II. There were other possible explanations of current Soviet interest in Berlin. Schuetz saw a fear on the part of the Soviets that Schuetz coming to Berlin, keeping in mind his past job in the Bonn government, signified an effort by the FRG to change the status of Berlin. In other words, in Soviet minds there was concern that the FRG was introducing new salami tactics in changing the status of Berlin. He saw in the Soviet Memorandum2 a warning rather than a new policy. He anticipated no crisis in Berlin. The Mayor asked if there was any evidence available to the Secretary pointing to a possible crisis over Berlin.
The Secretary said there was nothing of substance. Our Watch Committee had found no indicators. The Secretary could imagine that seen through the eyes of a Russian General, Berlin might appear to be a tempting and vulnerable object. He reminded the Mayor that he had pointed out to Gromyko in 1961 that Berlin was no more vulnerable than New York because of our presence there.3
Schuetz agreed, and added that while there appeared to be no evidence for any crisis, one would have to be watchful.
The Secretary asked how the Mayor interpreted the Soviet action in addressing themselves to the Germans alone on the question of Berlin.
Schuetz said this was puzzling since the Soviets must know that the Germans would inform the Americans as well as the British and French. He mentioned in this connection that Abrasimov had spoken to him recently of international obligations regarding Berlin which could only mean all of Berlin.
The Secretary referred to remarks he made to Foreign Minister Brandt in Brussels4 on this subject which had been interpreted as being rather negative. He assured Schuetz that he did not mean to be negative, but that out of his first 1–1/2 years of experience as Secretary of State with a Berlin crisis he only wanted to warn his colleague of the explosive nature of this problem. He said it was extremely important that all, the three Western Powers, as well as Bonn and Berlin stay very close on this.
Schuetz agreed that this was necessary and that as far as Berlin was concerned he would make sure that this was done.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on February 7. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. The source text is marked “Part I of V.” Schuetz also met with Vice President Humphrey and had a non-substantive talk with President Johnson. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., POL 7 GER W.↩
- For text of the January 29 Soviet note, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 984–986.↩
- Reference is presumably to 1961 discussions in New York; memoranda of their conversations are in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, pp. 431–433, 439–441, and 456–461.↩
- Reported in telegram Secto 16 from Brussels, December 13. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 242)↩