Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

283. Intelligence Note No. 1020¹

Washington, December 26, 1967.

SUBJECT

• French “Pocket Veto” of UK Common Market Bid Causes Some Friction, But No Crisis

The December 18–19 meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities (EC) concentrated its attention almost exclusively on the British application for entry into the Common Market. The principal result was a reconfirmation of the French “pocket veto,” although no formal vote was taken on the question. The chagrin and disappointment evidenced particularly by the Dutch and the Belgians may cause some slowdown of normal Community activities, but such a slowdown is not likely to endure long into the New Year. It is not expected that the continued French success in blocking negotiations on EC membership for the British will lead to any serious split in the Common Market.

The Preliminaries. France’s action at this latest meeting of the Council of Ministers is a logical culmination of the positions which that country has taken since the British renewed their bid in May. President De Gaulle, in press conferences on May 16 and November 27, made no secret of his attitude. Britain was not yet judged to be economically healthy enough for admission, the role of sterling as a reserve currency was incompatible with EC membership, and there would have to be profound changes in Britain’s social and political “nature” before it would be sufficiently European, if admitted, not to endanger the viability of the Common Market. At the October 23–24 meeting of the Council of Ministers,² French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, noting that France had no objection in principle to British entry, nevertheless said that the question of new members had to be studied in depth. He raised the problems of the UK balance of payments deficit and the role of sterling and called for solutions to both as necessary preconditions even to negotiations.

With the one exception of France, the other Common Market members were agreed that, as recommended in the EC Commission report of September 29, 1967, negotiations should be opened with the British (and the Irish, Danes, and Norwegians) to see whether solutions could be found to the problems involved in their membership applications. Given the known French position, it is doubtful whether either the UK or the “Friendly Five” seriously expected that the French could be brought to accept negotiations. But the UK Foreign Office made clear that the British expected a formal reply to their application from the Community as a whole. Further, in public statements and private conversations, British officials repeatedly emphasized that the UK application was for full membership and that any form of association—which the French hinted might be a suitable compromise—was unacceptable. The British also did all they could to encourage the five EC members favorable to their cause to stand firm. In particular, the British devoted attention to stiffening the attitude of the Germans, who were obviously in a key position to influence the French, if anyone was. As one observer noted, “the Dutch could make a row, but only the Germans could make a crisis.”

It has been clear for some time, however, that the Germans were not going to make a crisis. Because of broader foreign policy considerations the Kiesinger government, in this as in other matters, wanted to avoid a head-on collision with the French. The German Foreign Office emphasized in December that Germany would not contemplate negotiations between Britain and the Five, and that Germany would not be willing to employ specific pressure to change the French position on negotiations with the British. For this reason, the major issue on December 18–19 was not whether negotiations would be authorized but what posture the Five would assume in face of, and after, the French veto. Thus, the Five agreed at a meeting on December 14 that their best tactic at the December 18–19 session would be to press for a clear discussion and a clear reply to the British, i.e., a formal French veto. The Five’s tactic coincided with the British wish to force the issue on the principle of membership, perhaps with the idea that, with this in the record, it might be easier some day to reopen the issue at Brussels.

The December 18–19 Meeting. The Five thus entered the Brussels meeting probably well aware of the fact that they would not obtain approval of any form of negotiations with the British. They hoped, however, to isolate the French by forcing them in a formal vote to veto negotiations on the British application. In this hope they were disappointed.

A December 11–12 Council meeting had heard a report from the Commission on the UK devaluation of November 18, and its hoped-for results in improving the British balance of payments. Nevertheless, at the December 18–19 meeting, Couve de Murville insisted that the question of negotiating British entry could not even be considered until the health of the British economy had been demonstrably reestablished. In the long run the British might be able to overcome their difficulties, said Couve, but they are not now ready for membership, and to permit their entry would be dangerous for the Community. Moreover, to enter into long-drawn-out negotiations would freeze EC progress.

The other five Foreign Ministers argued variously for acceptance of the Commission’s recommendation and “negotiations now!” Brandt, for example, argued for a parallel progress in negotiations and British economic recovery. In the end, however, there was no vote, there was no formal veto, and the communique, subscribed to by all six, was rather bland for the occasion.

The communiqué ending the meeting, in language provided by the German Chairman, Minister of Economics Schiller, provided a seven-point summary record of the session. The principal points were: that no member objected in principle to the enlargement of the Common Market, although one member believed that enlargement would modify profoundly the nature of the Community; that all member states believed that the economic recovery of the UK was an essential precondition for its membership, although several member states (probably Italy and Benelux) did not believe that recovery needed to be complete prior to entry; that five member states shared the Commission’s view that negotiations with Britain should begin, although one member state believed that the UK economic recovery had to be completed in order that its application be considered; that, as a result, no agreement had been reached on opening negotiations, and the Council’s Chairman had been charged with so informing the interested countries; and that the applications for membership would remain on the Council’s agenda. Although no countries were identified by name in the communique, there is little question as to where each country stood.

An eighth point, that the operations of the Community would proceed normally, was eliminated at the request of Italy and Benelux. It was the least they could do, but the deletion committed no one to any action. Despite the wishes of the Friendly Five, it would seem that the communique did a better job of highlighting the poor state of the British economy than of conspicuously and unequivocally drawing attention to the isolation of France.

Immediate Reaction to the Pocket Veto. Resignation mingled with annoyance and, in some cases, indignation toward the French seems to be the prevailing reaction among the Friendly Five. The Dutch member walked out of a meeting of the Common Market’s Agricultural Ministers, causing the German Chairman to suspend the session. A meeting of Labor Ministers was cancelled at the request of the Dutch and Belgians, and the Dutch representative did not attend a meeting of the six Social Affairs Ministers. The Belgians have decided not to take part in future debates pending a “final policy decision” next year. (The next meeting of the Permanent Representatives is scheduled for February 4–5. It is interesting to note that for the first half of 1968 the French will serve as chairmen of the different meetings.) The Dutch plan not to participate in current Ministerial meetings. Both the Dutch and the Belgians have stressed, however, that their non-participation is not a boycott of the Common Market meetings. It is not clear yet what the significance of these gestures may turn out to be.

Immediately after the end of the Council meeting, the Five met in a rump session, but apparently decided on nothing except increased common action with the UK. Details are vague, and these consultations will probably turn out to be no more significant than the stratagem of semi-annual WEU meetings adopted after France’s 1963 veto. If talks with the British do develop, however, they are evidently intended largely to relate to matters outside of the Common Market’s jurisdictional area.

The British could hardly have been surprised at the turn of events in Brussels. Following the end of the meeting, Foreign Secretary Brown announced that the British application still stood, that the British did not intend to withdraw it, and that the UK now proposed to enter into consultations with the five EC members that favored negotiations. Informal consultations between the British and the Five may indeed take place, but they will almost certainly not be institutionalized. In face of the British rejection of anything but full membership, it is difficult to know how any talk of compromise can take place, but it is likely that, as time passes, association possibilities will be at least discussed.

There has been some talk of retaliation by the Five against the French which might take the form of blocking further progress in the Common Agricultural Policy (France is said to be the largest single beneficiary of the Guidance and Guarantee Fund) or preventing renewal of the Yaounde Convention which expires in mid-1969 (most of the members of the Convention and recipients of EEC aid are former French colonies). But the policies and programs of the communities are now seemingly so inextricably interrelated that it is hard to imagine that this will happen, though of course intra-community bargaining on these matters may be more fierce than ever. The Commission, although regretting the Council’s failure to reach agreement and urging a resumption of the movement “temporarily abandoned” toward expansion of the Community, has appealed “to all concerned to keep the consequences of the present disagreement within the narrowest possible limits.” This seems a far cry from President Rey’s pre-Council talk of crisis.

Similarly, a German government spokesman said the FRG plans to work to keep the Community functioning despite the UK problem, for, according to him, the process of consolidation and development of the Community must not be made dependent on British entry. Chancellor Kiesinger told Ambassador McGhee just prior to the conclusion of the Brussels meeting that the basic German tactic will be to seek a solution in stages which will take care of political requirements and UK prestige, and that the whole matter is one for compromise. This is entirely consist-ent with previously known German attitudes. The Dutch have been considered perhaps the only ones among the Five with the courage to challenge De Gaulle frontally on this issue. But they are also realists, and our Embassy in The Hague believes that there would be considerable reluctance even in The Netherlands to generate a crisis. The Belgians have shown unusual spirit lately vis-á-vis the French, but appear to be resigned to the fact of the French veto. A high-ranking advocate of UK entry in the Belgian Foreign Ministry believes that the Five have no choice but to accept the French veto or risk breaking up the Community, and none, he thinks, will accept this risk. The Italians face an election in the spring and do not want to be faced with a European crisis at this time. Foreign Minister Fanfani, in a statement in Rome, spoke obscurely in favor of harmonizing action of the Five in favor of negotiations, and at the same time cautioned against the temptation to act before reflecting.

Conclusion. The sum of these attitudes seems to be clear. The Five would like to see the UK enter the Communities, and would like to begin immediate negotiations to explore the subject. But they all appear to be aware, with varying degrees of resignation, that they have neither the juridical nor the practical means to force the French government to change what is obviously a fundamental aspect of its policy—the exclusion of the UK. It is not probable that there will be a sustained, effective attempt by them to retaliate within the Communities against France. Presumably, then, negotiations on British entry into the Communities must await the incumbency of a new French President. After the Brussels meeting of December 18–19, there will probably be less tactical skirmishing around the outskirts of this fact than there was in 1967.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Transmitted from the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, George C. Denney, Jr., to Secretary of State Rusk.
2. See Intelligence Note 854, “French Place New Road Blocks in Path of UK Bid for Common Market Membership,” October 27, 1957 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem). [Footnote in the source text. A copy of this paper is ibid.]