Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

326. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 13, 1968.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with Dr. Kurt Birrenbach Friday, September 13, 5:15 p.m.
• (The President, Dr. Birrenbach, German Charge von Stackelberg, Ed Fried)

Birrenbach told the President that the Chancellor had asked him to come here to describe German concerns over the situation in Europe following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and to get an understanding of United States thinking.

He stressed the following:

1. The additional Soviet divisions on the German front and the threat they posed.

2. The clear evidence of the unpredictability of Soviet policy which he attributed, in part, to collective leadership—and the dangers this carried for the West.

3. The Soviet attacks against Germany, including charges that Germany was interfering in the East and had aggressive designs.

4. The specific Soviet references to Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, implying that they had a right to interfere in Germany.

He said that it was necessary to strengthen NATO and outlined his helpful discussions with Secretary Rusk on what might be done and on the various possibilities for a NATO conference.²

The President asked Birrenbach to give the Chancellor his best wishes and to tell him that he remembered with warmth the hospitality the Chancellor had shown him in Germany.³ He said he believed that we had had a unique relationship with the Germans in the post-war period, and that he personally had great respect for the abilities and character of the German people.

The President said he believed that the future of Germany was largely in their own hands. Germany had made a phenomenal comeback since the war and was now in a position to take the lead in responding to the present crisis. The people of the United States had never been reluctant to discharge their obligations and responsibilities, but, if they were to get concerned about the present situation, they needed to be shown that the Europeans were concerned.

The situation now was much more serious and dangerous than the average man believed. He had given much thought to how he could help to strengthen NATO before he went out of office. The elections in the U.S. were a complicating factor because any moves without substance could lead to accusations that he was meddling in politics. That was another reason why it was important for Europeans to take the lead.

He pointed out the strength of feeling behind the Symington amendment. (Symington’s views were all the more surprising since he came from a German community and had himself had experience in the Defense Department.) The Czech crisis had stopped this movement, but the proponents will be back in due time to chip away again. Nothing to damage NATO would be done in his Administration, but what would happen in the next Administration was another matter.

It was essential, therefore, for Europe to take matters in its own hands. The time was ripe for a bold move to strengthen NATO and the key was what the Germans and our other NATO partners are prepared to do in terms of concrete actions. What happens here will depend on that. He said he realized there were advantages to having the top leaders get together to see what could be done, what the problems are and what solutions could be worked out. It was better for guidance to come from the top rather than for Foreign Ministers to report to their heads of government. But, if that did not prove possible, something could be done in a Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. Again the key was what the other nations are prepared to do.

He said he asked that his Ambassadors in Europe discuss this specifically with European Governments and he was awaiting reports now. He would be very disappointed if the answer was only to tell us about their difficulties.

We were faced with enough problems of our own: Our casualties and expenditures in Vietnam, our balance of payments problem, our deficit of $25 billion, the demands for aid.

In the midst of this, he had been willing to make his statement on Rumania, showing where we stood. We will be ready to do our part.

His schedule had been unusually heavy and he had cancelled appointments in order to talk to Birrenbach as Kiesinger’s representative. He thought very highly of the Chancellor, of his moderation and of his ability. He wanted him to know that he believed this to be a very dangerous situation. But the first move must be by the people who are in the cone of the volcano. The American people are slow to awaken, but they cannot be expected to be concerned about people who do not show by concrete actions that they are concerned about themselves.

Birrenbach said he understood the President’s views and would convey them to the Chancellor. He knew very clearly that the United States understood the situation in Europe and he agreed completely that if we do not take advantage of the present situation we may not have another opportunity. He thanked the President for his statement on Berlin and he asked whether Senator Mansfield’s statement on the future deployment of forces had a lot of support.

The President said the situation was very acute. The leadership in the Congress had been strongly in favor of reduction of forces in Europe. He had been opposed and had fought hard to prevent reductions and he would be able to do so as long as he was in office. But before Czechoslovakia, support for troop reductions was so strong that as a compromise it might have been necessary to schedule reductions of 50,000 to 100,000 men.

Birrenbach asked to what extent the offset question was in back of the drive for troop reductions.

The President said it was an important factor but not the only one. It was a long time since the end of World War II and Americans felt they had a right to ask Europeans to do more themselves. The balance of payments problem on troops had to be solved but there also had to be other actions which showed that the Europeans were willing to open their pocketbooks and put their resources on the line for defense.

The real question that the Europeans must face is what will happen in the next Administration. He felt that the Europeans were sleeping while Rome burns. Isolationist sentiment here was latent and becoming more serious.

We have tried and will continue to work closely with Germany. He had told the Chancellor that he should try to work with deGaulle. He had also said that the flirtation probably would not work and that Germany would probably have to come back to the same old girl ultimately. He had himself avoided any confrontation with deGaulle and refused to be provoked by him.

As far as the Russians are concerned, he had told them clearly that we were against aggression; that we have our obligations to the Germans and we mean to keep them. But we have problems to try to work out with the Russians from disarmament on down. And if we don’t want war, we have to see whether it is possible to work out anything with them.

The Russians were trying to catch us off guard before our elections. The President said he had been ready to talk to them about common problems, but Czechoslovakia had stopped that. But the problems didn’t go away.

The key was for the Chancellor and the other leaders of our European allies to say they believe that the Russian moves in Czechoslovakia have created a serious situation in Europe and therefore are going to do the following specific things. Armed with such a statement, the President said he could get support for actions the U.S. could take.

He hoped that the Chancellor would tell Ambassador Lodge what his own ideas are and what he believed our other NATO allies in Europe could do.

Birrenbach thanked the President for the opportunity to talk to him and said his visit here would help give the Chancellor a better idea of United States thinking and of the need for action that could strengthen our position in the present situation.

Edward R. Fried ⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Fried on September 14.
2. Memoranda of Birrenbach’s conversation with Rusk on September 9 and with Katz-enbach on September 10 are ibid., DEF 4 NATO and DEF 1 EUR.
3. President Johnson had visited Bonn in April 1967 to attend the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.