Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, October 16, 1968.

255959. USNATO deliver Cleveland 0900, Wed. Oct. 16. Paris also for Under Secretary. Ref: USNATO 5191 (Notal).² Subject: Guidance for Private NAC Session October 16 on Eastern Europe. You may draw upon following in private October 16 NAC session:

1. Assessment of situation

a. Despite slowdown of rumors of imminent Soviet attack on Balkan countries, Soviets still doubtless mistrust recent Romanian, Yugoslav and Albanian moves and danger exists they may seek “regularize” situation in Balkans by military means.

b. Kovalev’s September 26 Pravda article presented singularly naked doctrinal pretext for Soviet intervention in socialist world (you may draw on INR Research Memorandum RSE 143 of October 8³—and, in your discretion, release appropriate sections to participants—for detailed analysis of major themes). While article dealt primarily with Czechoslovakia, some element of threat to other socialist countries was certainly indirectly implied. Even though signed article of this type is not most authoritative form of Soviet public discourse, it seems unlikely that Pravda editors would fail to appreciate implications of article on so sensitive a subject—and enunciation of potentially threatening doctrine was thus deliberate. Moreover, Gromyko’s UNGA speech also contained gist of this doctrine.

c. Whatever Moscow’s intentions in August may have been, the move against Czechoslovakia produced a war scare elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe as evidenced by various degrees of military mobilizations and alerts. Romanian, Yugoslav, Albanian and even Austrian fears of the Soviet Union and in turn Moscow’s own perceptions of these apprehensions themselves tend to color the future of Balkan politics. The Soviets for their part have not been averse to putting Balkan communist countries under pressure (and the Kovalev article appears to have been in part designed to keep up the pressure). Moscow doubtless resented Romania’s lack of support, and was irritated with Tito’s criticism of its action. Belgrade’s criticism continues unabated, but Bucharest’s has subsided, presumably in recognition of Soviet pressures and out of desire not further goad Soviets.

d. Bucharest is thus evidently aware of Soviet sensitivities to the more fluid situation which has developed in the Balkan area, and Romania at least seems intent on avoiding actions which Moscow would find provocative. But even if Romania agrees—or has agreed during Pact Commander Marshal Yakubovsky’s last visit—to take part in a Warsaw Pact exercise as a means of reasserting fealty to the Pact, it is unlikely that Soviet suspicions about the reliability of Romania as an ally can be dispelled.

e. If tensions continue at their present level, there will remain for some time apprehension that Moscow may at some point in time see the situation in the Balkans as deteriorating in a way which ultimately threatens Soviet strategic interests. At such a moment, serious consideration may be given to a military solution. In any event, over long term, Soviet pressure tactics and reactions they elicit create a less stable situation in area.

f. Within NATO, we shall, of course, have a continuing exchange of current military intelligence via SitCen and we trust further cooperation among attaches in checking out reports and rumors. However, the greater problem may lie in a protracted period of potential danger. And in such a period NATO governments face the problem of devising policies which will help discourage or deter Soviet adventure but which do not exacerbate tensions in the area. At this moment, we continue to believe Soviets will continue to avoid moves risking serious confrontation with West so long as NATO maintains its essential military strength and political cohesion.

2. Contingency Planning

a. We believe emphasis at this time should be on non-military deterrent moves we and NATO allies can take to forestall further aggression in Central and Eastern Europe. (Strengthening of NATO in military field, a corollary move, now under way in NAC.) Planning range of specific political action possibilities presumably available to NATO might be geared to two time phases: (1) present stage of possible but unverifiable military threat, and (2) solid threat based on hard intelligence information.

b. In present stage, we believe seriousness with which we view possibility of invasion can best be conveyed by such means as President’s “dogs of war” speech August 30, Secretary’s meetings with Dobrynin during that period, Secretary’s October 2 UNGA address and subsequent meeting with Gromyko. Where opportunities available, two-way visits such as recently-completed visit of Yugoslav Deputy Premier Gligorov to Washington, visits to Bucharest by UK Foreign Secretary Stewart and Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel and forthcoming Katzenbach visit to Belgrade should be encouraged and exploited as means indicating to Soviets our serious concern over any change in existing situation. We would hope participants in October 16 NAC session would consider similar actions for both Yugoslavia and Romania, while being cautious about overloading circuit. Other useful actions during present stage would be symbolic military visits of type recently completed by destroyer USS Owens to Dubrovnik, background stories and journalistic leaks focused on gravity of NATO assessment of situation, and appropriate public reminders of previous Western assistance to Yugoslavia. Similar actions for Austria in present stage include assurances our deep concern by Ambassador MacArthur and US visit Foreign Minister Waldheim October 21–22.

c. In “solid threat” phase we would differentiate fairly sharply between threat to Romania and Yugoslavia or Austria where invasion would be of totally different dimension with strong possibility of global conflict developing.

Romania

Following steps might be considered: (1) another urgent, top-level meeting with Soviet Ambassador for assurances no invasion planned, (2) another well-advertised Presidential statement with maximum publicity, (3) early NAC meeting to consider possible NATO response, (4) emergency Security Council session, and (5) consultation with Congressional leaders.

Yugoslavia

Range of possibilities would include all of above plus: (1) public announcement of readiness to consider Yugoslav requests for economic and/or military materiel assistance, (2) legal steps to facilitate assistance to Yugoslavia, (3) urgent meetings with Yugoslavs at high level, (4) cessation of two-way military dependent travel, (5) restrict all civilian travel to Eastern Europe and USSR, and (6) improve military alert status of NATO and US forces in Europe and Mediterranean.

Austria

While likelihood invasion or transit of Austria by Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces appears less than for Romania-Yugoslavia, we also considering possible US and NATO responses. Starting point would be assessment that military intervention in Austria would have gravest immediate consequences. For this phase we would therefore envisage all of above steps, as adapted to Austrian developments, plus shifts in deployments designed to signal Soviets that move into Austria would run serious risk of involvement with forces principal treaty signatories. Assume NATO members would display similar concern and consider related actions.

d. In “solid threat” phase serious consideration should also be given to coordinated economic moves among Allies that might serve to deter or at least raise price of Soviet intervention. Economic reaction to be effective would have to involve consideration of terminating “business as usual” philosophy which appears to govern attitude most Allies toward private ventures in this area at present time.

3. You should make clear, in outlining above precis contingency planning, that while steps recommended for present phase are from standpoint US, firm and already being implemented, action/suggestions for second stage reflect only preliminary thinking. In time and as our own ideas jell, we will wish to consult actively in NAC on actual contingency plans.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–1 EUR E. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by George Kaplan (EUR) and Robert H. Baraz (INR), cleared by seven officers from EUR and INR, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, Moscow, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Vienna. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.
2. Telegram 5191, October 9, requested instructions for a private NAC session on October 16. (Ibid.)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., INR Files)
4. At the special session on October 16, Cleveland gave an oral presentation following in detail the outline presented here. By prior arrangement further discussion was postponed to the following week. (Telegram 5295 from Brussels, October 17; ibid., Central Files, POL 1–1 EUR E) At the meeting on October 23, the discussion, which was described as “lively and informed,” revealed widespread appreciation for the U.S. presentation and particularly the need for further consideration of the warning signal to the Soviets that might be included in the November Ministerial communique. (Telegram 5403 from Brussels, October 23; ibid.)