Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

15. Letter From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard¹

Washington, March 4, 1964.

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Ambassador McGhee had told me of his recent meetings with you.² I want to tell you how grateful I am for your thoughtfulness and candor in your discussions with him. As I mentioned at the Ranch,³ the Ambassador has my fullest confidence, support and trust, and your use of him as a channel of communication with me, I feel, is advantageous to both of us.

In this spirit, Mr. Chancellor, I have asked Ambassador McGhee to deliver to you this letter giving you my thinking on some of the problems currently concerning us here in Washington.

At the outset, may I say how much I appreciate your continuing personal efforts for achieving an ever-closer relationship between a more cohesive Europe and the United States. As you know from our talks last December, we in the United States are following with sympathetic interest the efforts for strengthening European unity, and it is our sincerest hope that there will be a close identity of views between us all as we move into the very important Kennedy Round.

Among the more urgent issues occupying our attention these last weeks are Cyprus, Viet-Nam and Cuba.

I personally was pleased with the prompt attention you gave the question of possible German participation in the proposed peace-keeping operation on the embattled island of Cyprus.⁴ Although our original peace plan has been set aside, we continue to believe, as we have from the outset, that in the first instance peace must be restored to the island. This is not only necessary for humanitarian reasons; it is an essential prerequisite for a political solution. The issue is now before the Security Council and we are hoping for constructive action there. Events, however, continue to move rapidly and I know we can count on your constructive support in dealing with this grave problem which involves three of our NATO allies.

The problem in Viet-Nam remains difficult. We are firmly committed to assist the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam in maintaining their independence and freedom against externally directed and supported subversion and aggression. We believe this struggle can be won and that the new Government of South Viet-Nam under General Nguyen Khanh is capable of bringing this about. Clearly the fight is uphill and the situation serious. And it is for these very reasons we consider proposals for neutralization unfortunate and even harmful. They can serve only to create doubts among the Vietnamese people about the determination of the Free World to help them repel the Communist aggressors. I hope therefore that you and your Government will find ways and means to demonstrate your support for the Government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in their struggle against Communist aggression.

In connection with Cuba, I want to express my personal gratitude for the cooperation we have been receiving from the Federal Republic in limiting Castro’s access to those Free World commodities which are so important to his economy. Given the nature of this continuing and complex problem, we will be looking to you and your Government for further assistance in attempting to make clear to our other NATO partners that increased trade and transportation ties with Castro’s Cuba, as well as governmental guarantees for export and insurance credits for that regime, not only jeopardize our efforts to reduce the Cuban-Communist threat to Latin America; they also undercut our broader purpose of achieving an orderly and progressive development in Latin America.

In this connection, let me say how pleased we were to learn that the Federal Republic and France were considering enlarging their economic assistance to Latin America. This is a constructive gesture, and I hope we can so coordinate our programs that our combined contributions will make for a maximum effort there. In this connection, it has occurred to us that perhaps the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD might provide a useful mechanism for this purpose.

As for aid to the developing nations, I was glad to learn of the Federal Republic’s increased contributions during 1963. I hope this contribution can be expanded in 1964. It is increasingly clear that such help is urgently needed for stabilization and growth in the developing areas, which, in turn, affect the Free World’s political and economic interests.

At Geneva, where the resumed Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference has been meeting since January, there has been little significant progress thus far. But I do not feel there is any reason for pessimism or despair. On the contrary, I hope and think it likely that during the next months the Soviet Union will find it in its own self-interest to negotiate seriously on the basis of the proposals I set before the Conference on January 21. I firmly believe the proposals I made can lead to a reduction in tensions, and hope that the German Government will not only support our position but will also have additional proposals to suggest. In any event, we intend to continue to consult closely with you as we try to move forward in this very important area so vital to the security and political objectives of our countries. For there is no doubt in my mind, Mr. Chancellor, that, in the last analysis, a slowing down in the arms race is more likely to help us achieve a free and reunified Germany, than an uncontrolled arms competition which strengthens those elements in Eastern Europe determined to resist change and perpetuate the present division of your country.

Before closing, I should tell you also that I have had very much in mind our exchange of views at the Ranch on defense matters. I particularly appreciated your clear understanding of the importance to the United States—in adhering to its commitment to maintain six divisions in Germany as long as needed—of continued offset purchases of military equipment by the Federal Republic. This arrangement clearly is beneficial to both countries, and, without question, should continue as long as needed. It is a matter of major importance to both our Governments that offset arrangements produce German military orders and payments to the United States fully equal to the annual levels of United States dollar defense expenditures of benefit to the Federal Republic’s balance of payments. I have been assured by my staff that discussions between our respective defense organizations for future military equipment procurement will be resumed during the next weeks. I also understand from Secretary McNamara that he will be meeting in May with Minister von Hassel to consider the results of these discussions and conclude agreements which will provide for full offset in orders and payments for the periods of 1963–64 and 1965–66. In this connection, Mr. Chancellor, I would personally appreciate your continuing support in this endeavor which is so important for the military security and financial strength of the Atlantic Community.

Thank you again for your kindnesses to Ambassador McGhee. I very much want to remain in touch with you and hope you will feel free to use Ambassador McGhee for this purpose.

Mrs. Johnson and I often talk about your visit last December which we enjoyed so much, and she joins me in sending personal best wishes to you and Frau Erhard.⁵

Sincerely,⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Germany, Chancellor Erhard, vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.
2. In telegram 2993 from Bonn, February 20, McGhee reported on discussions with Erhard prior to and immediately after talks with de Gaulle. (Ibid., Country File, Germany, Berlin) See also Documents 11 and 12.
3. Reference is to Erhard’s December 28–29 meetings with the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. Documentation on the meetings is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, Documents 248–256.
4. In his February 13 meeting with McGhee, reported in telegram 2885 from Bonn, February 13, Erhard stated: “He himself would have accepted the original proposal” for the employment of German forces. The plan had subsequently been modified. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W)
5. In a March 10 memorandum to the President, Bundy reported that McGhee had delivered this letter and received assurances from the Chancellor that he was “in complete agreement with all the points raised.” Bundy added: “This exercise was a net gain for us in terms of German-American relations generally, and on the specific issues raised.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, vol. 2)
6. Printed from an unsigned copy.