Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1965, noon.

SUBJECT

• France and NATO

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Leddy, EUR
  • Mr. Schaetzel, EUR
  • Mr. Popper, EUR/RPM
• UK
  • Lord Hood, Deputy Under Secretary
  • Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador

Lord Hood stated that his previous conversations with the Under Secretary and with Mr. Leddy had disclosed broad agreement on our analysis of French intentions.² Both governments felt that we should use the rest of this year to prepare for steps we might have to take if and when the French acted, after the December Presidential election. We both considered that the implications of the French position for NATO were serious but not fatal, and that what the French might do with respect to NATO and U.S. facilities in France was more serious than what they could do through withdrawal of their forces from NATO commitment. We agreed that NATO could make alternative arrangements if it must, but that these would be less satisfactory than those we now had.

Accordingly, we must try to deter De Gaulle from moving, if possible. Bribery and threats would be counter-productive. The right approach was to: (1) continue acting on the assumption that NATO would go on as an institution; (2) synchronize statements by allied leaders supporting NATO principles; (3) let it be known that we were taking the necessary precautions to meet possible French actions; (4) continue the momentum on NATO programs such as stepping up political consultation, the NATO Force Planning Exercise, and so forth, while maintaining an open door for the French; and (5) consider carefully any specific proposals made by the French. Generally, it was in our interest to seek to gain time by this largely declaratory policy, and against our interest to precipitate a crisis.

Lord Hood continued that if this approach were correct, the next step would be to put the matter to certain of the allies. This could best be done when the Under Secretary went to Paris early next month for the special NAC meeting. The Germans, Dutch and Italians were most important in this respect; Lord Hood asked whether the US and the UK should not approach them jointly. The Secretary thought this would be bound to lead to leaks and would heighten the impact of the conversations; furthermore, it would provoke a reaction from those allies not jointly approached. He did not think we should engage in joint US–UK talks with others at this time.

The Secretary noted that the French attitude created insecurity and nervousness, because of doubts regarding the status of the North Atlantic Treaty after 1969. He wondered whether it would not be advantageous for a number of us to state at the December Ministerial Meeting that we did not intend to avail ourselves of the privilege of denouncing the treaty. He asked whether such a step would provoke De Gaulle. Lord Hood thought not, depending on how it was done. He recalled the 1954 Nine-Power declaration at London,³ in which the French participated, declaring that they regarded the North Atlantic Treaty as being of indefinite duration.

The Secretary then asked whether there should be any more precise or more formal discussion with the French at this time. Lord Hood was inclined to think not: the French would hear of the exercise on which we were embarking, and we would stand ready to bring them into any discussions on NATO problems if they desired—as was the case in connection with the Select Committee of Defense Ministers. The Secretary agreed.

Mr. Leddy explained that we planned to compare US and UK talking papers which could be used for exploratory bilateral discussions with other allies. He did not expect that there would be any substantial difference between the two papers, though difference of emphasis might later appear as to the time and occasion for a confrontation with the French. This might be particularly true after the German election, when we might desire to move forward on ANF/MLF negotiations even though that might produce a strong reaction. The matter could be left open for the present, however.

Mr. Leddy added that FRG Vice Chancellor Mende had expressed the opinion to him that De Gaulle might be taking such a hard line on NATO in order to obtain a stronger French position in the organization.⁴ It was agreed that there was no real sign that giving the French more of the important jobs or more authority would have any substantial result.

Lord Hood suggested, and it was agreed, that we would exchange lists of actions we thought the French might take vis-a-vis NATO. It was also agreed that when the Defense Department study of the possible relocation of U.S. and NATO facilities in France had been completed, it should be discussed with U.K. experts. A meeting of legal experts in Washington might consider the legal problems which could be created by French action, and a regularly scheduled public affairs experts meeting in London, now scheduled for the second week in July, could look at the problem of public affairs policies on the French and NATO.

The Secretary asked what it would be wise to say if the press inquired about rumors that contingency plans were being made for a French withdrawal from NATO. The consensus was that one could take the line that “contingency planning” was too dramatic a term, but that naturally statements made by the French required us to give some thought to the problems which might arise.

Finally, the Secretary asked when and where the Winter Ministerial Meeting should meet in view of the French election. Lord Hood thought that the locale should remain Paris, but that the date might be changed. He suggested that the Under Secretary might discuss the matter with Secretary General Brosio in Paris next month, at the same time explaining the purpose of our bilateral contacts on the French problem. Mr. Schaetzel noted that we were seeking advice from Ambassadors Bohlen and Finletter on the subject.

In the course of the conversation the Secretary asked how we should handle the problem of the new SHAPE Headquarters building. Mr. Schaetzel explained that our failure to send instructions to USRO, stating that we were preparing to move ahead with it, was holding up the development of a situation in which the French would be the only opponents of constructing a new building. The Defense Department now seemed to be ready to agree. Mr. Leddy believed that it would be useful for the situation to unfold in this way, so that we could make it clear that we were continuing a business-as-usual policy in NATO. Lord Hood agreed.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper, initialed by Leddy, and approved in S on July 6. The conversation was held in Rusk’s office.
2. Memoranda of the conversations with Ball and Leddy on June 15 are ibid., POL US and DEF 4 NATO.
3. For text of the Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, pp. 1345 ff.
4. A memorandum of Leddy’s conversation with Vice Chancellor Erich Mende at 10:15 a.m. on June 16 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO.