241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany1
153411. For the Ambassador. Please deliver following message immediately from President to Chancellor Kiesinger. Follow form and style discussed in Leddy-Hillenbrand telecon.2 Signed original will be delivered Ambassador Knappstein ASAP. Text follows:
[Page 547]“Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I very much appreciate the thoughts you expressed to Ambassador McGhee on February 22. The warm friendship between our two countries is a source of great strength, not only for our own peoples but for the entire world community. I want you to know that this Government will extend every effort to maintain a close and confident working relation with you and your associates.
I want to thank you for receiving John McCloy, who has given me a full report of his good talk with you. And thank you also for your kind greetings.
The enterprise in which Messrs. McCloy, Duckwitz and Thomson are engaged is of great importance to the future of the Atlantic Community we have all worked so hard to fashion. It comes at a time when many NATO members are under strong political and economic pressures which could jeopardize the broad objectives of the Atlantic Alliance. I am strongly of the opinion that NATO troop deployments and other security arrangements should only be altered when and if the security situation permits. I hope that each of us will put first things first, and not allow the growth and consolidation of a strong Atlantic Community to be damaged by excessive concern with our own short-term difficulties in disregard of the broader common interest.
This is why the United States position in the trilateral talks has rested on the three interrelated principles which Mr. McCloy has already discussed with you:
- First, the level of forces in Europe should be determined by agreement among the Allies on the basis only of security considerations, broadly construed.
- Second, it is for the German Government to decide what military procurement it wishes to undertake in the light of its commitments to the Alliance.
- Third, the Allies should deal at the same time with the remaining problem of neutralizing the foreign exchange consequences of troop presence in Germany by cooperation in the management of monetary reserves and other financial arrangements.
We recognize that the simple offset concept—an advance agreement for military purchases of prescribed amounts to offset the foreign exchange costs of U.S. troops in Germany—can be superseded by arrangements appropriate to the full range of military and financial relations which form the solid core of the Atlantic Community. It is our strong hope that all of us will be able to move toward a new basis of continuing financial cooperation which will both strengthen the international monetary system and provide a firmer foundation for the troop deployments essential to mutual security. I am encouraged in this [Page 548] respect by the results of preliminary talks between our representatives and those of the Bundesbank.
As you know, the arrangements between the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom regarding the BAOR are also closely related to the constructive handling of our own problem. A major BAOR cut at this time would have damaging consequences for the security of us all. Because of the especially difficult economic circumstances of the U.K., arrangements on the U.S.-F.R.G. pattern would be inadequate. German purchases inevitably play a greater role. In review of your own budgetary problem, your willingness to try to find ways to deal with the British problem is a real contribution to Alliance solidarity. With imaginative efforts all around, I feel we can jointly work out a constructive solution. Mr. McCloy will be communicating our ideas in more detail to Messrs. Duckwitz and Thomson.
Mr. McCloy will also be discussing our views on the question of force levels and deployments. I know you appreciate that I am under great pressure from the Congress and public opinion to reduce our forces in Europe substantially. Some have urged a withdrawal of two divisions and others even more. I am myself determined to hold the line against any steps which would significantly weaken NATO. I am convinced that a limited rotational plan, which Mr. McCloy will explain, can satisfy NATO’s security requirements. This, together with a maximum effort by our NATO Allies and a successful outcome of the trilateral talks over-all will greatly help me in handling the pressures here at home.
A second matter is the problem of international liquidity and the current negotiations in the IMF and the Group of Ten. Rapid progress is needed this spring and summer to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. Specifically, we believe that, by the September meetings of the Bank and Fund, there should be agreement on a contingency plan for the creation of new reserves. We intend to press for such agreement even in the face of some resistance on the part of a few countries. With so much at stake, I hope we can count on your support.
Finally, I would like to mention the question of a non-proliferation treaty. You may be certain that we are examining your comments on the draft text of a treaty with utmost care. As Secretary Rusk assured Vice-Chancellor Brandt, the current draft has not been agreed upon with the Soviet Union, but only reflects our explorations regarding a possible basis of agreement. We have made quite clear to the Soviets our intention to consult with our Allies before reaching any agreement. We intend that these consultations be thorough and are prepared to take the necessary time for the purpose. I hope that the talks which Ambassador Foster has had with your government have been useful in advancing us toward a common viewpoint. You can rest assured that we will make every effort [Page 549] to work out formulas which the Federal Republic and our other Allies will find acceptable.
I know that the non-proliferation issue poses difficult problems for you. However, in my judgment, an equitable treaty would be a most important step toward the larger goal of bringing all nuclear weapons under effective control. In the terms in which you expressed your concern to Ambassador Foster, I think the treaty is indeed imbedded in the common interest of our two nations.
Mr. Chancellor, I hope this letter will be the first of many communications between the two of us. The strong bonds between the United States and the Federal Republic have linked our countries in a broad spectrum of important and complex endeavors. I consider it of great importance that we maintain a frank and open correspondence through which we can exchange views, impressions, and ideas. In particular, I very much hope that your schedule will permit a meeting with each other on a not too distant date. I know that your burdens are heavy and your time limited, but I hope that we may be able to find agreement on the date, time and place.
Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending our warmest greetings and best wishes to you and your family.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson”