Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

216. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson¹

Washington, November 15, 1966.

I am immensely heartened by your courageous announcement about joining the EEC. Your entry would certainly help to strengthen and unify the West. If you find on the way that there is anything we might do to smooth the path, I hope you will let me know.

The report from John McCloy on the Trilateral talks is encouraging, despite the real difficulties we still face. Thomson made an excellent contribution.² I am hopeful that we can get a genuine return from this exercise—militarily, politically and financially.

The immediate snag, which Carstens confirmed, is the inevitability of delay on the German side. While they can fruitfully continue to work with us in the Trilateral Group, it would be impossible for them to reach a responsible government position on these matters in time to keep the present schedule. We should surely give the Germans a chance to get themselves a government.

I know we agree that we must move together in order to maintain NATO as a credible deterrent and as a stabilizing influence, especially in Germany. Your presence in Germany is as important to us as your presence in the East, which I assume remains as we last discussed it.

I understand, as you know, the importance to you of being able to justify a change in your announced program, in view of the pressures inherent in your difficult but promising policies of economic adjustment. Would it help if I placed in the United Kingdom in the near future $35 million in orders beyond those already agreed to? I think I could do so on assurance from you that you will stay with us and the Germans in completing this fundamental review of the military, political and financial basis for the US–UK presence in Germany, making no change in your troop and supply dispositions there until after the completion of the review, and then that you will concert with us on any such changes in the light of that review. This procurement would supplement the accruals of dollars to you associated with the recent shift of our forces and installations to Britain from the Continent.

I may get some heat from Congress on this, and cannot move definitively until I have talked it over with some of my people on the Hill. I think I can persuade them to go along on the basis outlined here.

McCloy and our government officials are working on plans to handle deficits that result from the presence of our troops abroad through a multilateral clearing arrangement that should help neutralize balances, and contribute to an ultimate resolution of the monetary problem. That may take some time to negotiate. If successful, such an arrangement should help to satisfy some of our critics in Congress, and move the Germans to accept their own proper responsibilities.

I cannot stress too strongly the need for progress towards more equitable patterns for dealing with the various responsibilities we all bear throughout the world. As we both know, some of the criticism I get here on the subject is justified. And, as you can imagine, the new Congress will not be easier to persuade than its predecessor.

I very much hope that the arrangements proposed here will help you to join us in keeping this exercise on the tracks. Let us keep in close touch on this.³

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. Bruce was informed of the message in telegram 85292 to London, November 15. (Ibid.)
2. The second round of trilateral talks took place at the Department of State November 9–10, with McCloy, Thomson, and Carstens again representing their countries. In this round they discussed questions of military capabilities, the defense burden, and the foreign exchange problems resulting from the stationing of troops in Germany. Summaries of the meetings were transmitted to Paris in telegrams 82537, 83122, and 83129, November 10. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W) The text of an agreed tripartite minute, which outlined the steps necessary to deter aggression, was transmitted to Paris in telegram 83128, November 10. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO) For text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the second round, see Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1966, p. 867.
3. Printed from an unsigned copy.