Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

44. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 31, 1964, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Discussion on MLF, Atlantic Defense and Related Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• Under Secretary Ball
• Assistant Secretary Tyler
• Executive Secretary Read
• Mr. John McNaughton, Defense Department
• Professor Richard Neustadt
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House

Note: Each of the participants was given a copy of the attached “Notes for Discussion”.²

(a) MLF General Objectives and the FRG

Mr. Bundy expressed the view that we should consider any MLF arrangement satisfactory which met German emotional needs for first class membership in the immediate future without worrying about whether the force provided Britain with such a special position that it would lead to subsequent German demands for equal treatment.

The Under Secretary stated that he viewed the MLF as just “a step in an evolutionary process” towards greater European integration.

Mr. Bundy agreed and stated that the MLF would be hard to achieve in view of hardening French opposition. He would be willing to settle for anything we could get that would include UK, German, Italian and US participation and would provide something to build on.

The Under Secretary stated that if we started with a force which had two types of units—(1) national and (2) mixed-manned—the former might move in the direction of mixed-manning at a subsequent date, but the very existence of a national component would probably lead to German demands for similar national components of their own.

Mr. Ball noted that next issue of “Time” would contain a report from Bonn that the Germans were disturbed at the reported US–UK delay in timing of the MLF. The story also indicated that the Germans thought the UK proposals put forward by the Labor Government were so extensive that it would be unlikely if the MLF could be agreed upon before the German election, which would be a setback to Erhard.

Mr. Tyler stated the view that neither the Italians nor the Dutch would be ready to move on MLF before January 1, and therefore the German hope of a year-end signing was bound to be disappointed.

The German timing question was discussed at some length, and it was agreed that there was probably no magic in the January 15 date the Germans have been citing as essential for the start of the MLF debate, although the Bundestag recess in late June was a fixed final date. There was a consensus that the calendar was being used unduly as a reason for expedition by the FRG, but that the Bundestag problem had to be considered in our own scheduling.

There was some discussion as to whether it would be feasible to let the whole MLF-Atlantic nuclear force question slide for two or three years. Were we really sure whether we would be better off after the creation of an Atlantic force? Wasn’t there more stability in the present situation than we gave credit for, since the Germans were not about to proliferate? Mr. Bundy suggested that these questions should at least be addressed consciously as part of the policy-making process.

Mr. Ball thought it would be disadvantageous to delay these decisions. The number one asset we have going for us in Europe at the moment is confidence in US judgment and initiatives, and this would be gone if we delayed much longer. He thought that the forces for proliferation in the world, particularly in Asia, were greater than we had anticipated prior to the Chinese detonation. It was agreed that there was nothing to be gained by delay and that there would probably be very little change in the picture after German and French elections next year.

Mr. Bundy expressed the hope that the arguments for proceeding now would not be dominated by the arguments about meeting German desires but with the affirmative gains of creation of a genuine Atlantic force.

(b) France and the MLF

Mr. Bundy stated that the force must be “plausibly open to the French”, and one of the key problems here is that if we insist on members making a commitment “for the life of the Alliance” this is precisely the thing that de Gaulle would be most opposed to.

(There was discussion of the withdrawal provision in the NATO Charter, and it was agreed that during the 20-year period provided in the Treaty or thereafter if the Organization is extended, withdrawal would require one-year notice.)

The suggestion was made without resolution that the duration clause in the new force charter might provide that it remain in being as long as the UK was an active participant, since this might be longer than the “life of the NATO Alliance” in view of French threats.

Mr. Bundy suggested that we should permit the French to join at a subsequent date by permitting participation of “another kind of nuclear force”, such as it suggested by the French proposal for “coordination” of the Mirage force with the Alliance. He thought that it would be a mistake to treat the Atlantic force as something that required the participation of all members’ nuclear forces in being, as DOD had urged at one time.

It was agreed that the MLF could not be made palatable to the French, because it was in direct conflict with the French objective of an independent Europe and because of its decisively Atlantic character.

It was agreed that Mr. Tyler would be responsible for seeing that the US proposal was made in a form and at a time as compatible as possible to reasonable elements in France to minimize opportunities for Gaullist attacks against it as a conspiracy against France and Europe. Mr. Tyler will obtain Ambassador Bohlen’s views on these questions.

(c) The UK, MLF and a Broader Atlantic Nuclear Force

The Under Secretary stated if the UK agreed to put its Polaris into an Atlantic force subject to US permissive link safeguards, with transfer of ownership and flag to an Atlantic command, it would be hard for the Labor Government to justify it to the British people since it would cost far more than participation in the MLF. Mr. Bundy stated he thought the Labor Government merely wanted to be able to say to its people that it had part of the British Navy attached to the NATO Command.

Mr. McNaughton noted that it would cost the British about $650 million to build three Polaris units, which might constitute one-fourth of the force which they now contemplate, as set forth in the Gwynn-Jones’ article.³

The minimal manpower contribution the UK might make to the MLF was discussed and it was decided it would be in the neighborhood of a thousand men in a five-thousand-man force.

It was agreed that from the US viewpoint it would be ideal for the US and Europe to have separate vetoes over all units in the Atlantic nuclear force, but it was assumed that the UK also hoped for a third veto of its own.

There was a consensus that we should not push the Germans and Italians too much until the British have “sniffed the air” in both Rome and Bonn, but we should approach the Germans with our views on the British proposals before the Wilson December visit.

(d) The December Crises: EEC Agricultural Policy and the Kennedy Round

Mr. Ball stated that we were building up towards a year-end crisis in two major areas: (1) the failure of the FRG to come up with a common grains price proposal which is a prerequisite to a Common Market agricultural accord; and (2) the French threat to torpedo the Kennedy Round. Taken as a package this posed a threat both to the other EEC members and to the US. He noted that on EEC agricultural policies, De Gaulle was on the right track and had all EEC members except Germany with him.

It was agreed that the Under Secretary and Mr. Tyler will do a paper on the various strands of the December crisis and the implications for the debate on MLF and any broader Atlantic nuclear force.

It was recalled that the Germans had promised the French only to state a view on a grains price for the Common Market by December 15, but they had also promised us not to let the grains price question interfere with the Kennedy Round. Arguing from the latter commitment, we should attempt to persuade them to come up with an acceptable CAP proposal.

Mr. Bundy asked if there was any way that we could take the blame publicly to permit Erhard to come forward with an acceptable grains price proposal in time to permit Common Market progress.

The question of delaying the Kennedy Round and its importance vis-á-vis MLF was discussed. It was agreed that the French would oppose the MLF regardless of Common Market or Kennedy Round developments, and there were many disadvantages in any KR delay.

Mr. Ball stated the view that the US had made a mistake in advising the FRG last June that there was no technical reason why the Kennedy Round could not go ahead without a grains price agreement.

Mr. Tyler noted that CDU support in Germany was based in large measure on the rural vote and the farmers would probably sit out the next election if Erhard caved on a common grains price. Brandt has been silent on the question to date but he does not depend on the farm vote for support.

(e) Schedule

After extended discussion the following tentative schedule was agreed to:

Messrs. Ball and/or Bundy would go to Berlin for the meeting Mr. McCloy was arranging on November 11–13. Erhard would be there, and if they remained in Germany until the 16th, they could get a report on Gordon Walker’s talks with Schroeder on the 14th-15th. It was thought to be desirable to stop in London on the way back from the FRG for another round of talks before the Wilson visit. Rome was another possible stop on this trip, although it did not seem to be necessary, and would conflict with the November 22 Italian elections.

Harold Wilson would come to the United States to visit the President sometime after December 11, when Parliament recesses, and before Christmas. In view of the Secretary’s absence (he leaves New York for Paris on December 12), pre NATO bilaterals and big 4 FonMin meetings in Paris December 13–14, and the NATO meeting from December 15 to 18, December 21 and 22 seem to be preferred dates for the Wilson visit.

(f) Assignments

1. DOD—McNaughton and Rowan—The application of a permissive link system to submarines—how many US personnel would be required on subs manned by UK personnel to make the system operative and to permit necessary communications; in other words, the feasibility of a “veto squad” on UK subs. (Mr. McNaughton noted that there was a general PAL study underway at present which would be completed January 1, so that this would be in effect a reliable pre-study estimate on this specific limited question.)

2. DOD—McNaughton and Rowan—The terms under which United States submarines might be committed to an Atlantic force—the problems of permitting UK personnel to be present under conditions similar to those that we would wish to incorporate in a PAL system on UK-manned subs.

(It was agreed that the Germans would probably not object to such a US–UK arrangement. Mr. McNaughton reported that Rickover’s people believed that genuine mixed-manning on submarines was not feasible from an engineering security and safety viewpoint.)

3. DOD—McNaughton and Rowan—The advantages and disadvantages of a UK transfer of aircraft and Pershings to an Atlantic nuclear force.

4. Ball and Tyler—“The various strands of the December crisis”—EEC common agricultural policy problems; the Kennedy Round; implications for MLF and ANF.

5. Mr. Ball—A discussion of three possible alternatives for the Atlantic Nuclear Force:

• -1-An ANF consisting only of a mixed-manned surface component with the British share rendered at once equal and cheap and with British subs converted for hunter-killer purposes (or at any rate left separate).
• -2-An ANF with two components, one of them mixed-manned (as above) and the other subsurface—consisting of British submarines and maybe an equal number of American submarines assigned irrevocably, and under the control of the ANF governing board with control enforced through a two key system (as well as through some element of at least binational manning).
• -3-An ANF in either of the variants above with a third component: aircraft and/or Pershings.

Note: Mr. Bundy suggested the paper, but the Under Secretary volunteered to do it himself. G/PM expertise might be utilized here.

It was agreed that the group would meet again on Thursday, November 5, at a time to be arranged by Mr. Read. (11:00 a.m., November 5, 1964, set subsequently.)⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Benjamin H. Read.
2. Not found.
3. Reference is to Alun Gwynne-Jones’ article in the London Times, October 23, 1964, which sketched the outline of a new British proposal for participation in the MLF.
4. On November 3, the principal officers of the Department of State directly concerned with the MLF met in Under Secretary Ball’s conference room to discuss the British proposal. While no conclusion was reached at the meeting, three alternatives were considered: 1) The MLF as presently contemplated, 2) commitment of British nuclear forces to either an Atlantic or Allied force; or 3) mixed-manning of British Polaris submarines. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)) At the November 5 meeting of the interagency MLF group, the participants discussed further permissive links, the inclusion of aircraft and missiles in the ANF, mixed-manning of British Polaris submarines, and ANF ownership of the British submarines. The meeting concluded that the United States should not express its position on these topics pending further talks with the Europeans. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.) At another meeting on November 10, the MLF group heard a report from Ambassador Bruce, who was certain the MLF would be acceptable to the Labour government as long as it was part of an overall deal on defense matters. The group also considered a paper that outlined various alternatives on the employment of the British Polaris submarines. (Memorandum of conversation with attached alternative paper; ibid.)