Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, August 29, 1968, 2122Z.

229956. For Cleveland from Leddy. Subject: Strengthening NATO in Wake of Czech Crisis. In accordance with our conversation today on secure telephone,² following are substantive portions of EUR’s recommendations to the Secretary on steps to strengthen NATO. Please consider this strictly FYI and Noforn, for your personal background only. Septel contains our ideas for scenario which are appended to basic recommendations.³

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The principal aims of the draft Presidential messages are (a) to summarize briefly the main conclusions the US has drawn from the Czech crisis for Western and NATO interests; and (b) to propose a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers for the week of September 22, 1968.

As a result of the crisis a number of major issues will have to be reexamined intensively by the Allies. The Permanent Council and the NATO military authorities are already discussing some of them. Taking account of initial Allied reactions to the crisis, we believe the following matters might be indicated for Ministerial action at the September meeting:

1. We might aim at an interim freeze on NATO forces and lay the groundwork for establishing a floor under force levels for the longer term. We would, moreover, seek a demonstration of the Europeans’ willingness to make increased efforts for their own defense.

2. Defense Ministers might give guidance for improving reserves, equipment and mobilization capabilities. We may wish to announce plans for exercises involving the return to Europe of our redeployed forces.

3. Ministers might give necessary directives on strategic questions. Our aim would be to seek Allied reaffirmation of the validity of the flexible response concept but with agreement to reexamine the doctrine of political warning time.

4. Closely related to the foregoing, Ministers could direct that the current study of NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities be accelerated and completed in time for Ministerial consideration in December.

5. With regard to the Mediterranean, Ministers might direct the immediate activation of COMARAIRMED, the new command which is to coordinate aerial surveillance of the Soviet fleet.

6. On the political side, we may wish to seek agreement on a special declaration in which the member governments could reemphasize their support for the Alliance and the NATO security system in the wake of the Czech crisis. Such a declaration could also deal with the continuity in longer-term objectives for improving East-West relations.

7. In the declaration, or in the regular communique, we might also wish to make clear that the mutual force reduction proposal remains on the table for the longer term.

8. The most important Alliance political issue we may need to deal with, at least in preliminary fashion, is the Italian suggestion that member governments strengthen the Treaty by formal action to make clear their intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for an additional period of years beyond 1969. While this subject may not be ready for discussion at the Ministerial session, we should give it serious internal consideration in any case. Greater assurance about the Alliance’s future would have a favorable impact (a) on overall aspects of US-European relations, and (b) on various specific issues, notably the NPT.

We must of course be prepared for difficulties with the French over at least some aspects of the Ministerial Meeting. It may be necessary, for example, to divide the meeting into two sessions with the Fourteen (DPC) first taking up military questions and the Fifteen (NAC) subsequently considering political questions.

In our view, the advantages of an early Ministerial Meeting would clearly outweigh any difficulties. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has shocked European opinion to the point of creating a new, positive atmos-phere for NATO and for US leadership in tackling Alliance problems. We should take advantage of this atmosphere while it is so favorable.⁴ End text.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by McAuliffe, and approved by Leddy.
2. No record of this conversation has been found.
3. Telegram 230009 to the Mission to NATO, August 29. (Ibid.) This scenario called for a special Presidential message to all the NATO Heads of Government and the holding of a special NATO Ministerial Meeting the week of September 22 to draft new guidance on force levels and other elements of a military/political work program.
4. On August 30, Cleveland cabled his general agreement with EUR’s recommendations, but suggested the addition of a Defense Ministers’ meeting in Bonn on October 9. (Telegram 4454 from Brussels; ibid.)