Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

308. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 5, 1968, 3:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Tour d’Horizon

PARTICIPANTS

• Raymond Barre, Vice President of the Commission of the European Communities
• Michel Hedreul, Assistant Chef de Cabinet to Mr. Barre
• Pierre Montastruc, Official in Cabinet of Mr. Barre
• The Secretary
• George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Abraham Katz, Director, Office of OECD, European Communities and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs

The Secretary welcomed Barre, saying we were always interested to know what was happening in the Commission and the Six. Mr. Barre replied he was happy to be here and have an opportunity to exchange views with State, Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Such a dialogue was necessary to achieve better mutual understanding. This was essential as we shared the burden of the world economy together.

July 1 Tariff Cuts

The Secretary, referring to press speculation, asked whether it was Mr. Barre’s impression there would be no change regarding the tariff cuts scheduled for July 1. Mr. Barre replied he was certain there would be no change. Agriculture Minister p_BEJ1 Faure, at the recent EC Council of Ministers following agreement on the dairy CAP, announced there would be no objection to fulfilling the commitments including the external commitments. Despite the fact that the cost of settling the strike will be high, we have enough reserves, said Mr. Barre, to enable us not to modify our commercial and monetary policy. As a Frenchman, he said, I am hopeful this policy would be maintained.

The Secretary said he had been nervous that the social costs of the events might lead to a modification of the July 1 commitments. Mr. Barre replied that in France there are protectionist forces, which as July 1 approached, began questioning the ability of France to face competition in order to change the economic structure. Perhaps if there are major political changes, the policy of liberalization may be changed. But if no such changes take place he was confident in France’s adhering to its commitments.

European Reaction to U.S. Tax Bill

The Secretary asked if it was Mr. Barre’s expectation that passage of our tax bill would be welcomed in Europe. Mr. Barre replied that he had said at the combined meeting earlier that day that, if the bill were passed, the international financial community, especially in Europe, would be confident that a crisis could be avoided. He said the impression in Europe would be that the U.S. has finally gained control of its balance of payments. This was very important for the international monetary system.

UK Entry into the EC

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Barre saw any possibility that the recent events, which, he emphasized, we did not enjoy, might make any change in the prospects of UK entry.

Mr. Barre replied that he was not sure this was the case. In France and in other parts of Europe there was a conflict between emotions and reason when it came to UK entry. We are all confident, said Mr. Barre, that the UK will one day be admitted to the EC. But all feel, he said, that the UK cannot now assume the obligations of the Treaty. The situation is different from 1958 when the Six were entering a period of constructing the Community. Today the Common Market is built and it is difficult to conceive a situation in which one member would have a massive exceptional situation. Mr. Barre said he had agreed with the Commission on the need for consultations and negotiations with the UK. But the French government said one could not begin negotiating without knowing the end of the negotiation. Personally, he, Barre, regretted that the British were too quick to apply. If the UK had taken measures to restore equilibrium and confidence before applying, there would have been a more favorable answer.

Elections in the West

The Secretary pointed out that a number of NATO governments were in transition. The U.S., France, Italy, Belgium were all in the process of changing governments. He asked if Mr. Barre foresaw any difficulties for the Common Market because Italy and Belgium were without governments. Mr. Barre replied the Common Market was accustomed to having one or two countries without governments. He pointed out the recent agricultural decisions had been taken without a Belgian government. He thought it was possible to take some routine decisions this year. The big decisions pertaining to the second stage in the development of the Community—the creation of the economic union would be taken next year. But, he remarked, next year there will be German elections.

The Secretary remarked that Khrushchev once said “someone in the West is always having those damned elections.”

Key Political Questions Facing U.S.

The Secretary, after remarking that economic and technical issues would be discussed thoroughly in Mr. Barre’s other conversations, asked what key political questions Mr. Barre’s colleagues would be likely to ask on his return to Europe. He offered to try to answer any such questions Mr. Barre might have. But he could not answer the question who will be the next President.

Mr. Barre remarked that he would not interfere in internal political questions. He said that on the political side there were two questions or rather hopes in Europe. One hope is that it will be possible for the U.S. to arrive at a satisfactory settlement on Vietnam. The second hope was that social and racial equilibrium would be maintained in the United States in the next months. He said that the friends of the U.S. in Europe believe that international equilibrium is linked to these two matters.

U.S. Social and Racial Problems

The Secretary replied on the second point that no clear solution was probable in a matter of months. These were not problems of stagnation but problems of movement. Progress in this field stimulates action and sometimes violence. However, while much progress has been achieved, the most difficult parts of the problem were not resolved. Those aspects depending on attitudes and personal feelings rather than on laws and personal feelings were most difficult and will take more time. But, he emphasized, these are problems of movement and, not of stagnation.

Vietnam

As for the first point, the Secretary said, much will depend on how the conflict in Vietnam will be settled. Many Europeans ask the wrong question, he said. They ask whether they should support the U.S. in Vietnam. It is easy to say that the U.S. is big and stupid, but no matter what happens U.S. power will insulate Europe from South East Asia. The Europeans should be asking two other questions instead. First, what sort of Asia is in the interest of Europe, i.e., in terms of hard national self-interest? Second, what is the interest of Europe in the fidelity of the United States to its security commitments? On the latter question, the Secretary said there is no theory of the master race in this country which says NATO—yes, Asia—no. Europe has a big stake in the answer to the second question. To settle Vietnam in terms which would signify abandonment would be tragic for Europe. Europe has a big stake in not seeing America revert to isolationism.

Mr. Barre replied that as a Frenchman he understood our difficult problem very well. He had experienced this sort of problem in Indochina, in Tunisia, and Algeria. He understood that the U.S. cannot accept a settlement at any price. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would reach a settlement enabling us to maintain our cooperation with the rest of the world and not revert to isolationism. As he had told Ambassador Schaetzel, it would be a great danger if the U.S. should lose interest in the rest of the world.

The Secretary said we must be interested in peace both in the Atlantic and Pacific areas. During World War II we first defeated Hitler, then we defeated Japan. The second task was accomplished without much assistance from Europe or resources from the European theater, which was an indication of how high a second priority this task was given in the U.S. We have alliances with many countries. We are concerned what Peking and the government of North Korea as well as the government of North Vietnam will feel about our reaction.

As for the chances of a settlement, the Secretary continued, this remains to be seen. Unhappily, in the Paris talks everything is on the public record. We have tried to engage the North Vietnamese in private conversation, but they have so far refused. Nevertheless, we hope such talks could be started soon.

Mr. Barre remarked it was always a lengthy tedious process to negotiate with the Communists.

The Secretary pointed out it took one and one-half years to talk the fever out of the Berlin crisis. The Cuban missile crisis was an exception because by the nature of the crisis it had to be resolved quickly.

Mr. Barre remarked it was a matter of considerable importance that the conversations had begun.

The Secretary said that there now appears to be a broader understanding of the situation. About 78% of the territory and 90% of the population of North Vietnam are now free from bombing. Not one kilometer in South Vietnam is free from bombing and Hanoi will not tell us what will happen if we stop the bombing completely. They must tell us this and no one else is in a position to tell us. We hope they will someday, but they have not done so yet.

Mr. Barre said there was considerable hope in Europe that the U.S. could solve this problem. Europe has had the problem of decolonization. It is not the same problem, but the two problems are confused in people’s minds. That is why many in France favor a quick and drastic solution to the Vietnam problem. When he was in the French government during the Algerian war, there were plenty of people willing to give advice on how to obtain peace but when one actually looks for peace it is not so easy to attain it.

The Secretary said he frequently points out to his European friends that if forty Communist regiments were operating in Bavaria, Denmark, and Turkey, there would have to be some bombing. Europeans readily understand this but cannot understand bombing in Southeast Asia. For us, he said, the problem is the same.

Couve’s Economic Policy

The Secretary asked Mr. Barre what significance the switch of Couve and Debre had for financial, economic and monetary policy.

Mr. Barre replied that the change took place just prior to his departure so he had no first hand knowledge. He said he thought the change was made because Debre had not been happy with the high cost of the social settlement. Furthermore, he had not been in good health. It was necessary especially now to have a finance minister with a cool mind.

Mr. Barre and the Secretary agreed that this was a quality of M. Couve de Murville.

Mr. Barre thought there would be no change in economic policy nor for that matter in foreign policy. Couve had always been interested in financial and economic policies, and in the reshuffle it appeared he was the right man for solving both internal and international economic problems. He will be calm, efficient and devoted to international cooperation. Speaking for himself, Mr. Barre said it was a source of great confidence to him to see Couve in that post because of his fundamental orientation toward liberalization of trade and payments and the maintenance of competition.

Contagion of French Events

The Secretary asked to what extent the French events could be regarded as being provoked by a virus which was contagious in Europe. Perhaps this was true of the students elsewhere in Europe, but what about other parts of the society?

Mr. Barre replied that in France it was necessary to distinguish between a small minority of anarchist students and the vast majority seeking reform within a system of order. If we consider the social situation, the unions were favorable to a cautious economic rather than political settlement, but the workers were not. Union leaders now are cautious about the instructions they give the workers as they fear they may not be followed.

However, in other countries, Mr. Barre said, there is little danger of contagion. One possible exception is Italy where a balance of political forces has not been reestablished. Mr. Barre hoped that by fall the Socialist party could come back to power. In Italy, the repercussions will be social and political rather than in the area of labor relations.

Mr. Barre thought it was possible, barring a major political change which he did not foresee, and assuming the economy got back to work, that in France the social and economic consequences of this extraordinary crisis of anarchy and revolutionary romanticism could be minimized. It will, however, be necessary to make some changes in the French political scene. Frenchmen are not accustomed to a lengthy stability of government. France is witnessing many important and fundamental economic changes. Young people feel divorced from the establishment. The population is irritated with the stable and self-confident government with which they have no dialogue, Mr. Barre said.

The Secretary pointed out that we are in an important transitional period with respect to our population. Half of our population cannot remember World War II or the events leading up to it. When he lectures in universities, the Secretary said, he realized that one half the students were in the fifth and sixth grades when he became Secretary of State. In Eastern Europe the young people have no interest in the ideology. Thus, when there are legitimate grievances these can spread. In this country, most professors make clear they regard their students as a nuisance and would rather be at an all-faculty institution such as All-Souls. In Europe in the universities, the traditional system under which the senior professors dominate the departments leaves no place for bright young men. These real problems spread into other areas and provide the foundation for frivolity.

Youth and the Common Market

The Secretary felt that young people should be more involved in NATO and other major international efforts. He asked, does the Common Market succeed in engaging the interest of persons 25 and 30 years of age in the problems of European construction?

Mr. Barre replied that this question had been discussed in the Commission. He had pointed out that when he discussed Common Market problems in the universities, the older men discussed them in terms of self-interest. The younger people, while not having an ideology, do have a will to build a new society. In the transitional period in which we live, Mr. Barre continued, all values are being questioned. No system of spiritual, political and social values is immune. It is, therefore, essential for younger people to find new reasons for life. It was possible that, with new themes like European construction and aid to the developing countries, which appeal to the spirit of generosity of youth, one can orient them towards new achievements.

British Youth and the EC

The Secretary recalled that earlier in the conversation Mr. Barre had said the UK had acted too soon on its application. Some of his British friends were concerned that the younger generation, disillusioned by Britain as a world power, by Victorian Britain, and by the Britain of Churchill, were becoming disoriented. George Brown thought that by taking Britain into Europe, the government would give British youth a renewed elan and sense of purpose. He was worried that if the British youth would become disillusioned with the prospects for Europe they would not have anything. Therefore, the application was made sooner rather than later. There was a good deal of fear that otherwise the considerable support for British membership would erode.

Mr. Barre replied that he had spoken with Brown and had advised him to build up support for entry into Europe more progressively. It appeared to many Europeans despite the considerable propaganda in the UK on Common Market entry, that no true conversion had been achieved. In Europe, he said, it was asked whether the British were really ready to become part of Europe. If there could be better preparation, British chances would be better.

The Secretary remarked that in British tradition, the knight always slays the dragon. And this time Sir George did not succeed.

Secretary to Call on Commission in December

At this point the interview ended. The Secretary assured Mr. Barre that he and his colleagues would be welcomed here and hoped he would have useful talks. He said he planned to call on the Commission in December when in Brussels for the NATO Ministerial Meeting.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Katz and approved in S on June 15. The time of the conversation is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (JOHNSON Library)