Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

241. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Brussels, December 13, 1967, 1630Z.

1020. Secto 024. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting: Quadripartite dinner.

1. Brandt opened meeting by suggesting discussion of Soviet note to the Four,² and of the “inner” German situation (FRG-GDR relations). On the Soviet note Brandt said he was not alarmed since the Soviets often operate at two levels. Thus when they fear attack from inside their own camp they build up a smoke-screen. He believed the note was connected with Gromyko’s recent visit to Warsaw and GDR Foreign Minister Winzer’s visit to Belgrade, Soviets wanted to remove suspicion of Allies as to what was involved in Brandt/Tsarapkin talks. The note was also probably intended to influence attitude within the FRG.

2. For his part, Brandt believed talks with Soviets should continue without publicity to see what they mean. Soviet note should not be left unanswered. The FRG will give Soviets a short reply rejecting allegation against his government, but will also pick up last part where the Soviets seem to offer openings for further talks. Brandt believed Soviet allegations should also be rejected as soon as possible by British, US and French. He said replies need not be identical.

3. The Secretary referred to press reports concerning heavy Soviet pressure to avoid reestablishment of Yugoslav/FRG relations. He said we were prepared to reply briefly and offered to provide a draft for consideration. Foreign Minister Brown had no comment, but Mulley on British side agreed answer was called for. He wondered why Soviets sent note; he suggested usual coordination in Bonn would be best. Couve said he had not studied the Soviet communication nor had he discussed it. He did not know whether answer should be made or not. He agreed matter could be discussed in Bonn. Replies did not have to be identical since it is more difficult to get agreed text and we could spend weeks and weeks on that task. Secretary thought notes of Three Powers should be as close to identical as possible and prepared as promptly as possible. It was finally agreed question of sending response to Soviet statement would be coordinated in Ambassadorial Group in Bonn.

4. Brandt mentioned recent conference of FRG Chiefs of Mission from Eastern Europe. He said FRG was making some progress in the trade and cultural fields and some even in the political field. The next step is to resume relations with Yugoslavia. He pointed to the coincidence of Soviet statements attacking the FRG and the establishment of relations with Romania earlier this year, the agreement on trade missions in Prague in the summer, and now when the Soviets know Yugoslavia may be next. He said that up to now Kiesinger had had problems with the CDU on Yugoslavia, but now there will be no objection to negotiations. As a matter of fact, most of the problems have already been discussed informally.

5. Brandt said Tsarapkin had originally insisted on renunciation of force agreement between FRG and GDR as condition for progress in talks. Situation had changed at November 21 meeting. Tsarapkin now foresees bilateral between FRG and USSR which would be open to other socialist states, including the GDR, on basis of equality of treatment. Tsarapkin had also queried Brandt on Kiesinger statement that talks would not lead to much. Brandt reminded Tsarapkin that Chancellor Kiesin-ger’s second letter to Stoph had not been answered. In the letter, Kiesin-ger had offered renunciation of force to East Germans. Brandt agreed the conditions for each party to these agreements should be equal but that the circumstances of each might differ. According to Brandt, Tsarapkin confirmed that it was not necessary for the FRG to recognize the GDR. In discussing framework of an agreement, the Soviets threw in every demand they have had against the FRG except issue of FRG membership in NATO. Tsarapkin was specifically interested in assurances on inviolability of frontiers (FRG-GDR), Oder-Neisse Line, Munich agreement, non-interference by the FRG in West Berlin, renunciation of nuclears and suppression of Nazism.

6. Tsarapkin said: (A) The Potsdam Agreement is the basis for relations of the USSR and Germany and the Three Powers; (B) Articles 53 and 57 of the UN Charter are still valid; (C) Referred to the WEU of 1954 and the Settlement Convention.³

7. Brandt said the FRG had not thoroughly studied the implications of the Soviet approach. Meanwhile Duckwitz will feel out Soviet intentions shortly with Tsarapkin. Brandt had impression that Soviets are now interested in a bilateral declaration. Once agreement is reached thereon it would be open to the other socialist states on an equal basis. The FRG and Soviets are still far apart but Brandt saw renunciation of force as formula for bilateral exchange of views which would lead to reduction of tensions.

8. Brandt stressed that to be successful, discussions with Tsarapkin must be held quietly but if there were new developments or information the Three Powers would be informed through their Bonn Ambassadors. Such information should be closely held.

9. Secretary asked whether anything was said by Soviets about special status of Berlin. Brandt replied question was not discussed but only mentioned. Secretary asked for Brandt’s reactions to points required by Tsarapkin for a renunciation of force agreement. Brandt was of the opinion that renunciation of force was a heading, under which many issues would be considered.

10. There ensued an exchange between Brown, Brandt and Couve as to the meaning of a renunciation of force agreement, the main thrust of which, as summarized by Brown, was that the FRG was being asked for a lot for the privilege of renouncing force.

11. Brandt, in response to the Secretary’s question, confirmed that in his opinion the Soviets did not expect the FRG to leave NATO. After reviewing with Brandt the origin of the Brandt/Tsarapkin talks the Secretary expressed his concern that FRG efforts might lead to further Berlin problems. He recalled that if we had gone all the way on accepting existing frontiers, etc. in 1958–62 we might not have had a Berlin crisis. The Secretary was especially concerned lest anything happen that would cause another crisis in Berlin. He said we certainly cannot say no to these talks but we should know where we are going. He recalled that when the question of reopening the reunification question arose two or three years ago the FRG was unwilling to talk about the somewhat unpleasant things that go with it. He wanted to be sure that the Four would be there together if trouble occurred. It was inevitable that unpleasant issues would arise. It was possible the Soviets wanted to improve relations but the case to date is not persuasive. On the other hand they may be returning to the issue of Berlin and insist on changes in the status of the city. To Brandt’s query as to whether he had any evidence of such an oncoming crisis, the Secretary replied in the negative.

12. The Secretary said that if the frontiers of the GDR were frozen and renunciation of force agreement was signed, reunification might be considered finished. In reply, Brandt sought to reassure the Secretary that little new was being done, indicating FRG had already undertaken not to use force, and that he would not sacrifice the interests of Berlin.

13. Couve felt that except for (1) boundary between East and West Germany; (2) Oder-Neisse Line; (3) Berlin’s special status and (4) nuclear weapons the Three Powers had no concerns. The boundary and Oder-Neisse questions were not important and the nuclear issue is not relevant for the Three Powers. He was skeptical on outcome of the negotiations but believed them to be a good thing even if they led to nothing concrete.

14. Brandt gave assurances on protecting Allied prerogatives, pointing to FRG refusal to negotiate with the Soviets for Aeroflot use of the Berlin corridors.

15. Brown wondered whether you can protect the Berlin situation if you comply with Soviet demands. Brandt replied that he was not speaking of what the FRG would do but what the Soviets would want. The question is, would the Allies trust him to do what they had already done. He was not asking for permission but informing them and asking for their confidence.

16. The Secretary said there was no problem of giving our confidence but a problem of transferring to the FRG in the dark the rights of the US. We must stay very close when Allied rights are involved. He found the Soviet approach of the FRG somewhat objectionable. Should not the FRG consider some points on its side which should be involved in a renunciation of force agreement? If the Soviets really take seriously a renunciation of force, Soviet forces could go home and there could be a normal movement of people.

17. Brown wondered whether a mutual renunciation of force agreement could not be widened out in such a way as to help with the British BAOR offset problem. Brandt said the mutual withdrawal of troops was another problem and a time may come to take it up in the future. He considered his renunciation of force agreement similar to Brown’s friendship treaty. Brown said that the friendship treaty and other proposed arrangements were dead and he wondered why the Soviets were switching their attentions to the FRG. Brown said the Soviets were picking a fight on every front. He referred to difficulties with them over the Brooke case,⁴ and mentioned particularly fact that KGB had increased its activity in the UK.

18. At the end of the pre-dinner session, it was generally agreed that the FRG would go ahead with talks with the Soviets, but would proceed carefully and keep the Three Powers informed when their interests were involved.

19. Governing Mayor Schuetz joined the Foreign Ministers at dinner and made a report on the situation in Berlin. He said things were not so bad as some people thought. The student situation was better and he had been talking to West German businessmen, British businessmen and French businessmen to get them interested in the city. He would also be talking to American businessmen. He saw no signs of an oncoming crisis of any kind in the city. He was pessimistic on passes for this year but hopeful for 1968.

20. At the conclusion of the meeting the decision was made to issue no statement or declaration. Agreement was, however, reached on a common statement to be used for press background briefing, which being repeated separately.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,NATO 3 BEL (BR). Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. Dated December 8; for text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 972–977.
3. For text, see ibid., pp. 430–431.
4. Reference is to the 1965 sentencing of British citizen Gerald Brooke to 5 years in prison for “anti-Soviet activities.” Wilson brought up the issue without a successful resolution during his January 22–24 visit to the Soviet Union.