Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

92. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and european Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, June 29, 1965, 2000Z.

Polto 1875. Select Committee (SC) proposal. Following highlights informal PermReps plus one meeting Brosio’s office June 29 discuss creation SC. (Brosio felt it essential have such informal meeting smoke out others, particularly French on SC and make available more detailed suggestions than made at DefMin meet.) For this purpose I prepared statement (being forwarded by pouch) based on Dept Topol 1707 and Circs 2443 and 2412,² which was passed out at meeting.

Before reading paper I mentioned fact that many PermReps had approached us to obtain more details SC proposal and therefore at suggestion SYG I prepared informal statement in effort be helpful, emphasizing meeting and paper both informal, that we did not wish to establish SC as new NATO institution but was merely a mechanism see how could obtain suggestions for better nuclear consultation. Also emphasized desire to [hear?] suggestions from others and hope that SYG would continue follow through in order expedite matter.

Following are informal comments after paper read:

Canada (Ignatieff) welcomed SC suggestion since Canada desired further discussion nuclear matters for long time and it essential come to grips with implications of Athens and Ottawa decisions. While all hope deterrent will work, must recognize this depends on the will to employ which means must consult in detail ahead of time to avoid misunderstanding and to know how and when weapons should be used if necessary. While suggestion SC will be helpful, NAC should continue nuclear consultations and any suggestions by SC must be subject to NAC approval. Ignatieff raised following points:

1. Not sure why it implied SC should only report to Ministerial meetings rather than regular NAC.

2. SC should probably be composed three nuclear and three non-nuclear powers.

3. SC should not be institutionalized.

4. What would be frequency of SC meetings and locale and the role of SYG in SC?

5. Nuclear consultations should build on Athens and Ottawa agreements.

Ignatieff then suggested following topics for SC discussion:

1. Coordination of tactical weapons assigned NATO commanders.

2. Coordination use SAC weapons.

3. Coordination use future nuclear weapons systems, tactical or external.

4. Role of NAC in emergency situation in relation to above nuclear weapons.

5. Elaborate on Athens guidelines.

6. Improved communications.

7. Increase Allied roles in strategic planning (e.g. greater NATO role SAC, wider role SACEUR nuclear deputy, permanent consultative role Nuclear Committee).

8. How provide for greater role NATO governments in nuclear matters.

(Ignatieff later circulated paper covering points—being pouched.)

Belgium (De Staercke) agreed generally with Canadian points and welcomed SC suggestion. Endorsed idea meetings should be informal since wished make sure not reduce role of NAC which must make final decisions. He thought suggestion DefMins or regular Ministerial meetings would be only ones to discuss SC’s suggestions incorrect, since this gave impressions NAC being denigrated—“There are not two councils, only one, and at some of its meetings FonMins present.” He asked for clarification what we had in mind in setting up working group and/or panels since it obvious DefMins will not be able to do detailed work. Expressed hope SYG would keep countries not on SC informed of developments and questioned suggestion US paper that SC have MC consult regarding purely military matters. De Staercke felt entire question although military was definitely more political than military and did not like give impression SC and military would make suggestions without full consideration by NAC as political body. He also asked how SYG hoped handle question.

UK (Shuckburgh) welcomed SC and supported US statement which refined and defined McNamara’s suggestion but made it clear that proposals were basically limited. Therefore he not sure whether Canadians’ and Belgians’ suggestions regarding broad questions to be discussed by SC were its role. He envisaged SC making procedural suggestions and not being a permanent body. Adding if SC only made basic procedural recommendations would not be difficult agree on limited membership, otherwise problem most difficult. SC would only make recommendations while NAC in permanent or Ministerial session would make decisions.

Italy (Alessandrini) agreed with colleagues but felt his government would insist upon NAC as ultimate decision body and he wished to know what role SYG would be re SC.

Germany (Grewe) welcomed SC proposals and remarked pleased hear US paper suggested working group or panels since obviously DefMins would not have time work out detailed suggestions. Recalled both Athens and Ottawa meetings were combined FonMin and DefMin meetings and underlined any consideration SC suggestions should be by NAC or combined Ministerial meetings. He wondered how limited suggestions of US paper could be reconciled with wider suggestions on SC made by Canada and Belgium but in any event he certain FRG would want to be sure NAC involved in any decisions and thought that before final SC suggestions submitted December Ministerial meeting draft they should be considered by NAC as political body.

Netherlands (Boon) welcomed McNamara’s initiative since discussion nuclear matters can come only if nuclear powers so desire. Thought it important first to draw up mandate SC. Said it essential make sure NAC has final decision and pointed out Alliance had never before used special category of Ministers other than FonMins to make decisions for it and therefore any final suggestions should be presented to Council meeting rather than DefMin meeting. He glad committee open-ended and his government will decide whether they would like to be on committee after mandate established since Dutch not convinced such important matter should be studied just by few. He too wished to know position SYG and hoped there would be no changes in usual NAC operations in connection with establishing SC. He closed with statement saying he welcomed these discussions and Dutch would decide later what final position would be.

Greece (Palamas) welcomed suggestions, reiterated decisions must be by Council but gave green light to any agreed arrangements to work out procedural suggestions of SC.

US (Finletter) expressed gratitude for responses and stated he agreed with most suggestions but felt personally that narrow interpretation given by UK was more in keeping with our suggestions than those raised by Canada and Belgium.

He too impressed with the apparent unanimity expressed by others that paramount role of Permanent Council should be protected since it was a unique organization and should not be deprived in any way of its authority.

France (Schricke) merely thanked us for further details but stated had no instructions. He added odd statement that Athens and Ottawa meetings were meetings of FonMins and not combined FonMin-DefMin meetings. No one commented.³

SYG summed up by stating further informal meetings PermReps plus one discuss SC will take place after NAC meetings on July 7. He recorded general concern of all on paramount authority of NAC. Re role SYG, felt as chairman NAC, he should also chair SC meetings. Re Canada-UK dilemma suggested SC would study narrower aspects and make suggestions while broader problems brought up by Canada should be discussed in NAC.

Finletter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the NATO capitals.
2. Circular telegram 2412 is Document 87. Circular telegram 2443, June 7, discussed the size and composition of the committee, France’s participation, its relationship to other NATO bodies, a timetable for its organization, and its terms of reference, but added that the Department of State and Defense were just beginning to discuss what substantive questions the committee might want to address. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) Topol 1707, June 17, elaborated on the problems that the committee might consider, but again stressed that U.S. thinking was “preliminary and certainly not rigid.” (Ibid.)
3. On June 10, Finletter reported that the French seemed “generally favorable” toward going ahead with the committee, but subsequent conversations indicated their position would be determined on the specifics of the proposal. (Polto 1790 from Paris; ibid.) On June 30, at a lunch given by Brosio, the French Permanent Representative attacked the idea of the committee discussing the improvement of communications (beyond the competence of the Defense Ministers) and the use of nuclear weapons (a political question also beyond their competence). While Finletter argued that both questions should be studied by the Defense Ministers, he concluded that the final French position was still unclear, but the rest of the Alliance should be prepared to prevent the French from blocking the work of the committee. (Polto 1883 from Paris; ibid.)