Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 15, 1965, 7 p.m.

2377. Deptel 2196.² Reftel, particularly para 11, prompts me to venture following observations on current and predictable Soviet posture and behavior in wake of Southeast Asian developments:

1) I believe Kosygin went to Hanoi³ fully aware of suspicions we might entertain as to motives for his trip and complications it might introduce into the US-Soviet equation. It was with this in mind that Sovs publicized simultaneously their favorable reaction to President’s suggestion exchange of visits and announcement of Kosygin’s trip; similarly Soviet release of Landerman was timed to make favorable impression on us.⁴

Once in Hanoi, however, Sovs became a victim of DRV plot and Kosygin was genuinely on spot. I tend to believe that Vietnamese them-selves and not Chinese were primarily instigators of action against installations in South Vietnam since while Chinese may reap benefits in long run from episode, at moment Sovs have gained considerable tactical advantage in their struggle for Communist leadership. Vietnamese undoubtedly felt reasonably sure that their militant action could not but work their advantage whether US reacted or not since in either case pressure would have been on Kosygin. In one case, US would have been proved “paper tiger,” in the other case, Kosygin would be faced with a “fish or cut bait” situation. Latter is in fact what happened and Kosygin was probably forced expand original Sov military commitment to DRV.

Moreover, Sov commitment, while perhaps qualitatively the same as before, was forged in fire of conflict and carried with it a psychological entanglement which may in end force the Sovs to face up to fatal retreat or risk of confrontation with US. In other words, the Sovs may well be heading for sort of dilemma always inherent in duality of Sov policy which they have assiduously sought to avoid i.e. ideological considerations which require militancy and national interests which require avoidance of US-Soviet confrontation. Sovs have thus embarked on perilous path and are being propelled by ChiCom pressure and imperatives of developing situation itself perhaps faster and more recklessly than they themselves wish or their own security considerations would dictate. Joint statements following Hanoi and Pyong Yang meetings do not in themselves seriously extend Sov commitment in area but they do provide basis for increased pressure on Sovs to act in event deterioration of situation. Thus there is real danger in development situation and we can only hope that along with deeper commitment Sovs have managed to acquire some means of control over future DRV and North Korean (possibly even ChiCom) behavior.

2) That Sovs are aware of this danger seems reasonably clear from restraint of their message contrasted with militancy of the ChiCom message exchanged on occasion 15th anniversary Sov-Chinese defense treaty (similar contrast marks Sov Feb 9 and ChiCom Feb 13 declarations) as well as from current exercise in which they engaged in effort to assign full blame to US for deterioration US-Soviet relations. Most dramatic evidence of latter was warning to US contained Sov Govt Feb 9 statement which was elaborated subsequently in Korionov’s Pravda article reported Embtel 3236.⁵ This could be simply propaganda ploy in context current Soviet efforts demonstrate militancy to eastern brethren. It could, on other hand be reflection of official Sov assessment and against this possibility we should correct potentially serious miscalculation.

3) I have been giving serious thought to what we might do or say in order to provide clear signal to Sovs that course on which they now embarked is fraught with danger and that they should be under no delusion that bee is on them rather than us if there is to be improvement bilateral US-Sov relations. I would not think much could be done of a salutary nature before March 1; Sovs maneuverability obviously strait jacketed by requirements on them to do nothing which could be interpreted as weakness until March 1 meeting and immediate aftermath safely out of way. For this reason I would think any direct high-level action would be wasted until Sovs are out of their current ideological bind. At some later point, however, we must make clear to Sovs that any serious defeat of US foreign policy objectives in any part of the world would render impossible any substantial improvement in US-Soviet bilateral relations; we recognize this as an imperative for Sovs and they must equally recognize this as a condition for our own policy maneuverability.

4) I do think, however, that even prior to March 1 we should set record straight on the price tag which the Sovs are publicly placing on improvement our bilateral relations. This could probably best be done in upcoming speech by major American spokesman. This is important even if exercise I have referred to above is simply propaganda ploy; it is vital, of course, if Sovs are in fact victims of own propaganda and are being seriously deluded. Major points should in our view be:

A) That US interest in continuing forward progress in bilateral relations recorded during past couple of years has been vigorously reaffirmed by Pres Johnson since election and beginning of new administration;

B) This program, however, has been based on cooperative effort and can only continue on such basis; at present it is Soviet side (not United States) which has taken initiatives which have caused deterioration; and

C) While we have genuine interest in improvement bilateral relations this cannot be at expense of principle or basic interests.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to White House.
2. Dated February 13, it summarized a conversation between Indian Ambassador Nehru and Acting Secretary of State Ball on that day in which the Ambassador read extracts from reports of Brezhnev’s conversation with Indira Gandhi. In paragraph 2 the telegram noted the inability of the Soviet Union to understand U.S. policy since its military actions in Vietnam contrasted with the President’s public statements and that the Vietnam issue was inseparable from the general issue of U.S.-USSR relations. (Ibid.)
3. Kosygin visited Hanoi for several days starting February 6 and was there when U.S. forces carried out a retaliatory airstrike against North Vietnam following the Viet Cong raid on the U.S. base at Pleiku on February 7. For relevant documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, especially Documents 55 and 82.
4. Peter Landerman, who had been sentenced to 3 years on September 25, 1963, for killing a Soviet citizen in an automobile crash, was released on February 4. Documentation on his case is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PS 7–1 US–USSR/LANDERMAN, PETER N.
5. Dated February 13. (Ibid., PPV 7 US–USSR)