88. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Germany, France, and the Alliance
PARTICIPANTS
-
US
- The President
- Harry Obst—Interpreter
-
German
- Chancellor Erhard2
- Hermann Kuesterer—Interpreter
The President reaffirmed the determination of the US to keep the Alliance intact. He asked the Chancellor if he was familiar with the statement he made on May 73 in which he had made clear the determination of the US to support its Allies in Europe and had assured them that they could depend on the US. The President stressed that the US will stay in Germany and in Europe as long as it is needed.
The Chancellor thanked the President for his May 5 and May 8 statements.4 He affirmed that he and the German people agreed entirely with these views. The President said more in those two statements than General De Gaulle has said altogether.
The Chancellor said that he would have to meet with General De Gaulle next week. There were serious differences between Germany and France on many issues, and, except for the EEC, they had virtually no common positions at this time.
The President said he understood the problem and assured the Chancellor that he understood his difficulties with General De Gaulle. He said that he thought both the US and Germany should make their positions very clear to the General.
The Chancellor replied he did not want a public quarrel or confrontation next week.
The President affirmed that the US could rely on Germany more than any other partner of the Alliance. De Gaulle must be asked exactly where he stood, but the President agreed that this question might better [Page 215] be asked after the elections in September. This issue could not be postponed indefinitely, however, and especially not until 1969. The US was determined to preserve the Alliance, and, although it hoped that France would remain in it, at worst the Alliance could continue without France.
The Chancellor said De Gaulle was very well aware of the Chancellor’s position. De Gaulle did not really want a European Europe, but he knew that the Chancellor would not agree to anything that would disrupt NATO.
The Chancellor repeated his view that a confrontation should wait until after the elections and assured the President that Germany would not be afraid to use hard language with De Gaulle. One problem was that there were still groups in Germany sympathizing with De Gaulle because of the Adenauer-De Gaulle friendship. In the past De Gaulle could always be certain that Adenauer would follow whatever he suggested. The President could be assured—and De Gaulle also knew this very well—that the Chancellor’s attitude now was quite different and that this Chancellor would not just do what De Gaulle desired. Chancellor Erhard also assured the President that he was not at all worried or impressed by De Gaulle’s bluff of flirting with Moscow.
The President replied that the Chancellor was enduring De Gaulle just as reluctantly as he did, but that it might be wise to be patient until after the elections. After the elections it should be made clear to De Gaulle that NATO would continue with or without France.
The President told the Chancellor he should bring forward any ideas he might have to further German reunification and any approaches that he might think feasible. He could be assured such suggestions would be listened to sympathetically.
- Source: Department of State, President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. Drafted by Obst and Kent and approved in the White House on June 29. The conversation was held in the President’s Office. The source text is labeled “Part three of nine.”↩
- Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder visited Washington June 2–4 for talks on topics of mutual concern. Other memoranda of conversation and papers relating to the visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2520 and 2521.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 82.↩
- Neither of these statements has been further identified.↩