Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, March 21, 1967, 9:59 a.m.

159094. NATUS. Subject: Trilateral Meeting, March 21.

1. Trilateral March 20 meeting was taken up with statement by German Principal on decisions affecting UK offset which were taken by March 15 meeting of German cabinet, and by response of British Principal setting forth UK position in light of these decisions.

2. Duckwitz (FRG) read prepared statement that, in light of March 15 FRG cabinet meeting, he was authorized to propose following as Germany offset contribution to UK for British 1967–1968 fiscal year: (a) FRG undertakes to make DM 200 million available for military procurement and services in UK, of which DM 50 million would be placed by end December 1967, and balance by end March 1968 if necessary through prepayment; (b) German public purchases in UK during same period of “at least” DM 200 million, which FRG would endeavor to increase if possible; and (c) foregoing offers are based on FRG assumption that UK forces in FRG would remain at about present level during British 1967–1968 fiscal year. Duckwitz also noted cabinet action to approve Bundesbank-Federal Reserve bond purchasing arrangement.

3. Duckwitz’s statement continued with following observations on force levels: (a) FRG shares US view that force levels in Europe should be based on security considerations only; (b) FRG regards current force levels in Central Region as “about adequate but are also necessary to ensure the security of the NATO area in accordance with principles” of the Trilateral Minute of November 10 on conventional forces;² (c) FRG believes that a force withdrawal could be justified only if there were changes in present strategic situation, primarily as result of Warsaw Pact withdrawals from Eastern Europe including East Germany; (d) FRG view that withdrawals or redeployments can have important political impact on the Alliance; and (e) results of Trilateral Talks should be put into NATO force planning forum and reflected in NATO five-year force plan to be adopted by Defense Planning Committee next December.

3. Thomson (UK) welcomed FRG cabinet decisions which he noted have effect of restoring FRG offer of last October, but pointed out that even so there remains a gap of 15–17 million pounds in covering BOP costs of British forces in FRG now running at 82 million pounds annually after taking into account recently achieved administrative economies. He said HMG could not accept this gap without some force reductions. If FRG could agree to following “conditions,” HMG could limit its reduction in relation to 1967–1968 fiscal year (April 1, 1967–March 31, 1968) to one brigade group, with implementation not to begin prior to January 1, 1968: (a) achievement of some progress in British-FRG discussions now under way in Frankfurt for a bond purchasing arrangement similar to US–FRG arrangement; (b) joint undertaking by FRG and UK to exert their best efforts to achieve an additional German contribution of DM 50–100 million, through use for German commercial purchases of FRG funds now on deposit in UK, and through FRG encouragement of German civil public purchases; (c) FRG and US support of British approaches to WEU and NATO for relief from present UK obligation on maintaining forces on Continent; Thomson stressed HMG view it would be appropriate to use this occasion to relieve UK altogether from its unique and unilateral treaty obligation; and (d) possibility of further British withdrawals in fiscal year 1968–1969 would be judged in light of offset arrangements achieved for that year.

4. McCloy (US) recalled USG desire to base force levels on security needs alone, and expressed dismay at prospect that, if this not done, Trilateral Talks would have achieved only transitory results. He, therefore, considered inappropriate approaches to force levels couched in terms of “conditions.”

5. Duckwitz questioned Thomson’s figure of 82 million pounds for current BOP costs of British forces in Germany. He thought amount should be 75 million pounds, to accord with amount cited in DM in joint communique issued last October at close of British-German Ministerial Commission on offset. Figgures of British Treasury pointed out latter amount as used in communique had included proposed saving of 7–8 million pounds which HMG had in mind making through reductions in logistical stocks but had “adjourned” in response to Allied reactions.

6. Thomson pressed Duckwitz for early reaction to British position he had stated. Duckwitz and Harkort were reluctant to respond at this meeting but seemed indicate readiness to consider recording in public joint statement British-German willingness to make best efforts towards maximizing German purchases in UK at levels higher than cabinet approved offers. Duckwitz wished be assured, which Thomson did, that FRG would not be held accountable for any shortfalls between targets cited in such joint statement and cabinet approved undertakings.

7. Principals agreed that Report on “Reinforcement of Central Europe in an Emergency” resulting from March 15–16 meeting of Working Group II, should be conveyed to Brosio for attention of NATO force planners. However, they agreed that Brosio should not give force planners Part B of that paper, concerning “Military Factors Involved in Any East-West Force Reduction,” inasmuch as latter part is preliminary only. Further, they agreed Brosio should be asked to respond to queries from other NATO members re Trilateral consideration of latter subject to effect that nothing in depth had yet emerged and hence there is nothing to report.

8. Talks to resume morning of March 21.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Michael R. Gannett and approved by McAuliffe. Also sent to London and Paris.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO)