Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

177. Memorandum for President Johnson¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Gromyko, 5 p.m. October 10, 1966

U.S. Objectives

The following are the principal objectives of your meeting with Gromyko:

1. To add one more step to the many we have taken to convince the Soviets and the rest of the world that we are leaving no stone unturned in our search for peace in Viet-Nam.

2. To exacerbate the Sino-Soviet quarrel. (The mere fact that you receive Gromyko will doubtless lead to Chinese charges against the Soviets of collusion with the U.S.)

3. To demonstrate to the Soviets that despite Viet-Nam, we are not only willing, but desirous of taking steps that will ease tension.

Talking Points

A. Viet-Nam. You may wish to tell Gromyko that you have been fully informed of his talks with Secretary Rusk and that you do not propose to repeat the statement of our position which is well known to him. There are, however, several points which you may wish to underscore:

1. First of all is your sincere desire for a peaceful settlement. You have taken every feasible step to move matters towards negotiation for a settlement or, pending that, for a reciprocal reduction in military activity. You have noted Mr. Gromyko’s statement to the effect that every time we made a peaceful move we also took actions or made statements indicating a further American involvement. Such actions do not indicate bad faith on our part. They were previously planned and considered necessary only in view of the total lack of response from the other side.

2. We would be quite prepared to discuss what action each side might take to diminish the level of hostilities, but how can we do this when Hanoi will not talk to us in a conference, directly, or through third parties? Mr. Gromyko had suggested certain actions by us to establish a climate for a settlement but actions are needed on both sides to increase mutual confidence.

3. We will be grateful for anything the Soviets may be able to do to enable us to reach a peaceful settlement of this problem.

4. If Mr. Gromyko again urges unilateral U.S. actions, you may wish to note that the Soviets do not seem to have given us credit for having given up in advance one of our major negotiating assets; namely, we have made clear in advance our willingness to withdraw our troops and to give up the military bases which we have constructed in South Viet-Nam at enormous cost. In return for this, there has never been any concession from the other side.

B. Non-proliferation. Depending upon the status of Foster’s continuing talks you may wish to emphasize our desire to overcome the remaining differences between us on the text of an agreement. It seems to us that as far as our objectives in non-proliferation are concerned we have a wide area of agreement. We do not intend to turn our weapons over to any other nation. Responsibility for firing U.S. weapons rests with the President under our law and policy, and there is no prospect that this will or can be changed. However, we do not wish to undertake treaty obligations which would commit us to act as if no alliance of a collective security nature exists with our allies. We cannot say to them that collective security within the alliance is none of their business. We have gone a long way in seeking to reach compromise language with the Soviet Union and we do not believe that any real Soviet concerns would be affected by the language which we have proposed. Time is running out on this subject. We should therefore seek to resolve the remaining differences.

C. Communist China. You might wish to see whether Gromyko will be disposed to discuss this subject by touching on the following points:

1. We are amazed and puzzled by what appears to be going on in Communist China. The turmoil there will surely increase the difficulty the Chinese are encountering in feeding their enormous population.

2. These events are cause for concern which the Soviet Government may share. In particular we hope that the chaotic conditions in China will not tempt the Chinese to divert attention by military adventures. For our part, we will take no action which could legitimately serve as a pretext for such a dangerous course.

D. Germany. It seems unlikely that Gromyko will raise this as a separate subject. He will, of course, express the traditional Soviet views on Germany in the context of his remarks on non-proliferation. He might argue for admission of the so-called German Democratic Republic into the United Nations, although this is doubtful.

E. Outer Space Treaty. On October 4 the Soviets accepted two of our important compromise proposals and, for other treaty clauses such as that relating to the granting of tracking facilities, put forward compromise language of their own. This Soviet movement has brought us closer to a treaty, though several problems remain to be worked out and our allies need time to react. Ambassador Goldberg is making an intensive effort to wrap up all of the major treaty points. If substantial agreement has been reached by October 10, you may want to express satisfaction; otherwise you might hope for a speedy conclusion.

F. Civil Air Agreement. We have prepared and the Soviets have agreed that Pan American send a small group to Moscow to review and update the agreement between the two airlines preparatory to the signing of the inter-governmental agreement here. We understand that General Loginov, the Soviet Minister of Aviation, will come here in early November for the signing. We are currently studying a few amendments proposed by the Soviets and are proposing a few minor, technical changes of our own.

G. Consular Agreement and Trade Expansion. You may also wish to express an intention of pressing for the ratification of the Consular Agreement and for Congressional action which would facilitate the expansion of trade.

H. Fisheries Problem. You may wish to express the hope that the U.S.-Soviet talks which will resume next month on the problem caused by the Soviet fishing fleet currently massed off our Northwest Coast will result in a reduction of the tensions this problem is creating for us.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and cleared by EUR, FE, ACDA, IO, E, and H. Forwarded to Rostow by Read under an October 7 covering note stating that the memorandum “represents the Department’s views” and that “Rusk saw and concurred in an earlier draft essentially on the same lines.” Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 9:15 a.m. on October 10 together with an October 9 briefing memorandum on non-proliferation from Bator and an October 7 briefing memorandum on Vietnam from Harriman. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, Vol. XIV)