51. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Khrushchev Era Ends
TASS announced late today that 70-year-old Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev has been replaced as First Secretary of the CPSU and as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on grounds of age and health.
Move Sudden. All indications suggest that the move was sudden and forced upon Khrushchev. Not only was he divested of his top party and state jobs, but he lost his job on the Presidium of the Party. It is within the realm of possibility that Khrushchev indeed suffered a sudden deterioration in his health for he has evidently been in a less than perfect state of health for some time. Embassy Moscow has reported that the CPSU Presidium insisted that he take his latest vacation and that he severely restrict the number of visitors he received. However, his removal from the CPSU Presidium while the apparently still paralyzed Kozlov stays on suggests that his departure might not have been entirely voluntary.
Possible Reasons For Removal. There have been increasing signs of disenchantment with Khrushchev’s rambunctious, shotgun initiative style of leadership. He himself admitted in August that “some comrades” objected to his revealing the subject of the next Party plenum. Domestically, the precipitating cause may have been Khrushchev’s latest efforts to alter significantly the pattern of resource allocation away from the heavy industry-military complex towards the consumer and agriculture. Pravda on October 2 printed a truncated version of a Khrushchev speech on the subject which suggests that the issues were far from resolved.
Little Immediate Change in Domestic Policy Foreseen. The published statements of both Brezhnev and Kosygin have not revealed any significant [Page 120] divergence from Khrushchev’s views, nor are they like several other Presidium members reputed to be “hard-liners.” This may well be only the preliminary solution. If history repeats itself, the leadership will be preoccupied with further resolving the succession and the direction of policy change will be expressed in further personnel shifts. The reported sacking of Khrushchev’s son-in-law as Editor of Izvestiya, the failure of two close Khrushchev supporters—Shelest and Rashidov—to show up at a recent Moscow reception suggests that such shifts are in the offing. Khrushchev’s position as chairman of the RSFSR Party Bureau will presumably have to be filled. The 1962 bifurcation of the Party into political and economic hierarchies left the Central Committee in a state of uncertainty which will open the way for considerable political maneuvering in the coming weeks.
Foreign Policy Issues. There are no discernible foreign policy issues critical enough, or on which disagreement appeared serious enough, to have served as the motivation for Khrushchev’s ouster. While there may have been dissatisfaction with his China policy, Chinese personal attacks against him probably worked to solidify support in his favor. It is possible that Khrushchev may have been contemplating some radical new proposals on a foreign policy issue, perhaps Germany, but on balance we believe this unlikely.
Implications for Soviet Policy. Initially, at least, the new leadership is likely to be preoccupied with the internal problem of consolidating its own position and relatively cautious about actively engaging in negotiations with the West. Indeed, we have already been in a period of hiatus in East-West negotiations while the Soviets seemed to be waiting out the American election campaign. Moreover, there have been reasons to suppose that some of Khrushchev’s disarmament policies may have had opposition at home, in particular his initiative for a unilateral cut in the size of Soviet forces and an apparent intention to extend the idea of “mutual example” to troop deployments in Europe. Moscow’s refusal at the Geneva disarmament conference even to move on an issue such as the creation of a technical working group on nuclear delivery vehicles may also have reflected a freezing of Soviet disarmament policy (after signs of motion in June) resulting from internal disagreements.
If, as seems likely, Khrushchev’s ouster was primarily based upon conflicts over allocation of economic resources, it would seem that the resultant policies would militate against further Soviet moves on disarmament issues in coming months.
The new leadership is likely to wish to avoid tests of strength with the West at least until after it feels that its internal position is consolidated. We would expect the new regime, even if it may feel that Khrushchev’s policy on the German question was faulty, at least to delay [Page 121] any new crisis over Berlin. Similarly, we doubt that the regime will be prepared to make any early moves on such issues as overflights of Cuba. However, the succession period could generate sudden and unpredictable pressures on the new leadership, and we cannot rule out the possibility either of adventurous action or of some dramatic initiative toward improving relations with the West. Nevertheless, it is more likely that the new leaders will seek to keep things on an even keel rather than risk adding to their existing problems.
Effect on Sino-Soviet Relations. It does not seem likely that Khrushchev’s ouster will effect any basic or longlasting change in Moscow’s posture toward Communist China. There may, however, be a slight and temporary easing of the dispute as Peiping holds its fire to see how the Soviet scene jells, and as the new Soviet leadership also marks time to see if Khrushchev’s removal offers any real prospects for an adjustment with the Chinese. In particular, the Soviets may temporarily call off their push for an international communist conference to condemn the Chinese—a course that has always confronted them with great difficulties and is unsure of success. In any case, the retirement of Khrushchev will be interpreted by the Chinese as a victory for their policies. The new Soviet leadership will have to make clear as quickly as possible to the world communist movement just how it intends to meet the Chinese Communist challenge.
Effect on Eastern Europe. Any change in the Soviet leadership automatically becomes a source of instability in Eastern Europe. The peoples and leaders of these countries will probably adopt a wait and see attitude toward the new rulers. Unless a clear line emanates soon from the Kremlin, dissident elements within Eastern Europe may seek to take advantage of the situation, especially since some satellite leaders, e.g., in Czechoslovakia, have relied heavily on Khrushchev’s blessing to bolster their strength.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, USSR. Confidential. Initialed by Hughes.↩