We anticipate that the meeting will reflect the groundwork laid since our
September 4 discussion in the National Security Council.2 Our
ambassadors have made vigorous demarches regarding improved allied defense
contributions. Ambassador Cleveland
has been involved in continuous negotiations with his colleagues in NATO and I had discussions with most NATO foreign ministers in New York.3
I enclose a listing of the main issues that may arise at the meeting. You may
wish to discuss these with us prior to our departure.
I also enclose (1) a paper outlining the background and scope of the
Ministerial Meeting; and (2) a paper summarizing what we are doing with each
NATO country to encourage improved
defense efforts.4
Enclosure5
NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGBRUSSELS
November 14–16, 1968
Position Paper
SCOPE PAPER
I. The Political Background
Effects of the Czech Crisis
This fall’s Ministerial Meeting takes place against a background of
continuing Allied concern stemming from the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Even though the Allies do not wish to abandon their goals of reducing
East-West tensions, and ultimately arriving at a peaceful settlement of
the issues dividing Europe, the atmosphere has changed drastically as
compared with meetings of the past few years. The fact of the invasion,
and the resulting uncertainty regarding Soviet intentions toward Eastern
Europe, the Mediterranean and even Western Europe, have combined to
produce a new situation.
The highwater mark of detente was reached in December 1967 with adoption
of the Harmel Report and in
June 1968 with the Ministerial declaration on mutual force reductions.
Today, despite differences of emphasis among individual NATO governments, the accent is on
strengthening the Alliance’s defenses and its deterrent posture against
possible future contingencies.
For some of the Alliance members—for example France, Canada and
Denmark—the Soviet aggression has deflated exaggerated hopes for early
change in the Soviet Union’s European policy. (There is no evidence,
however, that De Gaulle has
changed his fundamental views on NATO,
the United States or Europe. There are some signs of French probing to
see whether bilateral US-French defense cooperation, particularly in the
nuclear field, might be improved essentially on French terms.) For the
US the present situation, which may not last, offers a major opportunity
to improve the Alliance’s political cohesion and its defense
posture.
East-West Discussions in Light of Czechoslovakia
The NATO discussions since August have
demonstrated that, for the longer term, none of our Allies wishes to
forestall essential contacts
[Page 783]
or negotiations with the East. Most of them still favor the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and would like to see a breakthrough in the
arms race in which the two great powers would be committed to accept
controls on their own nuclear armaments. On the other hand, however,
they are seriously concerned about the psychological and political
effects of any early talks in view of the post-Czech situation.
Other International Issues
Even though the European situation will be uppermost in the minds of the
NATO delegations, other
international issues will also affect the setting for this meeting. The
two major questions of the Middle East and Vietnam may figure in
Ministerial statements. Anticipation about policies to be followed by
the new U.S. Administration will also mark the meeting’s atmosphere.
Western European Unification
The continued lack of progress in unifying Western Europe will loom large
in the corridors. It may also be reflected in statements around the
table. De Gaulle’s intransigence
in keeping Britain out of the European Community has just manifested
itself again in the failure of the recent WEU Ministerial Meeting. Tentative ideas for a European
caucus in NATO have also failed to jell
into anything offering promise of immediate results. The British will
nevertheless continue to take soundings looking toward increased
intra-European cooperation in the NATO
framework.
Domestic Politics and Youth
The domestic political situation in some of the leading Allied countries
also remains delicate and complex. This is the case for example in the
UK, the FRG and Italy. For Canada, this
will be the first Ministerial Meeting since the Trudeau Government’s
electoral victory.
This year’s manifestations of radicalism among the youth in various
Allied countries continue to affect European attitudes across-the-board.
The memory of the near chaos in France last spring is still fresh in
everyone’s mind.
International Finance
Lastly, even though the gold and monetary crisis of the past winter is
well behind us, questions of domestic finance continue to loom large.
Their impact on resources that can be made available for Western defense
is likely to be the hardest factor conditioning Ministerial
deliberations.
A NATO Watershed
In light of the foregoing, this last NATO Ministerial Meeting of the
Johnson Administration—also the last meeting
before the twentieth
[Page 784]
anniversary of the Treaty’s signature—will represent a watershed in the
recent history of the Alliance. The past two years have seen major
improvements in NATO’s defense and
consultation arrangements. Now we would like to see a demonstration of
renewed political will on the part of the governments, especially with
regard to defense contributions.
II. The Meeting: U.S. Objectives and Problems
U.S. Objectives
Our broad objectives for this meeting, and for followup work to be done
by Permanent Representatives, flow from the political background and are
largely conditioned by it. Briefly stated, these are:
- —To achieve formal Ministerial recognition of the changed
situation resulting from the invasion of Czechoslovakia; from
the permanent stationing of substantial Warsaw Pact forces in
that country; from what is now known of
the high state of readiness of these forces; and from the
uncertainties created by Soviet actions and doctrine, including
national sovereignty and the “Socialist commonwealth”.
- —To elicit firm commitments from the other Allies regarding
qualitative and quantitative improvements in their NATO defense contributions.
- —To reach a common understanding on the political implications
of the post-Czech situation for the future of East-West
relations and contacts.
- —To reiterate as appropriate our support for Western European
unification and, specifically, for initiatives the European
members of the Alliance may take in the defense field.
- —To emphasize the need to continue the Alliance for the
indefinite future without undertaking new legal commitments that
would require action by the Senate.
- —To stress the continuity of US policy in supporting NATO as well as the concept of
collective security inherent in the Organization.
- —To make clear, without being provocative, Three Power (US,
UK, French) and general Allied support for established Western
positions on Germany and Berlin.
- —To recall our continued deep interest in Mediterranean
security as well as to seek, by adequate warnings, to deter
possible further Soviet moves that might affect the balance in
that area (e.g. Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania).
- —To give a clear signal to the Soviet Union of Allied
determination to defend the Treaty area, and to make clear that
any further Soviet aggressive moves in Eastern Europe would have
grave and incalculable consequences and would cause immediate
and appropriate Allied reactions in self-defense.
The Meetings and the Problems
The meetings will be attended by ministers of foreign affairs, defense
and finance. They will embrace sessions of three different bodies: the
Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC); the North Atlantic Council (NAC); and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC).
The North Atlantic Council
In the NAC, the main problem will be to
get fifteen-country agreement (including France) on general statements
regarding the European political situation, allied defense, Germany and
Berlin, and the“signal” to the East. Much of this work will have been
done in advance by the Permanent Representatives in the form of a draft
communique and other documents such as the post-Czech political
assessment. Discussion of these documents will afford an opportunity for
ministers to have a substantive exchange of views on the overall
situation. As a related but subsidiary issue, ministers may also be
asked to approve a report on civil emergency planning aimed at assuring
progress in this field to accompany renewed emphasis on a better NATO defense posture.
The Defense Planning Committee
In the DPC there will probably be some
hard bargaining among the Fourteen over various decisions to be taken
regarding improvement of the NATO
integrated defense system, and particularly the specific increases in
defense contributions to be made by individual countries. Here again,
much of the groundwork has already been laid by the Permanent
Representatives and by the Secretary’s October 7 dinner meeting in New
York. Nevertheless, the Germans, the Dutch and others have made clear
repeatedly that their national decisions must follow from collective
NATO decisions. Thus, the DPC decisions may have to be approved in
general terms first, with individual national decisions stated in
principle or on a contingent basis. The Europeans will also want to know
what the United States might do; e.g. hold early deployment exercises,
improve combat capability of forces in Europe, and in CONUS.
[Page 786]
On the financial side, our own concern involves balance of payments
considerations as well as increased budgetary resources other
governments might make available for defense. Even though our specific
negotiations on balance of payments grounds are likely to remain
bilateral, we are seeking to have a statement adopted recognizing the
common interest in neutralizing foreign exchange losses incurred by
contributions for NATO defense.
The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee
In addition to the NAC and DPC sessions, defense ministers of all
countries except France, Iceland and Luxembourg will meet in the NDAC. The purpose will be to review the
work of the NPG in light of that body’s discussions in Bonn in
October.
One possible issue: There may be an attempt on the part of several
countries to initiate discussions and studies which lead to a fixed set
of consultation rules and procedures governing the use of nuclear
weapons. This could result in a complete impasse or development of
procedures so inflexible as to be unworkable in any of the myriad
unforeseen circumstances which could arise. Either result could
seriously degrade NATO’s tactical
nuclear deterrent. Secretary Clifford intends to discourage pressures for such
development by reminding the MODs
directly of the dangers involved and by expressing deep US concern about
the maintenance of the deterrent.6
