Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

39. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Missions¹

CA–3816

Washington, October 8, 1964, 9:11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• NATO Secretary-General Brosio’s Visit September 28–29

The following summary is based on uncleared memoranda of conversations. It is for information only and its contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials.

This airgram summarizes the principal subjects discussed during the recent visit to Washington by NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio. Mr. Brosio met with the President and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, as well as many other U.S. officials. The basic issues discussed were: (1) East-West Relations; (2) French Attitude Toward NATO; (3) NATO Force Planning Exercise; (4) Multilateral Force; (5) Greek-Turkish Relations; (6) US Contribution to NATO Expenses; and (7) Consultation on Disarmament Issues in NAC.²

Arrangements for this visit probably exceeded any previous visit by a NATO Secretary General. They included the Presidential plane from New York to Washington, an honor guard, a large luncheon hosted by the President, and a trip with the President to SAC Headquarters at Omaha.

This was essentially a “get acquainted” visit. Mr. Brosio appears to be aware that he is ushering in a new phase in the life of NATO and that his record as Secretary General may depend upon his ability to adapt NATO to a new set of political requirements in a rapidly changing world. He favors close political consultation in NATO on all issues and would like to see NATO used to arrive at coordinated policies on world issues. Mr. Brosio sees his role as that of the honest broker. Although he gave the impression that he does not wish to take sides publicly on issues which are divisive, he appears personally to support most of our policies.

1. East-West Relations

Mr. Brosio thought it was important that NATO have an active role in considering East-West relations. Otherwise, individual members would tend to follow their own path with the Soviets. NATO should be the center for consultation, for exchanges of information, and coordination of positions. This was the only protection against the Soviets trying to take advantage of differences among the members. Mr. Brosio was of the opinion any meaningful rapprochement with the Russians was likely to be achieved in the context of the German problem, not disarmament. The situation was now at a fluid stage, with the Soviet Union-Communist China conflict bringing a momentary reduction of tensions, and perhaps we were at the beginning of a period of change in which the Soviet Union would come forward with something “sensible”. From his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Paris he had the impression the Soviets might look more seriously at a settlement in Europe. He was interested in the prospective contacts between the Germans and the Soviet Union and thought that the French policy also bore watching.

Secretary Rusk agreed that it was urgent and important to get a common appreciation of what is going on in the Communist world. He suggested the Political Advisers Committee discuss the matter, bringing in experts from capitals as desirable, in preparation for discussion at the December Ministerial Meeting. At the time of the Meeting, the question should be taken up both from the point of view of Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Chinese Communist relationship. There was very considerable movement in the Eastern European situation and we could expect some initiatives from one side or the other, or both, although there is not as yet any serious basis for initiatives which hold promise of serious negotiations. There is feeling in Germany, principally atmospheric at this point, about the need for a new move for reunification. It is hard to see such a move which does not involve substantially new security arrangements in Europe and the Germans do not seem to be prepared to address themselves to this aspect of the problem. The territorial question is also difficult. The United States has registered its willingness to discuss the problem if the other three powers are prepared to move together.

2. French Attitude Toward NATO

Mr. Brosio stated that on a continuing basis, his principal preoccupation since he took over as Secretary General has been the French attitude toward NATO. He summarized the major points of deGaulle’s position: (1) deGaulle thinks that although the threat has diminished the Alliance is still necessary; (2) he remains adamantly opposed to the Alliance, at the same time refusing to suggest changes in the treaty or the organization; (3) he stresses European unity as a key factor; (4) he persists in his opposition to any change in Alliance strategy, doubting that the United States would use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe; and, (5) he continues to be concerned with the unavoidable effect of political events in the outside world on the Alliance.

Mr. Brosio concluded that deGaulle would not do anything for the present, but in 1969 might well denounce the treaty. This made it most urgent that the Alliance members act in advance to forestall events in 1969. We would need to get the French to say what they want, initiating proposals in order to get them to express their views. Mr. Brosio did not think it reasonable to try to have initiatives for changing the organization until after the German elections in 1965, but certainly they should be undertaken from 1966 on.

3. NATO Force Planning Exercise

Mr. Brosio said there was no possibility of reaching agreed force goals by December. Both the Alpha and Bravo goals of SACEUR are qualitatively unattainable; either might cost an additional $20–$25 billion above present force expenditures over the five-year period. He felt that no attempt should be made to reach conclusions to be presented at the Ministerial Meeting. It would suffice for the DPWG to develop a progress report which could be reviewed by NAC and by a Defense Ministers meeting in December. He expressed the opinion that unless “some government” took the initiative of leadership the others would never reach the point of developing conclusions on goals and strategy which it was hoped this Exercise would produce. One method to exercise the leadership he feels is required would be to proceed immediately to discussions on strategy and request the military to fix force goals corresponding to the strategies discussed. United States views on reorienting the Exercise should be presented in the DPWG rather than NAC where opposing views might become too rigidly fixed. He expressed his concern over the stature of the DPWG, pointing out that many of the national delegations are staffed by representatives having little knowledge of the subject and virtually no authority and adding that the major NATO commanders tend to consider the DPWG as a group of amateurs. He would hope that delegations could be bolstered with senior military experts from member countries, even on an ad hoc basis.

In meetings with Secretary McNamara and officials of the Department of State, Mr. Brosio was informed that we attach great importance to the NATO Force Planning Exercise and to moving ahead with it as rapidly as possible. We believe that the structure of the DPWG and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is a good one, but that the DPC, on which the Permanent Representatives sit, should take a more vigorous part in overseeing the working of the DPWG. This would bring the Secretary-General, as Chairman of the DPC, into closer contact with the problem areas. Mr. Brosio is in a position to influence the progress of the Exercise and we would welcome his taking an active role.

Secretary McNamara said a December Ministers of Defense meeting should be planned tentatively. A final decision could be made in late November. (Mr. Brosio had said he preferred that an MOD meeting not be separate, but favored setting aside an afternoon during the regular meeting. Secretary McNamara did not disagree.) If an interim report from the DPWG were presented to the DPC by November 20, we could prepare comments by December 14 at the Ministers Meeting. The United States contribution would not be in the form of hard recommendations based on definite conclusions, but would offer alternative strategies for examination.

4. Multilateral Force

Mr. Brosio regarded the MLF as a desirable project which will add to NATO’s strength and go far toward meeting the MRBM problem. However, it is a military force with its own quasi-political institutions. He wanted to explore the functions and powers of these institutions and the relationship they will have to NATO. He had been informed of the acceleration of the schedule for conclusion of the MLF agreement and thought that at this stage it would be useful to have contact established between NAC and the MLF Working Group. This would ensure, from both the military and political points of view, that the arrangements evolved in such a way that others would not be able to create difficulties and the MLF would be a strengthening rather than divisive development for the Alliance. He feared the situation might arise in which the MLF Working Group would have agreed on a statute which then would be presented as a fait accompli to the Council. Although it was difficult to foretell French actions, the possibility that they might go so far as to use the MLF as a pretext for creating a major crisis in the Alliance was reason enough to prepare procedures for relating the MLF to NATO which would avoid criticism and objections.

He was told that although the MLF Working Group was ready to discuss its activities with the rest of the Council after a number of problems had been resolved, to do so at this moment might be premature and disrupting. We expect to keep the Secretary General fully informed on an informal basis, and remain ready to consider more formalized reporting arrangements from the MLF Working Group to the Secretary General at such time as they may seem desirable. The Council would have an opportunity to examine the agreement and recommend changes when it went to governments before the end of the year. Hopefully, we see as one of MLF’s greatest advantages an opportunity to establish the principle that NATO must be sufficiently flexible to allow like-minded allies to work together while keeping all informed.

5. Greek-Turkish Relations

Mr. Brosio was doubtful that either the United Nations General Assembly or the efforts of UN mediator Galo Plaza would lead to anything helpful in the Cyprus situation from the point of view of NATO. The General Assembly could pass resolutions but could not alter a treaty. Galo Plaza could make no headway without Makarios’ consent. If no progress were made, perhaps Greece and Turkey would face the fact that they need to engage in direct negotiations. The question then became, Who would lead them? No matter who it might be, whether NATO or a representative from the United States, the matter must be kept secret to avoid publicity which might endanger the possibility of successful negotiations.

Under Secretary Ball explained that the United States had proceeded from the beginning on the assumption that no negotiations had a chance if Makarios were directly involved. Makarios wants to be free of both the treaty and Greece, achieving total independence, and is seeking to nurture a “self-determination” atmosphere which will inhibit the Turks. As one step, he hopes to use the Cairo non-aligned conference to get endorsement of self-determination for Cyprus and de facto freedom from the Zurich accords. Meanwhile, Cyprus has become an internal political problem of the first order in Turkey and the situation there continues to deteriorate. At the same time, the Greek Government is realizing that it must settle a situation which contributes to Communist strength, upsets capital investment in Greece, and cuts the tourist trade. There is a growing will to settle the issues through reconciliation with the Turks. The Under Secretary wondered whether the Greek Government would be willing to give enough concessions. He and Mr. Brosio agreed that the most recent Greek position, described as enosis with protection of minorities, continuation of UK bases, and a NATO base with Turk participation, did not represent progress, backing away as it did from a Turkish base. The Under Secretary added that he expected pressures from Makarios to revive in November.

Before leaving Paris, Mr. Brosio had been informed that the Greek Government refused to accept the 1956 resolution³ as a basis for his examining Greek-Turkish relationships. It was, however, prepared to discuss, within the limits of the “watching brief,” measures to foster Greek-Turkish cooperation which would not touch on Cyprus. Mr. Brosio said it was difficult to make any real headway with the Greeks and Turks since one could go only so far before running up against Cyprus, a matter in which NATO could not intervene. Still he was willing to try to do something. Under Secretary Ball said he thought it was important and most useful to create a beginning of direct Greek-Turkish conversations. This would be the first time they had been willing to talk together and while talks went on, the Greeks would be able to work towards improved control of the island for action at a later date.

6. US Contribution to NATO Expenses

Mr. Brosio inquired as to our intentions toward reducing the United States share of contributions to the Infrastructure Program to 25%. He was unaware of any economic reasons for the United States position. The reaction of other delegations was not promising and although his staff had explored numerous criteria for evaluating national contributions, none had produced an obvious justification for the reduction. United States insistence on negotiating on Slice XVI and refusal to discuss further Slices has raised suspicions among other delegations concerning the ultimate reduction we will seek, even though, as he believes, they are coming to realize that some modification may be necessary. As an approach to negotiations he suggested the United States agree to contribute to Slice XVI at the present rate but work toward the possibility that when an agreed percentage is reached for Slices XVII through XX it would be retroactive for Slice XVI as well. In order to place the entire question of cost sharing in its proper perspective he suggested the United States also be prepared to negotiate its proposed reductions of contributions to the civil and military budget in the same framework.

In Mr. Brosio’s view, the solution to the question could have psychological and political repercussions and he cautioned against undercutting our position of primacy in the Alliance by placing other members in the position of contributing at the same or higher levels than we. An uncompromisingly rigid position would give “some country” the opportunity to force acceptance of its view that national infrastructure is preferable to a common program. If presented a convincing case with latitude to maneuver he will make every effort to assist the United States in reaching a satisfactory solution.

Assistant Secretary Tyler explained that strong Congressional feeling exists that the United States’ contribution is high in proportion to the economic ability of other members to share the burden. While Congressional interest may overemphasize the issue, the United States contribution figure of 30% has become a subject of contention. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara are under considerable pressure from Congress to reduce the burden. It was emphasized that our interest in a reduction in no way implies a lessening of United States support for the Alliance, but represents a search for a method of continuing full support in the face of legislative criticism of what appears to be an imbalance.

7. Consultation on Disarmament Issues in NAC

Mr. Foster, Director of ACDA, raised the question of how to handle disarmament issues in NAC. When the subject of disarmament is raised at the next UN General Assembly, the Soviets probably will press the United States on: (1) non-proliferation; (2) general disarmament; and possibly, (3) the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. The proposal for a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles, the observation posts, and the Gomulka plan may also be topics of discussion. Mr. Foster felt time was wasted by asking NAC to concentrate on the details of these issues. He thought the consultation process would be improved if NAC were asked to express its views on substantive policy and strategy and not on the wording of proposals which are to be put to the Soviets. He cited the NAC discussions on observation posts and on a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles as examples of too much attention to detail.

Without addressing himself directly to the question raised by Mr. Foster, Mr. Brosio said that NAC should be seized of the problems when they are still negotiable and not frozen. He said he would take Mr. Foster’s suggestions into consideration. He expected to discuss disarmament issues with Secretary General U Thant as well.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Sent to the other NATO capitals, Stockholm, Moscow, Geneva, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH, and CINCUSAREUR.
2. Memoranda of Brosio’s conversations with Rusk, Tyler, Foster, Dillon, and McNamara are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2435. No memorandum of his conversation with President Johnson has been found.
3. For text of the Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Differences Between Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 14, 1956, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, p. 17.