Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

70. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 18, 1965, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• European Union: MLF/ANF

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Undersecretary
• William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Ronald I. Spiers, EUR:RPM
• Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
• Ambassador Carl W. A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador to the U.S.

Foreign Minister Luns said that he was worried about the outcome of the Erhard visit to De Gaulle, and he would not be surprised if the result is a further step along the lines of the Fouchet Plan. The Netherlands is not very enthusiastic about the German proposals. Luns has made known to the Dutch Parliament that he does not favor the creation of a defense organ among the Six, since this could be a first move in a drift away from NATO. Saragat had agreed with this point when they discussed it in Paris. However, if Piccioni becomes Foreign Minister in Italy, Cattani’s views on the subject will prevail, and he is “all for De Gaulle.” Also, since Spaak has changed his position substantially in order to get agreement with France, the Netherlands is now practically isolated.

The Secretary asked whether Luns had any explanation for the drift in NATO toward preoccupation with trivial irritations, such as the contretemps about the Quadripartite communique in December and the difficulties about Wilson’s trip to Paris. This trend gave us much concern. Luns said this was partly due to frustration but also to De Gaulle’s methods. France had no enthusiasm for Schroeder and was always trying to weaken him. With Spaak it is a question of not knowing what he will do next. Recently there was a headline in a major Dutch paper reading: “Luns and Schroeder rebuffed in Washington.” This story came out of Paris and was printed even though his (Luns’) talk with the Secretary had not even taken place.

Turning to the MLF, the Secretary said that important elements in the U.S. will want to know that whatever emerges from the present discussions on this subject represents something Europe—with the exception of De Gaulle—wants. Otherwise it will not have much chance. Some are worried about the effect of the MLF on our relations with France, some about its effect on disarmament and East-West relations, and some are concerned about the size of the German role. These difficulties could be handled if the other participants make clear that this is something they want and which meets their problems.

Luns said there is a malaise in Europe about this question, which had been discussed at a recent Dutch Cabinet meeting where concern was expressed about the impression of US “disinterest.”

The Secretary said there had been a period of two or three weeks of extreme uneasiness in Germany, which we now thought was subsiding. We sensed a greater UK interest now in making progress on the nuclear question than had been evident during the NATO meeting. We hope that the Wilson-Erhard discussion will move the matter forward. Luns said that there was an impression that the prospects for success had changed. He recounted a talk with the German observer at the UN who insisted the MLF was “completely dead.” He had noted the President’s statement yesterday,² and he now understood that US interest was unabated and continued strong. He personally had veered from his initial position on the MLF to become a supporter, but there were still divisions in the Netherlands. The Minister of Defense was concerned that the financing arrangements not result in a setback for the Dutch naval program.

Luns asked our views on the time schedule for future discussion. The Secretary said we should look at this after the Erhard-Wilson talks. We did not want a big publicized Ministerial Meeting without some prior indication it can succeed. Erhard seemed to have relaxed somewhat on timing, and it now appears less likely that the Germans will insist on action before the election. However, it is still important that substantial progress be made before then or possible alternatives to the MLF will be debated during the campaign. We had become concerned about the new idea in Germany that non-proliferation should be reserved as a card for talks on reunification.

Luns said that he was confused about the French “game” in this area. Couve had insisted that Germany cannot under any circumstances be allowed a nuclear force, but on the other hand says that nothing can be done about nuclear proliferation, which is inevitable. Couve says that the US invented the possibility of German independence in this field by talking about it. Luns, however, recalled the between-the-wars history of the question of German rearmament. He had recently pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador that it was a mistake to view the alternatives as the MLF or the status quo.

Luns recalled that the Dutch had urged a full NAC discussion of this question. He had given this further thought in the light of the negative US, German and French reaction, and does not intend to press this subject. The Secretary said we thought there should be discussion in NAC at some later stage, after the views of potential participants have become more precise as a result of the present stage of bilateral talks.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Spiers, initialed by Tyler, and approved in S on January 28. The conversation was held in Rusk’s office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.”
2. See footnote 4, Document 68.