Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

53. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 30, 1964, 6 p.m.

3262. For Secretary from Ambassador. De Gaulle received me at noon today for what turned out to be a very general, relaxed conversation of about one-half hour. I gave him the President’s message about Ball’s visit and your desire to talk to him in December on a number of things, to which De Gaulle indicated that he would be glad to see you. I then told the General that while I had no particular instructions or any special questions to take up with him, since I was going home on a short visit I knew that his views in general on any current questions were always of great interest in Washington. I mentioned in this connection the general subject of U.S. relationship to Europe and secondly anything that he might tell me in regard to French views on the future organization of Europe.

1. Relationship of U.S. to Europe. De Gaulle began by saying that in the last fifteen years there had been a considerable change in the situation affecting Europe, particularly in the immediacy and nature of the Soviet threat. He said that whereas fifteen years ago many believed the threat to be real and immediate it had now apparently diminished to the point where virtually no one in Europe, and he ventured to say in the United States, believed in a Soviet attack. Since the West was hardly prepared to try and reach Moscow by military force and Soviet Union apparently was not prepared to inaugurate military measures against Western Europe there seemed to be a very good prospect for an extended period of peace. China was of course another question but that would not materialize in the form of a threat for at least fifty or a hundred years. For the immediate future it would appear that peace was a very real possibility and that this, together with a revived Western Europe, was one of the fundamental changes which had occurred affecting relations with the U.S. For example, because of these two factors he felt that European countries were again becoming “personalized” by which he meant they were beginning to assert their own personality and in effect to be seeking in one way or another their independence which could not but affect their relations to the U.S. He added parenthetically he thought the German interest in the MLF was merely a concealed measure of expressing their nationalism (this was only time during conversation that MLF was mentioned).

2. Future European Developments. De Gaulle then turned to Europe and said that while an economic Western Europe, at least of the Six, was a possibility—which would be put to the test on agricultural policy by the end of this year—the next step which would involve some form of political unity was a much more difficult task. In fact there was no European policy at the present time since each European country was following its own policy. For example Germany was preoccupied with the question of reunification. Whether through some strong move against Soviet Union as Foster Dulles had appeared to favor or through some negotiated arrangement with the Soviets was as yet unclear. France was in no hurry to see a reunified Germany since such a Germany would be a very “disquieting” influence in Europe. The truth was however that Germany was far from having a European policy at the present time and in fact, for reasons of its own security, did not object to being protected by the U.S. On the other hand, Holland, for example, had in the past feared French domination and more recently that of Germany. It had been her custom to turn originally to England for protection, but with the diminishing weight of England she was not disposed to turn to the U.S. to offset her fears.

There was another element to the problem while not directly a manifestation of the inability of the European nations to evolve a common policy—this attitude towards a so-called third world. Whereas France genuinely wished to help these countries, some European countries (he did not specify which) were not really anxious to help these third world countries to develop.

De Gaulle, after outlining the objections that he saw towards the unity as against the unification of Europe (a distinction he made in the French language) ended by saying that frankly he did not see clearly the way to European unity at the present time and left me with the impression that the attitude of Germany, because of its preoccupation with reunification, was an insurmountable obstacle towards any realization in the political field at the present time.

De Gaulle at this point volunteered that France had recognized China primarily in order to maintain contact. I then inquired of the General whether or not he thought that in regard to Vietnam the Chinese Communists, given their present ideological state of mind, would ever be able to accept an agreement which would in effect cut back Communist influence in Vietnam. De Gaulle stated that in Geneva in 1954 the ChiComs had not sought to proclaim Communism for all of Vietnam and he saw no insuperable obstacle in the same formula being followed in any future conference with Vietnam.

I then mentioned to De Gaulle how important Europe had become to the U.S. since the end of World War II, mentioning briefly our previous one hundred eighty years of isolationism, and that the signature of the NATO pact had been an enormous step for the U.S. to take. I also told him that in view of the immense military presence in Europe of the U.S. and the cost of such presence it was difficult, in the words of the late President Kennedy, to envisage a military presence in Europe without a corresponding political presence. De Gaulle replied in this connection that he thought that with the passage of time and the further diminution of the Soviet threat, events in Eastern Europe, particularly the loosening of the Soviet Bloc, it would become less necessary for the U.S. to maintain large forces in Europe. He felt it would be normal and logical at that unspecified time for the U.S. progressively to reduce its forces in Europe. I told him I thought this would take a good long time since even the slightest move in the direction of reduction of forces caused great anxiety and cries of alarm from Germany, which he admitted was the case.

De Gaulle said that he had always envisaged the continuance of the Alliance since he felt that France, no matter what happened, because of the tradition of friendship and association which existed between our two countries would wish to be allied with the U.S. as indeed it would wish to be allied with England. He said however that he felt that the present structure of NATO, which in effect, according to De Gaulle, provided for American control, was not satisfactory to France.

When I asked him what sort of reform the French had in mind he gave the standard reply that they were not prepared to put forth any proposals at the present time, but in reply to my question as to the time factor he indicated that France would not be prepared to stay in the present NATO structure at the expiration of the twenty years of the treaty, i.e., 1969.

I inquired how plans and other organizational matters, which we felt necessary in time of peace, could be made without some comparable organization to that existing in NATO, to which De Gaulle rather airily replied that general staff studies could of course be made coordinating actions for use in time of war. I mentioned at that point the importance of the nuclear problem and the great changes that they had introduced in relations between states, as well as military matters, but he showed no disposition to discuss this aspect of the matter.

In conclusion, De Gaulle sent his very best regards to the President, whom he said had been given a very exceptional mandate by the American people, which he said gave him a great deal of opportunity for action in the coming months.

Reverting to Vietnam, since as he said I had brought it up, he wished to express the very sincere hope not only for the sake of the people of the world but also for the U.S. itself that we would find some means of disengaging ourselves from this situation. He said the longer it was postponed the worse it would get.

In general he said if he would dare to offer any advice he would say that U.S. policy in the future should not be based upon general principles, or particularly declaration of such principles, but should be supple, realistic and reasonable.

Comment: De Gaulle was in an unusually affable and easy frame of mind. Little new emerged from the talk except that I found of considerable interest his definite statement to me that France was in no hurry to see German reunification and the related subject that Germany as a divided country was one of the obstacles to any progress on European unity. The second point of some interest was his definite statement that France would not stay in NATO after 1969. While he did not so state, I could not avoid to some extent the impression that he was thinking of a recasting of the treaty, possibly along bilateral lines since he spoke in this connection of France’s need for alliances with the U.S. and England. In actual fact, a treaty of collective security would much more logically entail some form of collective organization than would a bilateral treaty. This conversation seemed to me to reveal very clearly the old fashioned and negative cast of de Gaulle’s thinking on foreign policy.²

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 U. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London for Ball and Bruce.
2. Following a speech on November 22, De Gaulle had talked with Bohlen about the U.S. reluctance to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. When the Ambassador mentioned the thousands of American troops and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as an example of the U.S. commitment, the President commented that tactical weapons might be used, but that no one could expect the United States to risk its cities by using strategic nuclear weapons. (Telegram 3167 from Paris, November 23; ibid., DEF 1 EUR)