Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

242. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, December 20, 1967, 1230Z.

6447. NATUS/BUSEC/DISTO. Subj: Meeting with Kiesinger—NPT. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday evening for a final tour d’horizon prior to my departure later in the week for Washington. Several subjects were discussed.² The following concerns NPT.

1. The Chancellor said that he greatly appreciated the President’s “friendly” letter of Dec. 11,³ in response to his own letter of Dec. 8,⁴ and the assurance that the President had given him regarding the NPT. He was concerned, however, about one sentence to the effect that the NPT must not hamper the free flow of nuclear materials “between nations who enter into the treaty and carry out its obligations in good faith.” Since it was a fundamental German aim to preserve the European Community through EURATOM, he hoped that this did not mean that France would, as a non-signatory, be excluded. I told the Chancellor that I was confident that the President’s statement had not been intended to exclude France, which as a nuclear power would have a special position under the treaty. I pointed out, however, that the Swedish draft and, indeed, an earlier German draft, had language which would have excluded even the nuclear powers from nuclear imports—if they did not submit to IAEA inspection. We would not desire to interrupt supplies to France under our present EURATOM arrangements. We would, however, not be willing to revert to a purely bilateral arrangement with France.

2. The Chancellor expressed another concern about NPT. He quoted from a statement that Amb Foster had made in Geneva on Dec. 15 to the effect that the best way to overcome the present impasse on Article III was perhaps to negotiate with the Soviets in the same way that we had successfully negotiated Articles I and II.⁵ The Chancellor reminded me that the principal German concern over the NPT in the early days derived from the fact that we had negotiated Articles I and II before consulting Germany and our other Allies. He hoped that this was not what Foster had in mind. I stated that I felt sure it was not. I quoted from the results of Foster’s last meeting with Roshchin on Dec. 15, in which he had expressed to Roshchin the firm view that Article III could be based on nothing less than the US draft of Nov. 2—which the Chancellor knew had been supported by our Allies in the NAC meeting of Dec. 6. It was my understanding that, in comparing Article III with Articles I and II, Foster merely argued that, in Article III, we should deal with “the heart of the matter” and “avoid politically unacceptable labels” (such as IAEA safeguards), and had no intention to imply that we should not continue close consulations with our Allies.

3. The Chancellor, who apparently had heard of our adverse reaction to the German aide-mémoire of Nov. 20,⁶ said that he wanted to be very clear that the Germans would not make proposals with respect to the NPT for purely tactical reasons. It was far too serious a matter. He seemed to be admitting that this had been done in the past and apologizing for it. The German NPT proposals had, through the intervention of technicians, often been uncoordinated and misleading. In response to my query, he confirmed that he considered that his own letter to the President of Dec. 8 superseded the aide-mémoire. Germany was now concerned only with the issues of (A) verification, (B) preservation of the European nuclear community, (C) duration and (D) security from nuclear blackmail. I advised the Chancellor of the additional results of the Foster and Roshchin meeting Dec. 15 on the question of safeguards, duration and security issues.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Geneva, USNATO, USUN, Paris, London, Brussels, Rome, and Moscow.
2. McGhee reported on the other portions of his conversation with Kiesinger in telegram 6496 from Bonn, December 20. (Ibid.)
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Document 222.
4. Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of States Correspondence, Germany)
5. For text of the U.S. proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Document 216.
6. Not found.