Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

88. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–9–65

Washington, January 27, 1965.

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Problem

To estimate developments in Soviet policy over the next year or so.²

Conclusions

A. Foreign policy was not a principal cause of Khrushchev’s downfall. Nor does his removal alter the main factors which have shaped the USSR’s external policies for the last two years. Nevertheless, the end of one-man rule does have important implications for Soviet conduct. A collective leadership tends to be more conservative and less venturesome, though this does not mean inactivity or an inability to make decisions. But we expect that within the formal framework of collectivity a power struggle will develop, and during this phase the chances will probably increase for sharp fluctuations in policy. In any case, the US posture will be an important factor in influencing rival groups. (Paras. 1, 3–6)

B. Tensions in the Communist world will also continue to be among the most important factors in the Soviet outlook. Assertion of national self-interest is growing in Eastern Europe, and the new Soviet leaders are even less likely than Khrushchev to cope with it effectively. As the succession period in Soviet politics unfolds, East European nationalism may be moved to bolder ventures. As for Sino-Soviet relations the Soviets have demonstrated anew since Khrushchev’s removal that the conflict is fundamental and will continue to have contradictory consequences for policy. They will try to compete more effectively with Peiping for influence over existing nationalist regimes and revolutionary movements. A sharp crisis in Sino-Soviet relations, on the other hand, could push the USSR into a new search for agreements with the West. (Paras. 8–14)

C. The short-term outlook is for a continuation of the main lines of Khrushchev’s policies. In their relations with the West, we believe that the new Soviet leaders will neither seek direct confrontations nor be able to make significant concessions on major issues. The underdeveloped areas will remain the main arenas for the Soviets in the double contest against the West and China, and they will pursue an anti-Western policy in Africa and the Middle East with special vigor. In some cases, such as the Congo, where the risks appear manageable and proxies are available, the new Soviet leaders may be more forceful than Khrushchev in exploiting opportunities. (Paras. 16–21, 24–32, 35)

D. In Latin America, Khrushchev’s fall has probably reinforced Castro’s caution toward bringing on a direct clash with the US. More recently, Havana has implicitly agreed to forego interference in the affairs of the established Communist parties which, in turn, have agreed to undertake propaganda efforts to break down Cuba’s diplomatic isolation and reduce US economic pressures. (Paras. 33–34)

E. The course and outcome of a power struggle could produce important changes in the Khrushchev line over the long term, and perhaps even in the short run. During 1965 pressure on the collective leadership will be mounting as they face important economic and political choices connected with holding the party congress required by statute and presenting the new Five-Year economic plan. These events could become a political catalyst. We think that important pressures in the Soviet scene and the international setting will eventually favor the chances for a new Soviet effort to make the relaxation of tensions with the West the basis of the USSR’s foreign policy. But any such evolution would probably be a long-term process and subject to temporary setbacks and even reversals. (Paras. 22–23)

Discussion

1. Why and how Khrushchev was disposed of is still not completely clear. A consistent element in various Soviet explanations, however, has been a denial that the substance of foreign policy, as distinct from its conduct, was a root cause. Khrushchev was evidently charged with imposing personal decisions or bungling specific operations, but there has been no condemnation of the main lines of his foreign policies. Indeed, the new leadership has from the outset labored to reassure a wide variety of governments that it intends no changes and will honor previous commitments. It does not now appear that Khrushchev was removed from power to open the way for any sweeping alteration of the USSR’s foreign policy.

I. Factors Affecting the Soviet Outlook

2. A year ago we estimated that the various considerations which had led to a reduction of East-West tensions were not merely transitory and would almost certainly continue to determine Soviet policy for some time.³ The fall of Khrushchev of course creates a new situation, but it does not alter the principal factors which have shaped Soviet foreign policy for the last two years. Chief among these are the constraints imposed by the USSR’s unfavorable power relationship with the US. Moreover, the difficulties of the Soviet economy, the clash with Communist China, and assertiveness in Eastern Europe are problems inherent in the development of the USSR since Stalin’s death. We believe that Khrushchev’s successors recognize that these problems cannot be resolved merely by a change in leadership.

3. Internal Politics. During the next months and perhaps for a few years, internal politics are likely to influence the formulation of foreign policy much more than during the last years of Khrushchev. At present there appears to be a collective leadership with no clearly dominant figure. Moreover, the present leaders have an interest in preventing the rise of another Khrushchev and in consolidating their own positions. They are likely to be careful to avoid arousing the suspicions of their colleagues, and they may even attempt to create political and institutional barriers against one-man rule. A true collective leadership, however, is probably not durable. Party tradition is against it; the inherent tension between the party and government machineries is against it; the absence of systemic checks on power is against it; the simple need for a point of authority to resolve disputes and provide decisions is against it. Thus collective rule will probably become the formal framework for a power struggle.

4. Such a struggle is unpredictable in its course, its duration, and its outcome. It could lead in a straight line to the eventual emergence of a single ruler with powers approximating those which Khrushchev amassed. It could pass through cycles in which factions or individuals gain strength but cannot preserve it. But it is also possible that, if stalemate persists, the leaders ultimately will develop rules which formalize and perpetuate a distribution of power among various top positions. Until it is resolved, however, this situation provides an element of uncertainty in foreign as well as domestic affairs.

5. While clean distinctions cannot be drawn, periods of relatively stable collectivity and periods of intense struggle probably have different consequences for foreign policy. It is already clear that collectively need not mean diplomatic paralysis; the new leaders have displayed considerable activity and have shown themselves able to make several tactical choices. In general, however, during a period of stable collectivity each member of the group will probably tend to avoid sponsoring major initiatives which could cost him supporters and position. Thus the outlook in such a period is for limited undertakings and gradual changes. The pressure of the group probably reduces the chances of a major crisis produced by aggressive Soviet action, but in the same way it also sets a limit on movement in the opposite direction.

6. When the struggle for power is in its more active phases, however, individuals will tend to seek support by gathering political issues into a factional platform. This kind of struggle tends to create a conservative-radical rivalry, albeit with frequent inconsistencies. There will be a temptation to use foreign as well as internal issues in the contest, much as Khrushchev did during his own rise to power. Moreover, the necessity of making foreign policy decisions in response to new situations could also aggravate or even provoke the contest for leadership. In these circumstances, the chances for important changes in policy will increase. It is difficult to foresee what specific issues might be drawn into the conflict, but in general the issues are likely to arise in terms of what risks the USSR should accept or what price it must pay to achieve its objectives. In any event, whether the issues involve tactics or broader strategies, the US posture, posing alternatives to the contending factions, will inevitably play an important role at this stage.

7. Economic Problems. The concern of the new leadership with economic problems has been quite apparent in their first pronouncements and actions.⁴ As far as the effect of economic problems on foreign policy is concerned, the growth of defense spending and its impact on other sectors of the economy remains one of the principal long-term issues. An attempt to reduce defense expenditures, or even to check their growth, calls for an international atmosphere in which such an effort can be justified. Moreover, efforts to restore economic growth rates, modernize and re-equip Soviet industry, and improve the agricultural situation, depend in part on purchasing equipment and technology from advanced industrial countries on favorable credit terms. This too calls for an appropriate international atmosphere. In sum, the nature of Soviet economic problems puts some check on an aggressive foreign policy, particularly in Europe. But it is not a factor which strongly impels the USSR toward a broad and genuine improvement in relations with the West or inhibits Moscow in its exploitation of opportunities in the underdeveloped areas.

8. The China Problem. One of the first consequences of Khrushchev’s overthrow was the postponement of a showdown with Peiping. Formal contacts with the Chinese party were re-established. The result, however, has been to show that the conflict is fundamental, that the role of personalities is secondary, and that freedom of maneuver is limited on both sides. Peiping’s terms are virtually unconditional surrender; nothing short of a major reorientation of Soviet policies is likely to placate the present Chinese leaders. There may still be some Soviets who would be willing to make concessions to bring the Chinese challenge under control, but it is almost certain that no member of the political elite who came forward with a program to meet Chinese demands could escape damaging charges of appeasement. The conflict with China will continue, though it may now vary more in intensity and tactical maneuvering.

9. This conflict will continue to have contradictory consequences for Soviet policy. On the one hand, it is clear that the Soviets are not going to compete with China by adopting the extreme revolutionary militancy which Peiping advocates against the US. On the other hand, Chinese activity in the African and Asian areas calls forth competitive Soviet efforts to gain greater influence over existing regimes and revolutionary movements.

10. The Soviets will try to maintain the concept of an international Communist movement, but they probably have little hope of reconstituting it as a cohesive united force. The Chinese challenge in the international Communist movement is a factor in continuing Soviet reluctance to confront the growing nationalism of Eastern Europe or to discipline Castro. In addition, Soviet loss of control over the Communist parties of Japan and Indonesia probably leads to a more conciliatory attitude toward the governments of those countries. Occasionally, the Soviet effort to make a record against Chinese attacks leads to verbal ugliness toward the West or diplomatic maneuvers such as the recent endorsement of Peiping’s proposal for a world conference to ban nuclear weapons. But a sharp crisis on the Sino-Soviet front could be an important factor in moving the Soviets to improve relations with the West, or even to find parallel interests for an agreement with the Western powers.

11. Eastern Europe. The increasingly complicated environment in which Soviet policy must operate was illustrated by the diverse and often hostile reaction among foreign Communists to Khrushchev’s dismissal. This change from obedient compliance to reactions reflecting independent self-interest has its most important consequences in Eastern Europe. Those leaders in Eastern Europe who criticized Soviet methods and credited Khrushchev for his accomplishments have gained stature in their own parties. Moreover, a clamor for policy reassurances had to be quickly satisfied, and the refusal of many Communist leaders to accept the Soviet version of events in Moscow may have cut short an incipient campaign of de-Khrushchevization in the USSR. All this served to confirm the trends toward national autonomy in international communism.

12. If Khrushchev could not control or divert the revival of national consciousness and independent interests in Eastern Europe, his successors are even less likely to, because of their own internal weaknesses and lesser prestige. There are no indications that the new Soviet leaders mean to try to reimpose a strict authority, and the East European parties do not appear to expect such a turn. Recognizing Khrushchev’s failures to cope with the situation through sporadic and sometimes heavy-handed interventions, the new Soviet leaders will probably accommodate themselves to a good deal of change, trying the while to shape this change in a way which preserves their most important interests.

13. Last year we estimated that Soviet policy could probably accept such an accommodation, provided that the Eastern European regimes did not transgress the limits of remaining avowedly Communist and retaining at least formal membership in the Warsaw Pact. But we also estimated that a succession crisis in Soviet politics would pose a particular threat to stability in Eastern Europe.⁵

14. We continue to believe that, as the succession period unfolds. East European nationalism may be moved to bolder ventures. Rumania’s attitude toward the Warsaw Pact, for example, confronts the Soviet leaders with a critical situation in their own alliance. These circumstances add to the inhibitions against abrupt shifts in general Soviet foreign policy. Meanwhile, a solid front on foreign policy issues will probably become increasingly difficult to achieve, especially on moves which would raise tensions in Europe and run counter to East European desires for better relations with the West. From time to time, the USSR may forego opportunities for improved relations with the West in order to avoid encouraging similar moves in Eastern Europe.

15. The Non-Communist World. The various constraints on Soviet policy discussed above are offset to some extent by the increasing fluidity of the international scene. In the West, the continuing problems of the NATO alliance provide both opportunities and challenges to the USSR. Like Khrushchev, the new Soviet leaders probably see greater room and greater need for diplomatic maneuver, now that important Western elections have been held. They almost certainly are searching for an effective way to exploit the independent policies of de Gaulle. In the underdeveloped areas, changing times and conditions also offer chances for important gains in the double competition with the West and with China. Moreover, the increasing instability in many areas of the world can create unexpected situations forcing the Soviets into new modes of operation and into new lines of policy. The external situation therefore continues to draw Soviet policy into action and tactical maneuver wherever it can be applied.

II. The Outlook for Soviet Policy

16. As the new Soviet leaders survey their general situation, they are likely to recognize that the room for major substantive change is limited. Compared with the situation after Stalin’s death, the USSR now has a global range of contacts, commitments, and responsibilities. The course of Soviet policy, especially since the Cuban missile crisis, has been not merely the personal predilection of Khrushchev but a considered, though sometimes erratic, effort to cope with accumulated problems and pressures. Changes in the leadership could produce important changes in policy, but we think that, at least in the short run, the outlook is for a continuation of the main lines of Khrushchev’s policies, with modifications confined to matters of emphasis and tactical conduct.

17. We doubt that the new leaders see the question of peace and war much differently than Khrushchev did after the Cuban crisis. We think they appreciate that their unfavorable power relationship with the US argues against a policy of confrontation, and they are not likely to seek open challenges carrying high risks of war with the West. They probably will try to keep open the lines of contact and exchange with the US and continue with small bilateral agreements. At the same time, the new leaders may feel that they are somewhat on the defensive after the overthrow of Khrushchev, and that the West may be tempted to take advantage of the change in regime and the potential instability of collective leadership. Moreover, they may be dubious about the benefits of Khrushchev’s more conciliatory attitude toward the US. Such feelings, together with the built-in inhibitions against experimentation in a collective leadership, will tend to limit the chances of concessions to the US and the West. There will probably be much less talk about the relaxation of tension already achieved or the prospects for further progress. The general image of the West will probably be presented in more orthodox Communist terms, and the Khrushchevian preoccupation with US-Soviet relations as the focal point of policy may be diminished. For a time, therefore, US-Soviet relations will probably be somewhat cooler.

18. In the underdeveloped areas, Khrushchev was personally identified with the inception and development of a vigorous challenge to Western interests. Within the past year or so, Khrushchev brought Soviet policy further along with practical and ideological innovations designed to draw nationalist regimes into even closer relations with the USSR. This new approach involves playing down the creation of a Communist movement in most of Africa, especially in countries ruled by a one-party nationalist movement. Instead of competing directly as a rival political force, local Communists are probably now encouraged by the USSR to join and work within the ruling party. As a corollary, doctrinal changes are paving the way to acknowledging such governments as Algeria and the UAR as in some sense “socialist” and therefore acceptable as participants in a loose international grouping centered on the USSR.

19. This approach removes several obstacles which formerly hampered Soviet policy and offers a new basis for extending Moscow’s influence in the new nations. On the other hand, it probably is ideologically disquieting to some Communists, and it has the disadvantages of indirection: success may accrue more to the nationalists, who are at bottom unreliable allies, than to the Soviets. Moreover, it involves a continuation of expensive foreign aid programs, which have drawn criticism upon Khrushchev in the past, and the probability that each new opportunity will call for large new commitments of aid.

20. Despite misgivings of this kind, we believe that the new leaders intend to sustain a vigorous policy in the underdeveloped areas, including the innovations recently introduced under Khrushchev. They almost certainly believe that these areas are the main arenas in the contest with the West as well as with China. Pressure from China alone requires the most effective use of the various propaganda, economic, and political instruments of Soviet policy. In some cases, where the risks appear manageable, the Soviets may exploit revolutionary situations more intensely, especially through proxies as in the Congo. Relations with existing nationalist regimes will be tightened whenever possible, and ideological gaps are likely to be bridged by further modifications in Soviet thinking. Economic and especially military aid will continue to be important tools of Soviet foreign policy.

21. The working out of Soviet policy in the Afro-Asian areas will depend greatly on the more or less accidental occurrences of opportunities and on the actions of the US. Any number of critical situations in Africa, Asia, or even Latin America could develop in such a way that the Soviets would be tempted or feel compelled to take advantage of them despite the possibility of jeopardizing their general relations with the West. Moreover, they might calculate their interests and the attendant risks much differently than Khrushchev. US actions will, therefore, be a major factor in how the Soviets assess their net gain. They will continue to stretch the concept of peaceful coexistence so as to permit them to pursue vehement anti-Western policies in the underdeveloped areas without paying a price in their direct relations with the West. They will study with great care the US reaction to such events as their indirect intervention in the Congo.

22. A special problem facing the new Soviet leaders is the obligation, if party statutes are to be observed, to hold a party congress in 1965. This would be a normal occasion for presenting the outline of a new Five-Year economic plan for 1966–1970. These events might serve as a political catalyst, much as the first congress after Stalin’s death was a turning point in Khrushchev’s career and in post-Stalin policy. Some of the most contentious issues in Soviet policy will be up for decision, and many of these issues touch importantly on those vested interest groups, such as the military or heavy industry cliques, that could become significant elements in a power struggle. The Soviets will be deciding such crucial matters as long-term investment priorities, trends of defense spending, and requirements for Western credits and technological assistance, and all these have some bearing on foreign relations. In addition, the pressures for major change in policies could be heightened by a new crisis in the Sino-Soviet conflict or within the Communist world.

23. Over the longer run, the direction of any major change in foreign policy would depend greatly on the course of an internal struggle, which we cannot predict with any confidence. For example, this struggle could be won by a leader or a faction advocating tougher policies abroad. Or a faction advocating one approach, could gain power only to shift tactics, much as Khrushchev did. We think that important pressures in the Soviet scene and the international setting do favor the chances for a new Soviet effort to make the relaxation of tensions with the West the basis of the USSR’s foreign policy. But any such evolution would probably be a long-term process and subject to temporary setbacks and even reverses.

III. Tactics in the Near Term

24. In Khrushchev’s day, the non-Communist world came to have some fairly clear ideas about the tactical play of Soviet policies. Particularly after the missile crisis of 1962, it could be estimated with some confidence that Khrushchev respected certain levels of risks, whether in Berlin, Cuba, the Congo, Indonesia, or Vietnam. There is no reason to believe that his successors have greatly different notions of how far they can press in critical situations; in fact, their criticism of Khrushchev’s impetuosity suggests that they may be more cautious and less bellicose in a crisis. Yet they are untried, and the change of command in Moscow adds an element of uncertainty to estimating Soviet tactics, whether in ordinary negotiations or in crises.

25. Arms Control. In this field Soviet tactics will probably become less flamboyant with Khrushchev gone, though probably not much different in substance. Current statements continue the emphasis on partial measures and the route of mutual example. The USSR seems to be ready to make annual reductions in its overt defense budget if the US does likewise. Even if such reductions are more apparent than real, they establish a certain atmosphere and point up the possibility that the Soviets may be responsive to other US initiatives of this type.

26. Beyond such unilateral and uncontrolled steps, however, we see only a small chance for major developments while the internal political situation remains uncertain. A reluctance to alienate the military establishment could be an important factor in preventing Soviet concessions. This factor will grow if the political leaders are divided and begin seeking elements of support outside the party apparatus. There may also be an effort to use disarmament negotiations in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, by trying to appear responsive to Chinese proposals and participation. Finally, the USSR’s attitude towards arms control agreements will be affected by developments with respect to nuclear sharing in NATO.

27. Nevertheless, we think that over the longer term economic considerations and political reasons—such as the desire to isolate China—will lead the Soviet Union to consider further arms control agreements. We believe that even in the period of this estimate the Soviets might find one or another of the proposals already under discussion suitable as a next step and might accordingly display some new flexibility in negotiations. In particular, we believe that the proposals for the destruction of bombers and for a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be likely candidates. Thus far, however, there are no indications that the Soviets intend to change their position on inspection or verification of arms control measures.

28. The NATO Area. In the near term, Soviet policy toward NATO is likely to be dominated by the campaign against the various proposals for nuclear sharing in the Western alliance. The Soviets probably recognize that multilateral arrangements are preferable to more direct forms of German access to nuclear weapons and strategic planning; they may regard some sort of multilateral force as the least undesirable of these proposals. But for the Soviets these are at present unimportant details; they regard any form of German participation in the strategic forces of the West as a major challenge to their interests and are bent on preventing it altogether.

29. We expect a vigorous campaign of propaganda, threats, and inducements to inject the USSR into Western counsels. European security proposals are likely to be the heart of Soviet diplomatic efforts to delay or defeat an MLF-type project. The Soviets are likely to give more attention to the British Labor government as a potential partner in discussions on European security. At the same time, direct dealings with Bonn have been toned down while overtures to de Gaulle are being strengthened. The Warsaw Pact will probably be brought in for more attention, and some steps may be taken to create an impression of nuclear countermeasures to the MLF in the eastern alliance. Finally, there could be pressure for East-West negotiations before the West German elections.

30. Inevitably, the USSR’s European policy is limited by its rigid stand on Germany. Yet the MLF effort and its broader political implications and the coming German elections are important challenges to devise new approaches. The new attitude of Bonn toward Eastern Europe is a tempting opportunity to channel German thinking into new experiments in dealing with East Germany and the USSR over reunification. And there is little doubt that the effort to court the West Berlin authorities and to play Berlin against Bonn, Brandt against Erhard, will be continued. Yet Khrushchev’s effort to reactivate German policy by a direct approach to Bonn caused considerable apprehension in East Berlin and gave the Chinese a chance to feed Ulbricht’s latent fears that Moscow would eventually abandon the GDR. The new leaders will probably want to appear beyond suspicion and to reassert the basic principle of a divided Germany. Ulbricht’s demeanor suggests they have already done so. Moreover, the fluid situation in Eastern Europe makes any tampering with the political status quo in Central Europe even more unsettling. The immediate effect of Khrushchev’s fall, therefore, probably has been to narrow Soviet freedom of action on Germany.

31. One possible response to conflicting pressures is to challenge the West in its most vulnerable area, Berlin. On this narrower question the Soviets do have more flexibility than on the broad question of Germany. Thus far the new Soviet leaders have been far from threatening over Berlin and have even hinted that they might scale down their position in negotiations. Brandt’s role as chairman of the SPD and governing mayor of Berlin is a continuing opportunity for Soviet démarches, particularly in an election year. We think, however, that any Soviet activity on Berlin will have little substance, and that the USSR will be maneuvering rather than looking for real progress toward an acceptable German settlement. Nor do we foresee that such activity will occur in an atmosphere of grave crisis.

32. Southeast Asia. One of the more evident shifts in tactics that has already occurred is the Soviet stand on the continuing crisis in Indo-China. The new leaders are trying to play a more active role to discourage the US from broadening the war and to promote negotiations of some kind. This change probably reflects their belief that Khrushchev had left a dangerous situation largely in the hands of Peiping and had perhaps even encouraged the US to be more aggressive by his responses in past incidents. An urgent Soviet motive may also be fear that the DRV and China are pointing for a showdown with the US. Moreover, in the context of playing down the public dispute with China, the Soviets will probably try to regain some influence in Hanoi, hoping to provide a political alternative for any faction in the DRV that opposes complete reliance on Peiping. Depending on their success in this approach and on their estimate of US and Chinese intentions, the Soviets may try to increase their leverage by providing some direct military aid to Hanoi. But we doubt that the Soviets will undertake the military defense of the DRV or run very high risks to protect it.

33. Cuba. This is still a dangerous involvement of Soviet interests in an exposed position, and the USSR still desires to stabilize Cuban-American relations. The Soviets will probably press moderation on both Castro and the US, but Cuban control of the SAM system and the continuation of U-2 flights are the ingredients of a crisis which Castro could provoke at any time. According to Castro’s own account, however, he has given some commitment to the USSR not to use the SAMs against US overflights until other means of terminating them are exhausted, and the new Soviet leaders will probably try to hold him to such a commitment. Castro was reported to have been shaken by the disappearance of Khrushchev, possibly because he has even less confidence in the new Soviet leaders. There have been many indications of frictions between Havana and Moscow, to a large extent because of Soviet reluctance to take on any greater economic commitments. Thus the effect of the change in leadership in Moscow probably is to reinforce Castro’s caution toward bringing on a direct clash with the US.

34. Nevertheless, the USSR has apparently endorsed new tactics, agreed to by Latin American Communists late last year, which call for a more organized propaganda and agitation in Latin America to break down Cuba’s diplomatic isolation and reduce US economic pressures. In addition, Latin American Communists agreed to unite in more active support for the Venezuelan revolution; they also specified Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti as targets for a more militant struggle. They expressed support for Soviet tactics in handling the Chinese and gained an implicit ban on Cuban interference in the affairs of the established Communist parties. These developments suggest an uneasy bargain among the Soviets, Castro and his followers, and the traditional Communist leaders of Latin America. We do not believe that they foreshadow important new Soviet commitments or risks in Latin America, and the tactics pursued by individual parties will continue to be determined primarily by the local situation.

35. Africa and the Middle East. Special mention should be made of Soviet policy toward these areas. The growing political instability which seems certain to prevail throughout most of Africa provides enhanced opportunities to all varieties of radicals, many of whom are not amenable to Soviet control. Exploitation of favorable opportunities for the Soviets will be improved if they can continue to work with Nasser and Ben Bella. The prospects for the USSR in Africa are particularly promising from two standpoints. Over the next several years, it is possible that one or more radical nationalist regimes will of their own accord become largely pro-Soviet. Or it is possible that small cadres of Communists could gain power without relying on Communist mass movements or organized parties; such subversive elements sympathetic to Moscow will probably grow as students trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe return to Africa. In either case, the Soviets would have to assume economic burdens and to grapple with the questions of responsibility for a distant and probably turbulent nation. But the growing appeal of Chinese revolutionary thought and the challenge to the USSR will spur the Soviets to make even more strenuous efforts to cash in on the rise of radical regimes and the wave of anti-Westernism. This policy will be expressed in the UN as well, where the growing alignment of the USSR and the radical Afro-Asians will cause increasing difficulties for the West.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret. A cover sheet noting that the estimate had been prepared by the CIA and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board is not printed.
2. NIE 11–4–65, April 14 1965, estimated main trends in Soviet military policy over the next 6 years. The conclusions are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X.
3. NIE 11–9–64, “Soviet Foreign Policy,” dated 19 February 1964, Secret. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11–9–64 is Document 11.]
4. Our current views on the Soviet economy are contained in NIE 11–5–65, “Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects,” dated 22 January 1965, Secret. [Footnote in the source text. A copy of this NIE is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates.]
5. See NIE 12–64, “Changing Patterns in Eastern Europe,” dated 22 July 1964, Secret. [Footnote in the source text. A copy of this NIE is ibid. The Conclusions section is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Document 7.]