Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

317. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, November 14, 1968, 3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Dobrynin’s agenda for lunch² was quite clear:

• —Vietnam;
• —missile talks.

1. With respect to Vietnam, he was primarily interested in knowing how we were getting on with Saigon. I explained some of Saigon’s difficulties, emphasizing the role of Hanoi, VC, and Paris propaganda. I hit hard on the DMZ and firing upon our reconnaissance planes.³ I told him I was temperately optimistic about the GVN getting to Paris, but could give him no time.

He said he hoped it could be soon. We were losing momentum. He expressed the hope that when they got to Paris they would be able to organize private talks in various pairings.

With respect to Saigon and the NLF, he said that they would not come hat in hand to Thieu begging forgiveness but would negotiate hard on the basis of the population and territory they held, plus their program for the future of the country.

I said the critical matter, in my view, for Saigon and the NLF was to get off together up a back street in Paris and talk about the substance of the matter rather than jockeying publicly for face and position. He agreed.

His final remark of the lunch was as follows: “Off the record, I wish to tell you that we have had as much trouble with Hanoi as you are having with Saigon. The only difference is that your troubles take place in public.”

2. Missile talks. I told him that there might be advantages in opening the missile talks soon; but two things would be required if the President could have a strong case:

• —an atmosphere that made such talks politically possible;
• —clarity about the result.

He picked this up with the confidence of a man who had full instructions.

Dobrynin said that his government felt that it was important not to lose momentum in the missile talks, and it was equally important that we create a good atmosphere for the passage of the Non–Proliferation Treaty. He felt that it would be a great contribution to the future of U.S.–Soviet relations if President Johnson could get these talks started very soon, because it would lay a basis for moving rapidly with the next Administration.

He then turned very professionally to:

• —What are the conditions?
• —What do you want by way of an outcome?

With respect to conditions, I pointed out that the effort had been frustrated by their move into Czechoslovakia. The critical thing for us to know is that there was a clear dated plan for the movement of Soviet troops out of Czechoslovakia.

He asked: Does that mean all troops? If it does, you should know that some troops will remain.

I said that I could not talk for the President in this matter, but my impression was that the troop withdrawal issue had to be clear and Czechoslovakia, in general, quiet. He said he would try to get for me information on the timing of the troop withdrawal schedule, although he added that he thought our intelligence people were probably well informed.

I then said that it was a fact of life that trouble in Berlin would not create a proper atmosphere for moving forward. He said that the Soviet Union did not wish trouble in Berlin. It was Moscow’s impression, however, that Bonn was playing a game of mounting more and more meetings in Berlin as a provocation. Bonn rather hoped that there would be trouble, and this would serve as an excuse for postponing the NPT and obstructing U.S.–Soviet relations. He first said that Bonn was creating “new precedents” in the meetings it mounted in Berlin. When I challenged him on this, he shifted to: They are pushing too many meetings in Berlin in too short a period of time. I said I would check this, but that was not my impression. He ended by saying he would report our feeling about Berlin as an environmental condition.

He then turned to the proposed result of the meeting. He said he had assumed from our previous conversations that a meeting would:

• —exchange technical papers and explain them;
• —leave detailed negotiation for a later time; and
• —issue an agreed set of guiding principles.

He then put this question: Are the principles which I transmitted to you from the Chairman (attached at Tab A) satisfactory?⁴ Are there any clarifications that you wish in those principles? Is there anything you would like to add? He said that his government would, in his view, be glad to exchange views at the Ambassadorial level, via Tommy Thompson in Moscow, or elsewhere, so that President Johnson could have in hand the concrete result he wanted before proceeding to a final decision on a Summit Meeting on missiles. He was sure that his government would negotiate in good faith to try to achieve this result.

I said that I could not tell him whether the President would regard as a sufficient end result a meeting of the kind he described ending up with the publication of the principles as he had transmitted them to us. I told him I would be in touch with the President and let him know.

As we left, he pressed this point hard and asked when I could be back to him with an answer to this question. I said that I could give him no time. It was possible that the President would wish to consult Secretary Rusk, who is out of the country.⁵

He ended the discussion by saying he was sure his government was prepared to move fast on missile talks. He would inform them of the two conditions I had raised concerning the environment for such talks. He urged us to let him know if the “concrete result” we wish to have in hand was satisfactory and, if not satisfactory, how we would wish it changed.

3. We then exchanged views on the Middle East. He thought we should both work to try to get Jarring to lay on the table a proposal which had the backing of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said that he had transmitted his conversation with E.V. Rostow to Moscow and hoped for an early response. I asked him whether he thought Cairo was ready for peace. He said: Yes, if it did not involve a public acknowledgment of defeat. I asked if that included letting the Israeli ships go through the canal. He said that he thought that Cairo was unhinging the link between Israeli shipping and the refugee problem; but it would probably try to keep the Israeli ships as a “late item” in the settlement.

4. General Observations. We exchanged reflections on the last eight years. He said he thought this had been a period of “missed opportunities” in which the fault lay on both sides. Nevertheless, we had made some progress. It would be a great thing if we were to set the missile talks in motion soon and lay a framework for continuity into the next Administration while accelerating the passage of the NPT.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.
2. Reference is to Rostow’s lunch meeting with Dobrynin on November 14.
3. See special memo on reconnaissance. [Handwritten footnote in the source text. The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume VII.]
4. Document 308.
5. Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.