Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

242. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 20, 1967, 1348Z.

271. For Kohler, Rimestad,² and Leddy.

Subject:

• Chancery Site Negotiations.

Ref:

• Moscow 191.³

1. As you will have seen from our tel 91 July 14, Foreign Ministry, in démarche to Guthrie on eve his departure, has in effect rejected our proposal that Soviet proffered site for new US Chancery and living quarters be extended to include site of our present chancery and suitable connecting avenue thereto.

2. We must consider which of various options open to us is most suitable course of action at this juncture when pressures are mounting on both sides for some resolution of chancery problem. We assume, in this respect, that Mt. Alto property cannot be reserved indefinitely for Soviet occupation. Similarly, we are advised that Soviets also hope for early decision regarding acceptability to us of site which is in area of Moscow already in process (CEMA development) of urban renovation and reconstruction.

3. I think that those of us with direct experience of our present chancery living quarters in Moscow need little documentation to comprehend how cramped and inadequately officed and housed we are. Pressures to accommodate, under suitable security safeguards, additional personnel and their dependents mount from year to year from all agencies of our government. We have already outgrown our present rabbit-warren, and it seems to me that we must, in our over-all national interest, give a sympathetic reading to proposals which will allow us to accommodate personnel and operations commensurate with our ever-increasing contact and involvement, at all levels, with the Soviet Union.

4. Soviet need for new quarters in Washington seems equally demonstrable; they will say, it is even more evident.

5. It is against this larger background of world powers with rapidly expanding points of contact that we must regard our present negotiations. The Soviet side seems prepared to accept Mt. Alto. In turn, they have assured us over a period of months that the site presently offered, which is not rectangular in shape subsequent to modifications we suggested, is best they have available. We are disposed to accept this statement as probably accurate since our own knowledge of Moscow suggests that no site in city is ideal and that no properties prospected by other embassies in market for sites are as desirable as that offered us.

6. Shortcomings of site, i.e., present location in slum-like area, low elevation of property, nearness to football stadium, must be balanced against evident intent of Soviet authorities to reconstruct this area, which is situated very near to Foreign Ministry and which is already being rehabilitated with construction of CEMA complex of buildings in modern design.

7. I am fully aware of numerous considerations which militate against unconditional acceptance of site. These particularly include problem of low elevation of site. There is also need to obtain Congressional approval of over-all desirability of exchange of sites and construction of new US Embassy.

8. Certainly we shall always face in Moscow greater problems with regard to efficiency of construction, access to materials, and availability of skilled labor than USSR will face in Washington, even if there is mutual agreement that construction in each site proceed step-by-agreed-step. Proposed site in Moscow thus can never be fully equated to site offered in Washington, where quality of urban development and of civic and technological services greatly favors Soviet construction in Washington. Decision which must be taken is therefore essentially political in character. Looking to the longer term, and despite very fundamental differences along whole range of present policies and convictions, do we wish to take step accommodating our respective missions in more suitable quarters than either now has?

9. Subject to Washington review of certain special aspects of problem, my recommendation is that we accept in principle Soviet construction on Mt. Alto site in exchange for our construction on Soviet proffered site. Our acceptance “in principle” should be conveyed in terms of whatever conditions we regard as over-riding. These would include, of course, any reservations concerning height of buildings. I think we have in this connection useful argument at hand in our requirement to house growing US official population in Moscow on limited acreage offered by site which Soviet planners themselves hope will retain park-like character. For efficient use of site, tall buildings will obviously be required.

10. I recognize that US-Soviet relations are now undergoing perhaps more than usual strain. This need not, however, deter either country from embarking on useful and desirable projects of longer term significance. In any event, I would expect some years to elapse before either project could be finally realized even if agreement in principle is reached in near future.

Thompson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, BG Moscow. Secret; Limdis.
2. Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.
3. Dated July 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, BG Moscow)