Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

316. Intelligence Note No. 512¹

Washington, June 28, 1968.

SUBJECT

• NATO Ministers Outline New detente Goal

The NATO foreign ministers, at the spring ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council,² convened for the first time in Iceland, issued a “signal” to the USSR to encourage it to prepare for future discussions on the possibility of mutual force reductions in Europe, evidenced concern over increased Soviet activities in the Mediterranean, and declared their solidarity on the issue of access to Berlin. They thus concentrated on the twin goals of insuring collective defense and promoting detente, which were outlined in last December’s Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (the Harmel Report). While the Berlin declaration was adopted unanimously, France partially disassociated itself from the actions and public statements regarding force cuts and Mediterranean security.

East-West Relations. In their general review of the international situation, several ministers touched on the elusive nature of detente, referring especially to continued evidence of the rigid posture of the Soviet Union towards the West. Following consideration of a review of East-West relations since 1966, prepared by the permanent Council as part of the follow-up to the Harmel Report, there was a prolonged debate on how to achieve a proper balance in communique references to detente. It was finally agreed—as is usually the case in NATO discussions of this subject—that the ministers would publicly reaffirm their intention to continue efforts to promote detente, while warning that opportunities for rapid progress should not be overrated. The ministers also restated their intention to continue the examination and review of European security problems and to prepare for the time when “fruitful discussions” of these questions might be possible with the East, as originally called for in the Harmel Report.

Several members welcomed the recent UN General Assembly endorsement of the NPT, but no attempt was made at the meeting to reach agreement on a statement regarding the treaty for inclusion in the communique.

Mutual Force Reductions. In their major detente-oriented action, all ministers confirmed the decision of the permanent Council to give priority to the study, also undertaken as a Harmel Report follow-up, of the possibility of balanced and mutual force reductions by East and West. This provided the opportunity for the Fourteen to attempt to counter domestic pressures for defense cuts by reaffirming recent statements by NATO’s Defense Planning Committee that the overall military capacity of the Alliance should not be reduced except as part of mutual force reductions. Belgian defense cuts announced last December and public debate about possible defense reductions in Germany had aroused concern that unilateral slashes by several NATO members might occur and that this could lead to a general downward spiral of national commitments to and hardware allocations for the common defense. Thus, the hope of heading off any unilateral cuts, by stressing the need for reciprocity, and the desire to reduce domestic budget-cutting pressures, by showing the public that NATO was as forthcoming on arms control as could prudently be afforded, were prime factors in renewing allied activity in the field of mutual East-West force reductions, even though no member government expected Moscow to be receptive to the idea at an early date.

Ministers of the Fourteen adopted a declaration on this subject which was made public as an attachment to the ministerial communi-que, thus serving notice that it was up to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries also to begin preparations for possible future discussions. While accepting the general statements in the declaration regarding hopes for progress in the field of arms control and, more specifically, the desirability of an East-West agreement on mutual force reductions, France disassociated itself from those portions which specified the principles to be followed in continuing the NATO study and which reaffirmed the need to maintain the overall military capacity of the Alliance in the meantime. The French did, however, affirm publicly their intention to continue to participate in this NATO study.

Mediterranean Security. Mindful of the fact that a year has passed since a major expansion of Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean began, most members were anxious to give some evidence of the Alliance’s awareness that this Soviet activity could pose an additional threat to its members’ security. The most that could be agreed upon publicly by all fifteen members was their approval of a Harmel follow-up report dealing with “the situation in the Mediterranean” and their readiness to extend consultations on this subject within NATO as circumstances required. France would not concur in any reference to a Soviet threat as such and disputed the need for specific recommendations by the ministers. It thus disassociated itself from a further communique paragraph which expressed allied concern over the recent expansion of Soviet activity in the area and which noted that early consideration would be given to measures designed to safeguard the security interests of NATO members there, including increased surveillance activities. Previous discussion within the permanent Council had made apparent considerable apprehension that any specific measures undertaken might seem unduly provocative to the Soviets or to the Arab nations. Ministers of the Fourteen did agree, however, that activation of a NATO maritime air surveillance command for the Mediterranean should be expedited. They also instructed the permanent representatives to consider other possible measures, including an expansion of allied military exercises in the area and the formation of a standby multi-national naval force to be available on call. These latter actions were not made public. Previous discussions of the immediate formation of a NATO standing naval force for the Mediterranean similar to that recently established in the Atlantic had evidenced no support for this idea.

Berlin. The NATO ministers also focused their attention on the recent East German attempts to encroach on the political and psychological position of West Berlin. All fifteen ministers approved and publicly associated themselves with the expressed determination of the US, the UK and France to maintain freedom of access to that city. The ministerial communique called attention to Soviet responsibility for any action which hampered or endangered free access to Berlin and urged that such actions, which it called “a deliberate attempt to jeopardize detente,” be discontinued. The statement adopted was based on a draft proposed by the West Germans; even though Foreign Minister Brandt had been prepared, in case of French opposition, to accept a Four-Power declaration on Berlin appended to the NATO communique, approval by all NATO members was achieved.

Conclusions. The NATO ministerial session just concluded was relatively undramatic, as the principal items on the agenda, viz., the three follow-up reports relating to aspects of the Harmel Study, were approved and the recommendations accepted with few changes from the drafts presented by the permanent representatives, who had succeeded in making unusually thorough and effective preparations. Likewise, the French reservations on these drafts had already been spelled out in full. The position of France in NATO has thus remained consistent for over a year. It is a rather reluctant ally. It seeks continued participation in the political and many military discussions, consultations, and studies of the Alliance, and it will often join in statements of general position. However, it disassociates itself from almost all concrete actions or calls for action, and from moves that imply a coordination of future policy, lest any of this imply a subordination of French policy to the US or to others.

Relatively little notice was paid at this session to the approach of 1969 and the opportunity that will legally become available to member governments to give one year’s notice of withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty. By contrast, last December, with this date in mind, the ministers had given emphasis to projecting the Alliance and its work well beyond that 20th anniversary date. Secretary General Brosio did announce that he would soon seek North Atlantic Council discussion on the public affairs handling of NATO’s birthday activities next year, but this was in response to several references by ministers to the need to enhance further the NATO “image” and particularly its appeal to youth, rather than in the context of withdrawal rights. Other speakers referred to continued public support for NATO membership, while only the Portuguese Foreign Minister mentioned specifically that 1969 would pre-sent the question of whether his country could remain bound to the North Atlantic Treaty, as presently written. Thus, as the Alliance focuses ever more attentively on detente, though still keeping its powder dry, its continuance into the third decade of work appears to be taken increasingly for granted by almost all, including France.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 ICE(RE). Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and sent from INR Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr., to Secretary Rusk.
2. Held June 24 and 25. The U.S. Delegation records of this meeting, including telegrams to and from the delegation, memoranda of conversation, briefing papers, schedules, and agenda, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182. For text of the communique and attached Declaration on Balanced Force Reductions, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75–77.
3. In a telegram on June 25, the Mission to NATO characterized the meeting as follows: “In general, there was less disarray and more determination at this meeting than in any NATO Ministerial in recent years.” (Telegram 556 from Reykjavik, Secto 24; Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 ICE(RE))