Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

59. Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, October 17, 1964.

[document number not declassified]

IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEV’S DOWNFALL

1. The first public acts of Khrushchev’s successors were to reassure the Soviet people and the world that they have no intention of repudiating fundamental doctrines and policies developed since the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In one sense, this is hardly surprising, for the policies and programs symbolized by de-Stalinization at home and peaceful coexistence abroad represented prudent adjustments to post-Stalin realities in both domestic and foreign affairs. But in a higher political sense, the public expression of fidelity to the “Leninist line worked out at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses,” followed by assurances to the US and other foreign governments that Soviet foreign policy will be unchanged, commit the new leaders to continue the broad policy lines of the Khrushchev era. These pronouncements also serve notice to the Chinese Communists that they should have no illusions that the USSR may now be disposed to abandon or compromise the “principled” positions it has long defended against Peiping’s assaults.

2. The announcements that the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium had “granted” Khrushchev’s request to be relieved of his duties were clearly intended to emphasize that normal constitutional procedures had been scrupulously observed in handling the transfer of authority. This, and the invocation of the party congress lines, suggest that, in the period immediately ahead, the new leaders will concentrate on consolidating their domestic position and refrain from any major foreign initiatives, both in the contest with Peiping and in relations with the West.

3. The key to Moscow’s policies over the longer term, of course, lies in the unanswered question as to what precipitated Khrushchev’s downfall at this time. As in all major turning points in Soviet history, it would be vain to attribute this coup to any single event or issue. Khrushchev unquestionably aroused the resentment and enmity of many powerful and ambitious men during the long and eventful period of his leadership. There must have been many officials in the upper reaches of the Soviet party and administration who strongly believed that some of his policies and innovations were not only misguided but reckless and damaging to the long-range interests and strength of the Soviet state. These officials were obliged to endure the disruptive effects of Khrushchev’s ill-advised ventures in economic policy and organization, many of which were hastily reversed or abandoned. In the foreign policy field, there is no question that some of Khrushchev’s colleagues felt that certain of his major ventures subjected Soviet security to needless risks for highly dubious objectives and that his penchant for bluff and intimidation damaged the nation’s prestige and the credibility of its basic objectives without yielding significant gains.

4. A survey of Khrushchev’s recent conduct of Soviet foreign policy and his strategy in dealing with the Chinese, however, leads us to believe that there were no differences within the leadership on these questions serious enough to have precipitated the move against Khrushchev. This does not mean, of course, that the indictment of Khrushchev’s leadership did not include criticisms of his handling of foreign ventures, such as the Berlin offensive of 1958–62 and the Cuban crisis. But it seems unlikely that charges of failure or ineptitude on specific policies or tactics extended to sharp differences over fundamental objectives of long-established Soviet policies which are deeply rooted in the USSR’s national security and political interests.

5. Khrushchev’s downfall, in our view, was the product of an accumulation of what might be termed personal-political resentments and dissatisfaction with his leadership, combined with a climatic showdown on basic issues of economic planning, management and personnel having a direct bearing on the long-term structure and direction of the Soviet economy and military posture. The strength of these feelings was evident in Pravda’s 17 October denunciation of “subjectivism and drifting in Communist construction, hare-brained scheming, immature bragging and phrase-mongering, commandism,” and intolerable “armchair methods, personal decisions, and disregard for the practical experience of the masses.”

6. The catalyst which appears to have brought these disparate forces and issues to a head was Khrushchev’s attack, culminating in his late September speech at the Kremlin meeting on a new long-term economic plan, on the entrenched economic traditionalism and vested interests which he believed had long frustrated his program of economic reform. This attack, in the eyes of powerful elements in the party and in the industrial and military establishment, threatened to upset the existing balance of influence and resources which these elements, by a kind of tacit agreement, were determined to maintain. As Ambassador Kohler noted in September 1963, a stalemate exists among the rival claimants to Soviet resources. He viewed the Soviet economy as becoming increasingly similar to the American economy in that there is a variety of entrenched interests which compete in the allocation of limited resources. In Kohler’s view, these rival claimants had imposed sharp limitations on any radical departures in economic policy and, particularly, on any substantial diversion of resources to the consumer sectors. In his judgment, Khrushchev at best could only freeze the existing structure of allocations and rely on the annual increments in GNP for investments in his favorite programs, such as the rapid expansion of the chemical industry.

7. In his talks with Secretary Rusk and Undersecretary Harriman in the summer of 1963, Khrushchev indicated that he intended to freeze investments in all sectors of the economy other than chemistry and agriculture. However, by the late summer of 1964, Khrushchev apparently had made the critical decision to [go?] far beyond this strategy and to mount a fundamental attack on traditional economic doctrine and the existing division of resources. The breaking point thus came when, in late September, he made his major bid to break the stalemate and to force through a definitive reorientation and overhaul of the economy in which the “main task” would be to ensure a “more rapid development of the consumers goods industry.” In contrast with this unequivocal demand for preferential development of consumer industries, Khrushchev had assured the Central Committee plenum last February that consumer requirements would continue to bow to defense needs in line with traditional policy. The thrust of the late September speech, however, strongly implied that defense priorities would be downgraded indefinitely under the new long-term plan. Khrushchev also asserted that traditionally defense-oriented heavy industries must increasingly contribute to consumer production. The first concrete manifestation of this new direction appeared in the party-government decree of 5 September which outlined Khrushchev’s program for accelerating poultry production and designated the State Committee for Aviation Technology to organize the necessary production of machines and equipment.

8. In addition to this demand for a major reorientation in economic priorities, Khrushchev may have been planning other far-reaching actions at the Central Committee meeting scheduled for some time in November and at the semi-annual Supreme Soviet session anticipated in December. These may have included important personnel changes in the party and administration. This is an area in which he apparently had temporized for a long period. The large accumulation of “dead wood” at high levels has long been obvious. Khrushchev, moreover, has frequently complained about obstructionists and bureaucrats, although these remarks probably were not aimed at members of the top leadership. Within the party presidium, however, there are a number of aging, sickly, or apparently ineffective members. Fear of being ousted from places of authority and privilege may well have been one of the factors that forged the anti-Khrushchev alliance.

9. If these were, in fact, some of the considerations which precipitated Khrushchev’s downfall, it seems likely that his successors will be inclined to pursue a cautious domestic policy of consolidation and status quo, avoiding any challenge to entrenched interests and the existing balance of internal power and resources. It also seems unlikely that there will be any sharp departures in other areas of domestic policy, such as regime attitude toward the intelligentsia. The new leaders probably will develop their initial gestures to reassure the Soviet people that they need have no fear of any reversion to more repressive policies.

10. It is difficult to see how the changeover in Moscow could produce any basic change in attitude toward China. It is possible that the new leaders, in the initial period of consolidation, may wish to revert to Khrushchev’s pre-1963 policy of temporizing in order to avert a formal schism in the Communist movement. But it seems unlikely, particularly in the aftermath of China’s successful nuclear detonation, that the Peiping leaders would accommodate the Russians on such an option. The new regime probably will find their hands forced by the Chinese and that they will be no more able to temporize than was Khrushchev.

11. The Chinese have not confined their assaults to Khrushchev himself but have denounced his entire “clique.” There is no reason to believe that Brezhnev and Kosygin may be disposed to try to work toward a reconciliation. In his speech in East Germany on 6 October, Brezhnev attacked the “splitting policy of those who—for the sake of their chauvinist aims—try to divide, to undermine the unity of the socialist countries” and he specifically endorsed the “impending international forum of Communists”—presumably a reference to the December preparatory meeting. Kosygin was less direct in his 3 October speech on the 15th anniversary of East Germany, denouncing the “absurd theories of the contemporary left-wing opportunists who advocate the establishment of isolated national economies” and restrict economic contacts between socialist countries.

12. Although it is possible that the new leaders questioned the wisdom of Khrushchev’s moves to bring the conflict with Peiping to a head, it is doubtful that they would be willing to accept the political costs of deferring or abandoning proposals for a preparatory meeting and for a full-scale conference next year. The Pravda article of 17 October stated specifically that “our party, as hitherto, will pursue an active line for the convocation of an international meeting of all Communist parties to discuss topical problems of the struggle for peace … and for the consolidation of the unity of the Communist movement on the immutable principles of proletarian internationalism.” Khrushchev’s successors must expect the Chinese to exploit his downfall as a repudiation of his stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict. [1 line of source text not declassified] sources close to the Chinese government regard Moscow developments as a “big victory” and believe the December meeting “inevitably” will be postponed.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.