Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 3, 1965.

SUBJECT

• European Political Union—Information Memorandum

Erhard and De Gaulle agreed at Rambouillet to resume talks on political union. With the Common Market’s grain price issue resolved and the pace of the MLF/ANF negotiations altered, De Gaulle evidently feels emboldened to move now in the political field which, he said in Strasbourg on November 22, “is first of all the field of defense.”

Previous Political Union Treaty negotiations—notably the Fouchet-Cattani negotiations of 1961–62—foundered on several key issues: British participation; federal vs. confederal forms and possibilities for evolution; and the competence of a political union in economic and defense matters, in view of the concern constantly expressed by all but De Gaulle that neither NATO nor the European Communities should be weakened.

Proposals advanced late last year by Spaak, Erhard and Saragat manage with uneven success to skirt these and other once-crucial questions. All of the 1964 proposals envisage a pre-treaty consultative stage. Their starting points, except for the Spaak notion of an independent “wise men” group, are essentially confederal, and their emphasis is on gradual progress. Of these, Erhard’s plan, with its generally inoffensive blueprint for slow movement toward political union (including defense) and strong call for strengthening the existing European Communities, probably offers the least controversial basis for a resumption of discussions. The Italian proposal, while generally less promising than Erhard’s, except as regards an important role for the European Parliament, is also less precise on defense. In both respects it could be helpful to the other Five in standing up to De Gaulle.

Erhard and De Gaulle apparently envisage a Foreign Ministers meeting of the Six this spring after a round of preparatory work at the senior official level (Cattani). If all goes well, there would be a “European summit” discussion during the summer. This could be explosive, especially if De Gaulle sniffs any possibility in the defense field of heading off the MLF/ANF.

We must now deal with the situation in the light of two relatively new elements. First, there is the French attack on NATO which—if we accept what they say—is to be followed by their withdrawal from the organization in 1969. Second, there is the nuclear issue, particularly the October reversal of the French position on MLF. This suggests that defense policy may be more of a stumbling block to progress on political unity than had been assumed even in 1964. It also suggests that De Gaulle can, if he wishes, use the nuclear issue as a bargaining counter to gain acceptance of his views on political unity.

European political unity poses an acute dilemma for the “good Europeans.” On the one hand, and for a variety of reasons, some (Erhard, Cattani and occasionally Spaak) feel that an initiative no matter how insubstantial is necessary to maintain momentum. On the other hand, another group who are in substantial agreement with Erhard and Cattani on the end objective and in opposition to Gaullist views (for instance, Hallstein, practically all Dutchmen and probably Schroeder), feel an initiative at this juncture would not only be futile but could in fact lead to erosion of the progress toward unity that has been made over the last fifteen years. This latter group would concentrate for the time being on strengthening the economic community.

The Five are of course struggling with a basic contradiction, namely, how to reconcile the irreconcilable. They are for a degree of supranationality, the French are flatly against it; they want a federal structure, which the French oppose; they want to build institutions, De Gaulle wants to weaken the existing bodies and wishes to place the emphasis on policy agreements as a precondition to organizational arrangements; finally, the Five want a community open to the membership of others, which the French oppose.

It remains our task to avoid the accusation of involving ourselves as a participant in such sensitive and involved internal European affairs. But at the same time the impact on our own interests of the decisions the Europeans arrive at will be substantial. The Five nations are working for solutions which they see as protecting their own and our interests. It should not be beyond our competence to make our weight felt by appropriate and unobtrusive means on the side of those who are working toward the kind of European unity which is favorable to our national interests and to the kind of Atlantic relationship we want. It would be unfortunate and contrary to our own objectives if in avoidance of direct involvement the “good Europeans” were to construe the U.S. attitude as indifference to their goal of working towards an integrated Europe in close partnership with the United States.

I am attaching a paper prepared in EUR which summarizes the recent history of European political union and evaluates its significance to the United States.

Attachment²

EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION

[Here follow the first 9–1/2 pages, which review the Fouchet-Cattani efforts at European political union in 1961 and 1962; Spaak’s plan proposed at the WEU Parliamentarians meeting on September 9, 1964; the Erhard plan and the Italian plan, both floated in November 1964; and the impact of De Gaulle’s statement on the subject at Strasbourg on November 22.]

U.S. Concerns

We have maintained a public posture of sympathetic interest in European political union but have generally withheld approbation or disapproval of specific plans. This has usually taken the form of comments like the Secretary’s of September 10, 1964 that “the organization of Europe …is a European problem.” We were mildly taken with Erhard’s initiative, essentially because it came from the Germans and contained an imaginative yet pragmatic scheme for Community progress, and said that it was “a constructive contribution to that achievement of European unification within the framework of Atlantic partnership which has long been and remains a central objective of United States foreign policy.” There was no need for an official reaction to Spaak’s suggestions, and our reactions to the Italian plan were never solicited.

When asked by the Six, the UK and others with some interest in the question, however, we have expressed our preoccupations more frankly. These preoccupations, briefly, are that we would be concerned if any such negotiations weakened rather than strengthened NATO, were to lead to an inward-oriented “small Europe” with the characteristic of excluding the British for all time, did not promote European integration by strengthening the existing European Communities, and if they ignored the crucial collateral policy of Atlantic partnership. On the actual form of political union, we have quietly supported generally “federalist” concepts and the democratization of Europe via increased Parliamentary powers, although we have made it clear that the decisions were for Europeans to take.

The forthcoming round may be taken more seriously in Europe than any previous activity in this field. Our reactions will be solicited and our public statements carefully appraised. An especially sharp eye will be fixed on our reaction to the French aim of keeping defense affairs in the foreground, with the clear objective of frustrating the MLF/ANF idea.

On their merits, the several plans aired to date add up to warmed-over Fouchet. There will doubtless be others. We must exercise care in commenting publicly and privately, but the organization of the Atlantic area is too important for us to appear to be indifferent to the outcome.

Viewed in retrospect, our general endorsement of the Erhard effort was just about right. It kept us aloof from the actual form and direction of political union while putting us on record as favoring further progress toward European integration. Here we are for the moment on solid ground. If only because of its comprehensiveness, the Erhard Plan will have to be taken most seriously by the Six and would probably be first on the agenda. In the present European atmosphere, it also provides a sensible, common denominator basis for discussion. The French would have a difficult job trying to subtract very much from it, and the Netherlands and Belgium might be able to give it more substance.

Our main concern at the start of the 1965 phase should properly be over the defense factor. Here the Italian formulation suggesting discussion on defense matters when necessary may provide pro-MLF elements ammunition for stalling De Gaulle. When it becomes feasible to do so, we should not hesitate to express our serious apprehension over any serious trend toward De Gaulle’s approach.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel, Deane R. Hinton, and George R. Kaplan (EUR/RPM) on February 2.
2. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan on January 28.