36. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson1
Dear Mr. President:
Last April you transmitted to me through Ambassador Finletter, your Permanent Representative with NATO, a message in which you expressed your firm intention to initiate all necessary measures in the United States to make it possible to sign an agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear Force before the end of this year.2 I informed you at the time through Ambassador Finletter that I fully concurred in your views and intentions in this question. At our meeting in June we confirmed this agreement and set it forth explicitly in our communiqué.3
The heads of our Delegation in Paris have endeavored to further the discussions in the working group of the eight interested states in order that the treaty might be signed by our target date. Unfortunately, the working group has not made such rapid progress as I had hoped. As matters stand, there is little prospect that this group will be able by the end of the year to work out a draft treaty to which all governments concerned could quickly agree.
In the meantime our two Delegation Chairmen in Paris have worked out an initial working draft for an MLF Charter. This draft no doubt needs revision, but in my opinion it should be submitted to the other interested governments as soon as possible. This seems to me all the more important in that the most recent political developments make it desirable to meet the envisaged signature date, if possible.
The main reason for this view is the danger that the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations may adopt a resolution calling on us to suspend all negotiations and other arrangements which might in any way alter the status quo in the area of control of atomic weapons, pending the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of atomic weapons. Other resolutions opposing the establishment of the MLF are also within the realm of possibility. In Geneva clear tendencies in this direction have become discernible among the uncommitted states.
I therefore consider it important that we take some step that will tend to ensure the establishment of the MLF before such a resolution is adopted in the General Assembly—which might happen as early as January 1965.
[Page 79]For me there is also another reason: if I do meet with Mr. Khrushchev I should first like to see something definite accomplished with regard to the MLF.
Because of these considerations I deem it desirable to sign the MLF Treaty as early as the end of November or the beginning of December of this year.
Unfortunately, it is not to be expected that all eight of the interested governments will be prepared at that time to sign. Perhaps we may still be able to persuade some government or other to sign with us. However, we must be prepared for the possibility that no third or fourth government can make a decision to sign at that time. It is my belief that, even so, we should take the lead in order by our example to spur others to accession. In such an eventuality we should, however, consider how we might by some appropriate clause in the Treaty avoid misinterpretations and the impression that we wish to place the MLF solely on a U.S.-German basis.
We have developed some ideas about this which Ambassador Grewe, who will transmit this note, might explain.
On this occasion Ambassador Grewe can also set forth our ideas on the question of how we might in connection with the conclusion of the MLF Treaty achieve better coordination and consultation in the field of overall nuclear strategy and thereby perhaps make it easier for some states that are still hesitant to join the MLF.4
I hope that we shall soon be able to place the MLF on a firm basis and should be very grateful to you if you would inform me of your views on this question.
Cordially yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. The source text is a Department of State translation. A copy of the German language text is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.↩
- See Document 17.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 26.↩
- German NATO Permanent Representative Wilhelm Grewe delivered the letter to the President to Secretary Rusk on October 2. In a private conversation at that time, Grewe raised the issue of coordination and consultation with the United States on overall nuclear strategy. Rusk replied “firmly” that while the United States was willing to consult about nuclear strategy, it was “not willing to give any veto or any control over the U.S. nuclear deterrent to countries who were not taking the same commitments and risks in the world.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182) In another conversation with Rusk and State Department officials, Grewe discussed at length how agreement on the MLF might be reached by the end of the year. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF))↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Erhard signed the German language original.↩