Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations¹

Washington, May 10, 1967, 7:22 p.m.

191860. Deliver Ambassador Cleveland 9:00 a.m., May 11. NATUS. Joint State/Defense Message. Ref: Paris 17787.² Subject: Mutual Force Reduction.

1. We agree generally with your approach to question of mutual force reduction. Expression of continuing US interest in this matter and proposal to locate study of force reductions within framework of force planning processes seems good method of beginning tentative consideration of this important subject. Obviously political and arms control aspects will also have to be given prominent consideration as you suggest in para 7 reftel. We hope, as you suggest, it will be possible to work out an agreed approach to study of mutual force reduction in anticipation of the December Ministerial meeting.

2. We also agree British should clearly understand there will be no approach to the Soviets at this time on question of reciprocal reductions and that if they raise the matter they will be speaking absolutely for themselves. Rather than attempting to make preconditions as suggested para 3 reftel, we would prefer you make points in context of DPC discussion.

3. In this connection and in connection with the matter of working out reductions with the Soviets which you raise in paragraph 7 of reftel, we believe that for a number of reasons the Soviet Union does not favor formal negotiation at this time. As recently as February, Kosygin in a conversation with Wilson made settlement of European frontiers a prerequisite for mutually agreed reduction of forces. This was an entirely new precondition. Other high Soviet officials (FYI. Abrasimov to McGhee, March 17, 1967. End FYI.) have indicated that the USSR would wait for deeds not words as regards reciprocal withdrawals and that Soviets would withdraw troops from East Germany only after a Western reduction. While no Soviet reduction appears imminent, we believe, nevertheless, that the “mutual example” approach is more promising than any public or private approach directed specifically at the USSR which would make any subsequent Soviet reduction appear to be collaborative with the United States or with NATO. From our point of view avoidance of formal approaches to the Soviets offers greater prospect that they will, in fact, make some reductions in the future once they can be dissociated from specific US and UK actions.

4. Any studies undertaken, of course, as suggested in paragraph 6 reftel by force planners would concentrate on the political and military effects of any changes in Soviet force levels. Possible Western redeployments could be designed to fit into this evolving process in such a manner that the relative Western strength in relation to Soviet strength in Europe would not be impaired. (And, in this connection, we agree with the point in middle your paragraph 3 that US/UK redeployment now under discussion are not reductions. This does not mean that Soviets cannot respond by redeployment of their own.)

5. We see no objection to French participation in the exercise on ad hoc basis as you propose, although we remain skeptical that they will in the long run make a positive contribution to any multilateral effort to reach agreement on force levels.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Romine; cleared by Kohler, McAuliffe, Springsteen, McNaughton, G/PM, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Moscow, London, Bonn, and Brussels.
2. Telegram 17787, May 8, reported that initial DPC discussion of mutual force reductions had been set for May 11, transmitted some suggestions on the question, and requested instructions. (Ibid.)