Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

94. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 6, 1965, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Select Committee and Defense Common Market

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary McNamara
• Assistant Secretary McNaughton
• Assistant Secretary Leddy
• Ronald I. Spiers, Deputy Director, RPM
• Carl W.A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador
• Herman C. Jorissen, Counselor, Dutch Embassy

Ambassador Schurmann said that he had a series of questions to ask about the Select Committee proposal which Secretary McNamara had put to NATO May 31. First, what exactly did he see as the task of this committee? Ambassador Schurmann recalled that initially the U.S. had emphasized the technical aspects of communications, but this emphasis may now have changed. Secretary McNamara said the objective was to determine how the desire for greater participation in nuclear affairs by other members of the Alliance might be met. In spite of all the discussion of this problem, none of the other members of NATO have come up with specific proposals, and all initiatives—he cited the Omaha liaison arrangements, the Athens Guidelines, the MLF and various papers analyzing strategic and military problems—have come from the United States. Apart from the French, who desire to see no changes made, no concrete suggestions have come forth. He accepted the desire for a greater degree of participation as bona fide. Unfortunately, however, there had been no effective forum for discussion of these problems. Every time these issues came up, there were fifty or sixty people around. Out of a discussion among a limited number in the Select Committee, plans for achieving a greater degree of participation may evolve. This was the primary objective of the Select Committee suggestion. The Committee would make recommendations to NAC and would not take decisions on its own. He did not want the discussion limited to technical aspects, but these aspects were important to begin with: unless the technical problems could be resolved, there was little point in further discussion.

Ambassador Schurmann asked if the Select Committee would not infringe on the MLF Working Group. Secretary McNamara replied in the negative. The MLF Working Group was only concerned with this one narrow subject. There is no discussion in the MLF Working Group of the basic issue of how greater Alliance participation in nuclear affairs is to be achieved. This group is simply concerned with one facet of the approach to the problem. Even if the ANF/MLF comes into existence, it will not fulfill all of the needs in this area. The Select Committee and the ANF/MLF were complementary, not conflicting or mutually exclusive.

Ambassador Schurmann asked about the French attitude on the Select Committee. Secretary McNamara said it was “positive, so far.” He had been pleased and surprised at the French reaction. Some people welcomed it whenever the French took a negative position, but he was not among these. We gain by unity, not division, in the Alliance, and he very much hoped the French would accept the proposal, which does not run counter to any of France’s objectives.²

Ambassador Schurmann asked what we would do if the French refused to participate. Secretary McNamara said in this event he would wish to go ahead with the Committee anyway. We should not dissolve the Alliance because France refuses to cooperate, nor deny ourselves the gains which can accrue to the rest of us from cooperation.

Ambassador Schurmann asked if we had heard that the French will approve the Select Committee if the ANF is abandoned. Secretary McNamara said we would not accept such an exchange. These are unrelated questions.

Ambassador Schurmann asked if the Committee would be ad hoc or permanent. Secretary McNamara said it would be purely ad hoc.

Ambassador Schurmann asked whether it would meet in July. Secretary McNamara noted that there had been some talk of a meeting July 27–28, but it was premature to make final decisions, since preliminary questions had not been settled.

Ambassador Schurmann asked about US views on composition. Secretary McNamara said membership was a matter for NAC to decide. We assume that the US and the UK will have to be members, since we are the ones that have the basic nuclear information. We hope France will join. There is a case to be made for German membership because of their majority military role in the Alliance. Our main hope was that the Committee will be kept small. So far we have been trying to work in far too large a group. Ambassador Schurmann noted that Italy and Canada had been mentioned as possible members. Secretary McNamara said that no Canadian authority had said anything to him about such an interest. He noted we were not in favor of an “open-ended” Committee.

Secretary McNamara said he thought the Select Committee was the best way to determine just what the interests of the other countries were as regards participation in nuclear affairs and how to go about meeting these interests. He alluded to the MRBM problem and the problem of nuclear decision-making as representative questions. The MRBM problem has remained unsettled for three years, and he thought this was “disgraceful.” We have got to find a forum and a method to deal with problems such as these. We must get down to informed discussion. He emphasized again that it would not be the Select Committee’s business to settle these questions but only to make recommendations to NAC.

Ambassador Schurmann asked if we would be willing to discuss nuclear assistance to such countries as France. Secretary McNamara said he would be happy to see this placed on the agenda of the Select Committee. This was a perfectly legitimate subject to discuss. The basic point was that the US should not have to assume responsibility for all tough decisions, such as whether there should be MRBMs in Europe. “It’s not my soil and not my money.” He felt the Europeans had a perfect right to ask the US for more information as a basis for more intelligent discussion. The Select Committee could serve this purpose. After that, the next step would be discussions and decisions at a higher level, perhaps in the Nuclear Committee. NATO, he felt, had so far been too heavy on procedure, and too light on substance. Secretary McNamara said there is a host of important questions that NATO is not acting on, partly because it is not organized to do so. The Select Committee can help.

Ambassador Schurmann asked whether we would object to having a rotating member. Secretary McNamara said this could be useful if the Committee’s life were extended. Some countries—the Scandinavians and Portugal—do not appear to want to be on the Committee; others may wish to participate, and rotation may be a way of meeting this desire without too much enlargement of the Committee.

Ambassador Schurmann asked how we felt about Brosio’s chairing the Select Committee. Secretary McNamara said he would be delighted and saw considerable merit in this.

Ambassador Schurmann raised the question of the Defense Common Market. He asked whether we had “practical means” in mind to give effect to this idea. Secretary McNamara said we did not, that initially it would have to be worked out on a bilateral basis. He felt that if each NATO member could accept the principle of buying arms from the source of highest quality and lowest cost, “we would shortly develop” a common market. Another aspect would be to work out joint financing of major development programs, such as the US–FRG main battle tank program, which is a step forward and in which others may ultimately wish to join in. These programs can lead to standardization of major weapons systems within the Alliance. A common market would also involve freedom from duties and avoidance of artificial restrictions on development and production. Ambassador Schurmann asked if this concept would imply a larger share of the market for Europe. Secretary McNamara noted that Europe is not now competitive, and it will have to reorganize itself. There is no inherent reason why European countries cannot meet the “highest quality, lowest price” principle with proper organization and salesmanship. The problem now is that individual countries are attempting too broad a spectrum of production. This increases costs beyond competitive levels. European countries will have to specialize. We do not intend either to exert pressure or to subsidize on our own behalf, but we will compete. He felt European countries can become more competitive if they act correctly and that they will then naturally get a larger share of the market. We offer the advantages of the US mass market. However, painful economic and politically costly adjustments will be required, as was the case in the UK in canceling the TSR–2.

Ambassador Schurmann asked if this will be worked out multilaterally. Secretary McNamara said he had given up on effectively approaching these problems through multilateral action. Mr. Leddy noted that after these questions had been worked out bilaterally, they can be taken to NAC and formalized. Secretary McNamara agreed.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers. The meeting was held in the Pentagon.
2. McNamara’s hopes were not realized. At a North Atlantic Council meeting on July 7, the French Permanent Representative stated that France saw no useful purpose in the Select Committee. However, at that time France did not indicate whether that meant it would not participate in the committee or would attempt to block its establishment. (Polto 29 from Paris, July 7; ibid.) On July 12, Finletter reported that Couve de Murville had elaborated on this position, saying France would not object to the committee proceeding, but would object to Secretary General Brosio having any part in it. (Polto 47 from Paris; ibid.)