Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 13, 1964, 9 p.m.

2882. (Conversation with Chancellor Erhard) (For Dept: Part I of IV)²

On eve of his departure today for Paris, Chancellor Erhard requested me to call on him for a general review of current problems, in which he ranged for an hour and a half over his forthcoming visit with President de Gaulle, French recognition Communist China, MLF situation, Passierschein problem, and a number of miscellaneous subjects being reported by separate telegrams. I took the opportunity to raise a number of points from our side, as indicated in Part IV.

Meeting with de Gaulle.

1. The Chancellor said that his visit to Paris should be regarded as one of the regular meetings agreed to under the Franco-German Treaty “to maintain contacts.” He could assure me that no change of policy was involved on the part of the German Government (I assumed he meant particularly with respect to Communist China), nor any change in the loyalty and friendship of the German Government toward the United States. Dr. Westrick, who was present, added that the large number of the group accompanying the Chancellor did not signify anything with regard to the importance of the visit, but merely reflected the obligations under the treaty to consult at particular levels.

2. The Chancellor commented that I should not believe everything that the press was saying with regard to the visit. (Although I do not know precisely what he was referring to, it may have been the article in the international edition of The New York Times Feb. 12, to the effect that he was going to Paris in an atmosphere of “improved Franco-German relations” and of “increasing respect” for de Gaulle’s policies. The article also appears to presage a change in policy on the part of Germany towards Communist China.)

3. The Chancellor assured me that he would much prefer to be going to the U.S. than to France. The Germans were in agreement with de Gaulle, he said, on the question of friendship between France and Germany and in all-German and Berlin matters. Looking at it broadly, however, he attached a great deal more significance to his relations with the U.S. and United Kingdom. He expected that de Gaulle would tell him in Paris that he seeks a Europe not controlled by the U.S. He would tell de Gaulle that he does not feel Germany to be controlled by the U.S., but indeed protected by the American Alliance. Referring to the de Gaulle press conference of January 31,³ the Chancellor voiced the opinion that de Gaulle had in fact said nothing new. The Chancellor had been shocked, however, at the hardness of de Gaulle’s attacks against the UK and the U.S., which he construed as being more anti-Anglo-Saxon in their intent than pro-French.

French recognition of Communist China.⁴

1. On the subject of Communist China, the Chancellor said that he felt de Gaulle’s recognition of Peking was a dangerous act, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. (He also had misgivings about de Gaulle’s prospective visits to Latin America and South-East Asia.⁵ He wondered what de Gaulle’s motives were, since he could not increase his economic assistance to these areas without overstraining the French economy. The Chancellor foresaw additional problems that would be created by these visits.)

2. In response to his question about the consequences of French recognition of Communist China, I gave him my own interpretation in terms of (A) its effect on the nations of Southeast Asia and U.S. efforts to check Communist subversion and aggression there, and (B) the disruptive effects in the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of such an important matter not being discussed in the Council. The Chancellor added “not even with the Germans under the Franco-German Treaty,”⁶ and pointed out the adverse effect French recognition would have on the question of recognition of the so-called GDR.

3. He asked what effect, in my view, this act of recognition might have on Chinese-Russian relations. Disclaiming any expert opinion in such matters, I expressed the view that it could be interpreted by the Soviets as an effort on the part of France to exploit the Russian-Chinese split. This was something we had scrupulously avoided doing, since the Russian reaction to such a move might well be to take steps to repair the split. Erhard wondered whether it could not have the opposite effect, i.e. if Western recognition and economic aid were given to Communist China, Khrushchev might consider this to be an attack on him and he might thereby be forced to talk to the West.

4. I gave the Chancellor the background leading up to the break in relations by the Government of the Republic of China with France on February 10, as given in Depcirtel 1479.⁷ The Chancellor expressed regret that the break had not been at French initiative. I pointed out that in the light of the démarche by the French Charge in Taipei, which the Charge himself had interpreted as meaning that France intended to sever its relations with Taipei, the French really had taken the initiative.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to London, Rome, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Moscow, Taipei, and Tokyo.
2. Part III, telegram 2884 from Bonn, February 13, is printed as Document 12. Telegram 2883 from Bonn, February 13, dealing with German-Italian conversations on MLF, labeled as Part II, and telegram 2885 from Bonn, February 13, labeled as Part IV, dealing with Cyprus, Cuba, and the Communist Bloc are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. McGhee commented on these discussions in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 138–139.
3. For text of de Gaulle’s January 31 press conference, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 162–182.
4. France announced its intention to accord diplomatic recognition on January 14.
5. de Gaulle visited Mexico March 16–19 and Latin America September 21–October 15. His East Asian tour took place in August–September 1966.
6. For text of the Franco-German Treaty on Organization and Principles of Cooperation, signed at Paris on January 22, 1963, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 834–838.
7. Circular telegram 1479, February 17, reported that the Chinese Nationalists had decided to sever diplomatic relations with France following French recognition of the People’s Republic of China. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHINAT)