Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, November 26, 1966, 10:30 a.m.

91669. NATUS. Ref: A. Brussels 2421 rptd Paris; being rptd Bonn London & Moscow by Dept; B. Brussels 2429.² Subj: NATO Ministerial Meeting—Study on Future of Alliance.

1. Primarily as result of Belgian initiative with US (reftels), Dept has been considering desirability and feasibility of NATO Ministers in December commissioning a major study on future of Alliance. Briefly, US like many European countries is concerned with need to articulate up-to-date role for the Alliance; to assure its continued relevance to improved East-West relations in line with the President’s October 7 speech;³ and, against background of French withdrawal and approach of 1969, to assure continued governmental and public understanding and support for goals of Western cohesion and deterrent strength of Alliance.

2. Tactically, we prefer that initiative on this problem come from Europe. Belgian suggestion is most helpful from this standpoint. As to content, we believe any new study should concentrate on political and non-military side of NATO and Atlantic policies.

3. We are convinced that questions of strategic doctrine, force levels and deployment, and nuclear planning should continue to be handled in existing framework. A new study might take note of NATO progress on these issues to provide balance and necessary background for a report to Ministers. Terms of reference should not however provide for any independent substantive study of these matters.

4. Among the many problems in formulating and getting underway a study on future of the Alliance is method and timing of approach to Germans. Immediate question is whether in time remaining before the December Ministerial meeting, the existing German Government or a new one can take decision to go along with study. If not, it might be better simply to have ideas advanced in December with final decision to be taken subsequently by the Permanent Council or by Ministers in the spring. We think it highly unlikely study could be a success without full German cooperation from the outset.

5. In light of Belgian suggestions and our own thinking we have concluded that a NATO decision in December or subsequently might embody the following elements:

a. Ministers should ask Brosio and the Permanent Council to undertake a thorough study of broad policies, activities and organization relating to NATO’s non-military functions. In part this would be a follow-up to existing work on East-West relations.

b. The study should be completed in time for action to be taken at the December 1967 Ministerial meeting. We doubt that work of this scope and importance could be gotten underway and completed in time for Ministerial consideration next spring.

c. Brosio and the Permanent Council could be assisted by senior officials from capitals and, subject to limits explained below, by consultation with independent experts or public figures having a suitable background in Atlantic and international affairs. As a variant of this idea, creation of a special commission might be envisaged. Membership in such a commission would be open to all NATO countries. Governments could designate either special representatives or their NATO Permanent Representatives to sit on the Commission.

d. The work might be organized under several main headings. The following seem logical to us but we recognize that other variations may be preferred.

(1) Improving East-West Relations. This might be essentially a development from the present NATO exercise. It would concentrate on such areas as contacts, cultural affairs and economic relations—with a view to seeing how these could be handled so as not only to improve East-West relations but also encourage constructive change in the East. Independent experts could be helpful on these aspects.

(2) European Security and the German Problem. This field must be reserved to governments and take due account of quadripartite responsibilities. Therefore outside experts should not be used for this part of the study.

(3) General Atlantic and European Relations. Work in this area could concentrate on such things as a restatement of the principles of Atlantic cooperation and their relationship to Western European unification. Independent experts and public figures might be consulted on these issues.

(4) Organization of NATO. Under this heading there could be a reexamination of Alliance machinery in light of recommendations made under the three preceding headings. Outside advice could also be sought on these matters.

6. For Brussels: As follow-up to Under Secretary Rostow’s talks with Harmel (reftel B), please inform Belgian Govt that we are grateful for ideas in Belgian memorandum; that our study has resulted in tentative points outlined in para five above which have been developed with benefit of Belgian ideas; and that we assume they will be taking soundings with other key NATO countries. You should also make clear we will probably be talking with others informally to clarify our own views. We wish to emphasize however that any such discussions would not involve preempting this important Belgian initiative. Please ascertain whether Belgians see any problem in our referring to fact they have raised subject with us and noting that they may be making a proposal in connection with the Ministerial. Meanwhile, we shall be giving further thought to entire subject, including the detailed points in body of Belgian memorandum.

7. For Bonn and London: As soon as we have results of approach to Belgians we expect to take soundings with UK and Federal Republic.

8. For USRO: We hope to provide guidance for action with other NATO delegations as soon as we have results of soundings with Belgium, FRG and UK. Meanwhile, we think it important to avoid any general NATO discussion of matters covered in this message.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Vest,INR, S/P, and four offices in EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Telegram 2429, November 23, reported that at a luncheon for Rostow, given by Foreign Minister Harmel, the discussion centered on the Belgian proposal for a study of “whither NATO.” (Ibid., POL 7 US/Rostow) Telegram 2421 transmitted the text of the Belgian proposal that examined the current problems of the Alliance in light of De Gaulle’s actions in the spring of 1966 and suggested areas that could be profitably explored dealing with the future of NATO. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO)
3. See Document 211.