99. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)1

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Policy on Maltese Association with NATO

The U.S. position is that NATO membership for Malta is not practicable because of the deep-seated objection of several of the Allies2 and associated membership is undesirable because it would introduce a [Page 237] second-class status for which there is no provision in the treaty. Therefore our objective has been to persuade NATO to work out arrangements which would involve Malta in continuing close relationships with NATO and NATO countries. This is desirable because of the existence of the NATO base there and also, from a long-range point of view, to inhibit the development of an irresponsible non-aligned posture in Malta which could facilitate Communist designs.

From August 1964 until this spring we pushed our NATO Allies towards this end without success, primarily because of the objections of France and the Scandinavians. After Prime Minister Borg-Olivier intimated to Brosio that he might be content with something along the following line, we took the lead, acting through Brosio, to persuade NAC to agree to a draft resolution which: (a) affirms the deep interest of the members of NATO in the security of Malta, (b) expresses the willingness of its members to consult with GOM whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of Malta is threatened, and (c) confirms the readiness of NATO members to examine at the request of GOM the possibility of establishing future arrangements with Malta. The Maltese now seem to want to haggle. Regardless of their attitude, it is most unlikely that NAC will agree to anything much more substantial than this particular resolution for the indefinite future.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Confidential. Drafted by Vest.
  2. Leddy wrote in the margin at this point: “Why do they object?”