97. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State1
Polto 63. Subject: Bilateral discussions on French policy toward NATO. This is round-up on Under Secretary’s bilateral talks on France and NATO with British, Germans, Dutch, Italians, Belgians and NATO SYG Brosio held on July 12–13.2 No talks were held with Canadians in view inability FonMin Martin to come to Paris. Questions raised during bilaterals on subjects other than NATO-French issue are being reported by separate telegrams. Participants listed at end of cable.
Under Secretary outlined preliminary US thinking, emphasizing that USG has not arrived at definite conclusions and before doing so wishes have views of other allies. Accumulating evidence available to us through various sources, including direct statement to us by De Gaulle and Couve de Murville, indicate that it virtually certain France will at some stage make proposals or take further specific steps designed to weaken or destroy NATO, especially its integrated military arrangements and political machinery. This French attitude toward NATO must be taken seriously, even though it is difficult to understand. Two world [Page 234] wars have demonstrated conclusively importance of creating an integrated military structure and forces in being in time of peace as means of preventing war. France of all countries should understand this. Nevertheless De Gaulle seems to want to replace NATO with series of old-fashioned bilateral military alliances. US of course has no interest in purely bilateral military commitments with France. An integrated NATO is important to the security of the US, but a bilateral commitment from the French outside of such an integrated Atlantic military structure would be of no value to us.
In our judgment it is probable that the French will not make any serious move before the end of the year. It is uncertain when or how they will move, but given De Gaulle’s broad objectives it is most important that the other allies engage in timely preparations for whatever may come. It is probable that De Gaulle’s timetable for moving against NATO has been stepped up and that he may begin to take specific actions in 1966 rather than waiting until 1968 or 1969. He may put forward formal proposals for a drastic revision of NATO or he may take a series of steps designed to accomplish the same result piecemeal. The French have already blocked a NATO decision for a new SHAPE building in France. Other steps might be a request of the US and NATO to move NATO and US facilities out of France, including some or all of the US air base complex and some of communications. These actions could be taken simultaneously with other piecemeal policies such as using the French veto to prevent constructive developments in NATO, or increasing pursuit of the empty-chair policy.
The French have tried to make it appear that 1969 calls for a basic review and reform of NATO. However, this is not the case. NATO continues indefinitely. The only significance of 1969 is that it is a date after which a member may withdraw. In short, it is not a NATO problem, but a problem of French policy toward NATO.
The US is now engaged in thorough technical studies of what would have to be done if US and NATO facilities were to be removed from France. It is our best military judgment that NATO could continue as an effective and credible military deterrent even if the French should withdraw. Existing facilities in France would in this event, of course, have to be moved elsewhere, which would require specific agreements on physical arrangements with other NATO countries, including probably at least the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.
The US has no wish to provoke a confrontation with France on NATO. The best possible solution would be for France to decide to continue in NATO and to participate fully once more in carrying forward NATO objectives. If France weakens its ties with NATO, or withdraws from it, that will be the result of a unilateral French policy to isolate itself.
Question of timing and tactics to be followed by the other allies in response to possible French moves is of great importance. If the French [Page 235] present to NATO specific and definite proposals for changing the structure, they should be considered carefully and on their merits. If, on the other hand, the French should make certain limited proposals, such as the removal of specific facilities from France, a decision would have to be made on whether this should be an occasion for requesting the French to explain their over-all objectives.
The US is carrying forward the present bilateral discussions on an entirely private and informal basis. No doubt the French would learn of these talks. If they inquire, they should be candidly informed that the other allies are necessarily studying what they should do against the day when France might act to carry out objectives which it has made known publicly and privately in many ways.
The US hopes that the other allies would study these questions and that in the fall, after the German elections, it would be possible to resume bilateral discussions. By that time the US would have completed its own studies on the military aspects.
The foregoing presentation was used in each of our bilateral talks. Following are the observations on major points of the other countries concerned:
[Here follow a summary of the British view, described as in substantial agreement with the U.S. assessment, the German position, described as in complete agreement with the U.S. presentation, and the Dutch ideas about four possibilities that France might choose; a report that the Italians and Secretary General were extremely concerned not to provoke the French, while the Belgians were generally in accord with the U.S. position; and a list of the foreign participants in the bilateral conversations.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the NATO capitals.↩
- Ball was in Paris to brief the North Atlantic Council on the Dominican Republic crisis and U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Records of these briefings, papers prepared for his trip, and background papers for the meetings are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2523.↩