Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

66. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, October 31, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Affairs

There are many controversial issues in the Soviet Union and it seems clear that the Soviet leadership divides in different ways, depending upon the issue concerned. Although most of the leadership appears to have been agreed upon the necessity of dropping Khrushchev, this does not mean that they will hold together on other issues. One of the most important divisions is between what might be called the Stalinists on the one hand and the Revisionists or Modernizers on the other. The Stalinists do not, of course, advocate a complete return to the methods and policies of Stalin but do believe in strict Party control and minimum tampering with the ideology.

Although the new regime will doubtless be at pains to conceal the direction of their policies as long as possible, the few clues we have would appear to indicate that the Stalinists are in the ascendancy. Future developments in Soviet policy will be importantly affected by the success or failure of the efforts of the new leadership to resolve, or at least diminish, their differences with Communist China.

Although the United States and other Western countries can probably not determine the outcome between the contending factions in the Soviet Union, they can, to some extent, at least influence developments. Until the trends of Soviet policy become more clear, it would be advisable for us to keep open the option to the Soviet Union of continuing the broad lines of Khrushchev’s policies toward the West.

One of the most important steps which we could take in this direction would be a serious attempt to develop our trade relations with the Soviet Union to which they appear to attach an exaggerated importance. It is suggested that we be prepared to move promptly after the election in this direction.

It would appear to me that undue attention has been focused upon the personalities of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Although I consider Kosygin the more competent of the two, I do not think that either one is capable of establishing himself as the sole leader, and I suspect that even now other members of the Presidium have more influence in the formulation of policy.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Secret. Initialed by Thompson and Rusk. Copies were also sent to Ball, Tyler, Rostow, and Hughes.