Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

268. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals¹

Washington, October 4, 1967, 0307Z.

48343. NATUS. Subject: Future of the Alliance Study—US-Belgian Discussions. This message is for background and guidance of addressee posts.

1. Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel and Under Secretary Rostow on October 3 held general review of status and prospects Future of Alliance Study. Kohler, Stoessel and Department officers were present on US side. In addition to Harmel, Belgian side included Davignon (Harmel’s Chef de Cabinet), Van der Straten-Waillet of Foreign Ministry and Belgian Ambassador.

2. Belgian Reaction to Work of Sub-Groups—Davignon characterized Belgian view of Sub-Group work along following lines: Report on East-West relations (Sub-Group I) has not caused major problems at sub-group level. In Belgian view, however, it is too timid, especially section on Germany which says less than public statements by German leaders. Spaak’s draft on inter-Allied relations (Sub-Group II) has caused major difficulties with the French. While Spaak is unwilling to change substance of the report, he is trying to make form less objectionable. Kohler’s report on defense policy (Sub-Group III) is the best report substantively. It deals with matters that primarily concern the Fourteen and thus provides less of a target for French. Patijn’s report on developments outside Treaty area (Sub-Group IV) contains many good ideas but language is too far-reaching for a number of countries.

3. French Intentions—Belgian side indicated concern that, unless US and Belgium quietly spread word that they intend to see the exercise through, a number of other countries will get cold feet in face of present or anticipated French objections. Harmel expressed view that Fourteen should proceed prudently but firmly including scheduled action by Ministers in December. He said that even if De Gaulle should take France out of the Alliance completely (something he thought would not be in France’s interest) the Fourteen would continue. For them to back down on Future Alliance Study would be tantamount to giving up right to carry on intensified political consultations. For the rest, Harmel thought it best not to try to speculate on French tactics or timing but deal with situations as they arise.

4. Rostow expressed general agreement with Harmel’s views. He emphasized that improved political consultations are important in order to safeguard the ability of Allied nations to act internationally. This was especially important for the US given present domestic and international situation.

5. In response to Rostow’s question, Harmel said he thought it would be desirable for the US or Belgium to sound out French authorities quietly. He emphasized, however, that this should not take form of a series of approaches which would dramatize the situation and engage French prestige. He also thought approach should be made only after rapporteurs’ report from Ditchley Park meeting October 11–12 is in hand. It was left that US and Belgium would be in touch re this question after Ditchley meeting.

6. Form and Content of Report—Harmel thought it would not be practicable to combine the four sub-group reports into one comprehensive document. On other hand, he considered it essential that Special Group have before it a single umbrella document or covering report which would hopefully be produced by the rapporteurs. This document should be primarily a set of conclusions on which Special Group representatives could take positions. Harmel said that rapporteurs’ efforts naturally reflect their individual personalities; that their work should be viewed as input to the Special Group; but that main thing would be consolidated set of conclusions. He cited Kohler summary for Sub-Group III as model. Rostow expressed general agreement with this comment.

7. Belgians noted that Brosio is prepared to take responsibility for drafting such a document after Ditchley Park if necessary. They thought it would be difficult for him to take lead at present stage lest he compromise his position with other countries, especially France.

8. Harmel expressed view that substantial agreement must be reached at Special Group level. He thought it most unlikely that Ministers in December could improve the package. As to substance, he noted that each country would have some special point of interest. Problem was for the Special Group to balance these out. Belgium, for example, would be interested in highlighting the central importance of a concerted allied program for reducing tensions with the Communist world, pointing towards an ultimate settlement. If the approach was not accepted in the first instance, that would be regrettable. But it is of great political importance that we make the effort.

9. In response to questions by Rostow, Harmel expressed opinion that Special Group could readily agree on language to identify problems and goals re Germany and European security. He recognized that there would be difficulty in defining methods for Western consultations on these issues, however. The German question affected all Alliance members. Belgium at any rate would be opposed to a restricted body in NATO to consult on this issue. Rostow and Stoessel said that after consideration of all the alternatives, they agreed.

10. Rostow noted importance we must all attach to German views in this general area. Kohler pointed out that while Germans favor Allied consultations, they have a big interest in avoiding any derogation from quadripartite responsibilities. Rostow remarked that Future of Alliance report should make clear that future NATO consultations should not imply such derogation. Stoessel noted that it might be preferable to identify problem and issues but not try to spell out plan for establishment of a group in NATO as part of Harmel exercise.

11. On issues outside NATO area, Rostow emphasized importance of NATO consultations covering, for example, the Middle East and Africa. Such consultations should be open to those NATO countries wishing to participate. Harmel agreed that it was important for the Alliance to consider developments in regions in close proximity to the Treaty area. He hoped the report would include clear language on this point.

12. Harmel raised question (which had interested Belgians early this year) of asking NATO countries “to sign on” to the Treaty for a specified number of years beyond 1969; i.e., to agree not to exercise withdrawal rights under Article 13. He had now come around to view that question was too sensitive and complex to be handled in this manner. Important thing, he thought, was for the Future of the Alliance Study to make clear by implication that Alliance is not only necessary but would continue automatically for an indefinite period in order to accomplish its objectives; e.g. bringing about a European settlement. Rostow stated US in full agreement with Belgium on this point.

13. Arrangements for Special Group Meeting—On assumption that rapporteurs will complete their work at Ditchley meeting October 11–12, both sides considered it important that Special Group meet as near November one as possible. Exact timing is to be worked out through Brosio. Both sides thought two full days would be required and that a second session might be necessary prior to December Ministerial Meeting. Rostow expressed view Special Group might meet over a weekend in case three days needed.

14. Harmel said he attached special importance to high-level, political attendance in the cases of a number of countries. Examples were: Germany, where Scheutz or his successor should be urged to come; Canada; Denmark; Italy; Netherlands; Turkey and UK. He also thought considerable diplomatic preparation might be necessary between Ditchley meeting and Special Group meeting and suggested Belgium had already been active in urging high-level participation. Harmel plans to attend himself, and has told Luns his attendance is essential.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Stoessel, Kohler, and EUR/FBX; and approved by Rostow. Also sent to Brussels for Bowie, EUCOM for POLAD, and SHAPE for POLAD. Repeated to CINCEUR and Belgrade for Leddy.