Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 24, 1964, 11 a.m.

3577. Deptel 3395.² Reply to reftel re prejudice to national security through recently discovered microphone network must, in my opinion, be considered in at least three different categories:

1. Interception of Conversations.

A. Fortunately, secure rooms have been available during entire period of my incumbency. Consequently, I have invariably operated on assumption that conversations or oral exchanges outside these rooms and particularly in my own office were being overheard and/or recorded. In exchanges with staff and with American and foreign visitors or in press conferences I have refrained from any statements which I was not willing for Soviet side to overhear. Indeed, I have frequently made statements deliberately in the hope, if not expectation, that they would be overheard. For example, as to what I thought would happen in the case of the shooting down of an American observer plane over Cuba. Exceptions to this practice have been in case of frequent consultations with my British, French and German colleagues which invariably take place in the secure rooms of my own or their embassies and less frequent conversations with selected colleagues or on sensitive subjects with a few others, notably the Canadian and Australian Ambassadors.

B. The same rule described in (A) has been applied by all members of the staff working on substantive or sensitive questions. I know of no significant slips or violations. However, our security officer is looking into this aspect in greater detail and will be reporting separately.

C. My own discussions on sensitive matters with staff members have been held in a secure room and the same rule has been applied with respect to conversations on such matters between staff members.

Similarly, the rule has been followed that all material to be enciphered and all other material of a classified nature must be dictated in one of the secure rooms or prepared in the form of handwritten drafts. Here too, I know of no slips or violations.

2. Compromise of Telegraphic Traffic.

A. If it is assumed that all outgoing and incoming telegraphic traffic has been known to the Soviet Govt then this would have been more seriously prejudicial to the national security in ways going beyond the compromise of codes and cryptographic techniques.

B. Even knowledge of telegraphic traffic, however, I do not believe would seriously have compromised any of the principal negotiations which have taken place since I arrived in Sept 1962—notably the Cuban crisis, the Test Ban Agreement, the new Cultural Exchange Agreement and the Consular Convention. In most instances (except Cuba, handled semi-publicly) the basic position papers or negotiating positions were transmitted by courier. Outgoing telegraphic traffic consisted principally of factual reports of negotiating sessions, the substance of which was already known to the Soviet side. Incoming traffic was generally in the form of modified or fresh instructions which were the basis of communications to and discussions with the Soviet side within a short period after receipt. I have been unable to recall any specific occasion, however, when the Soviet side seemed to have been forewarned of a new position in advance and to have been able to prepare a counter which gave them a negotiating advantage.

C. The Soviets would have profited particularly from a knowledge of the considerable flow of information telegrams this Embassy receives, not only from the Dept but from other posts throughout the world, particularly those in critical areas, such as Germany, Laos. This is very difficult to evaluate. I personally am somewhat skeptical as to whether Soviet officials have received this kind of information since I can recall no specific instance when Soviet officials seemed to be in possession of really accurate information coming unquestionably from American sources about our activities or intentions. The one occasion on which Khrushchev alleged to have possession of specific info coming from our own communications was about my role in the wide diameter pipe embargo and this was clearly inaccurate, as I reported at the time. However, it is conceivable that there has been some flow of information which has influenced Soviet actions with respect to such critical problems as the situation in Berlin, harassments on the Autobahn and in air corridors, the situation in Laos, the situation in Cuba and their attitude toward the MLF.

3. There is one type of conversation which takes place in the Embassy which may have facilitated KGB counter-intelligence operations. This would be discussions which have taken place from time to time between Emb officers and individual Americans, notably exchange students and professors, regarding the latter’s personal problems and difficulties in the Soviet Union. Generally speaking, such conversations have not taken place in the secure areas and could have provided to the KGB material facilitating their exploitation of the individuals. This aspect will also be gone into in more detail by the Embassy’s security officer.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, BG 16 MOSCOW. Confidential.
2. Dated May 21, it reported that a “damage assessment” was being taken to determine if the microphone network had resulted in any loss to U.S. national security and asked Kohler to prepare an assessment for the period of his Ambassadorship. (Ibid.)