Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

214. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, October 28, 1966, 8:30 p.m.

75415. NATUS. Subj: NATO and France. For Ambassadors Cleveland and Bohlen from Leddy.

1. Now that we have been working out new relationship between NATO and France for the past eight months, I think it would be helpful to have agreed picture of situation. I would appreciate your comments on scene as we see it:

NATO

2. De Gaulle has given clear instruction that France is to disengage from all NATO military activities with few exceptions such as early warning activities which he is willing to tolerate as sop to French military. He is willing to have General Staff talks between France and NATO military authorities as well as permanent French military liaison missions to NATO military components, which will be empowered to exchange information and arrange for communications but will not be empowered to enter into arrangements or undertake engagements which might compromise French ability to remain neutral if it so chooses in event of war. On political level France remains a party to the Treaty and member of Alliance represented on NAC and other non-military activities. For public consumption, it is “an ally of its allies,” even though it has undermined the confidence of both its NATO and WEU allies in sincerity of its undertakings. This posture should be adequate to get French Government through next parliamentary elections without any serious domestic questions being raised on French relations with NATO.

3. Rigid French position has finally brought back to reality those Allies who put primary value on maintaining French association at whatever cost to Alliance. Thus pace of decisions has increased. Major steps taken or underway to date are:

a) NAC will move to Brussels, SHAPE to Casteau in Belgium, AFCENT to Maastricht area in Netherlands. The Military Committee is expected to follow NAC to Brussels.

b) French forces will remain in Germany. Germans clearly want them to remain and need multilateral cover for Franco-German bilateral on facilities.SACEUR and General Ailleret will discuss technical arrangements to relate French and NATO military activities and report to their Principals. France proved unwilling to implement pertinent portion of Brussels Ministerial communique of last June and was unwilling even to agree that, once it had declared war under Article 5 of the Treaty, French forces would serve in the NATO military framework.

c) NADGE is major exceptional activity which Fourteen and France have preliminarily agreed to carry through. Fourteen want France’s financial contribution. France wants early warning intelligence. Project would be operable without French stations.

4. There remain a number of areas to be clarified, negotiated or decided:

a) The “constitutional question” of continuing French role in NAC and its subsidiary bodies, and how we deal with this at the short and medium term. Our general position has been to let French initiate own withdrawals (which being rapidly done) and, where they remain, to assert principle that France is not permitted to negate or stop work from which it has withdrawn. The Fourteen is now considering a proposal by which the DPC, without France, would have broad responsibilities as Board of Directors for NATO defense activities.

b) Terms of French participation in certain NATO military support agencies such as NATO Supply Center, SHAPE Technical Center and SACLANT ASW Research Center.

c) Possible relocation of those military support agencies now located in France such as Hawk NPLO, NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, and AGARD.

d) French financial participation in selected activities which fall under the military budget and future infrastructure projects. While France is withdrawing from such activities and projects, it has indicated interest in participating selectively. We have under consideration proposal to increase percentage price to French since they would be choosing only nationally useful programs.

e) French financial liability arising from French unilateral abrogation of agreements, which forced US and NATO withdrawal from France.

f) Overflights of French territory. France continues to permit these on monthly basis, but will give no firm assurance about policy in time of crisis. Fourteen agree it is better to proceed on this basis than to precipitate issue which might lead French to reduce degree of cooperation.

5. In sum, major relocations and decisions of principle have now largely been taken; there remain number of lesser points to be worked out, chiefly in liaison and financial areas. There will be no definitive overall France-NATO arrangement, but series of agreements and understandings is emerging which cumulatively and pragmatically have already clearly defined France’s relationship to Fourteen as “neutral” nation which will not accept commitments of any nature which hamper its freedom of decision.

6. We expect that it will take good part of next year to wrap up loose ends. French actions since de Gaulle announced public withdrawals last spring have already resulted in more extensive withdrawals than originally anticipated by many Allies. This is particularly evident in such areas as French abstention from the Military Committee and French treatment of the problem of mission of French troops in Germany. We would expect in general that future actions by both France and the Fourteen will result in even more complete French divorce from the military side of the Alliance. Unknown, at this point, is degree to which France may restrict its own participation in non-military, and especially political, activities of the Alliance. French abstention from POLAD report on East-West relations may be straw in the wind.

France-US

7. Bilateral discussions have been held with French regarding withdrawal from facilities in France during which (a) we have reaffirmed we do not accept April 1, 1967 deadline for withdrawals, (b) French have reiterated they are prepared recognize problems we have that will stretch out our withdrawals but ask that we inform them fully regarding our plans, (c) French have cooperated in enabling special measures and workers to be introduced to move stocks, and in allowing schools to complete this academic year with continuation of appropriate support facilities.

8. Separate bilateral discussions have been held between Ambassador Bohlen and French Foreign Minister in which French have made clear that:

a) They are unwilling for any US equipment or military personnel to remain in France even under French control.

b) They are willing to permit continued US use in peacetime including time of crisis of petroleum pipeline and telecommunications facilities under French management, and are awaiting our response to this offer.

c) They can give no assurance regarding continued use of pipeline and telecommunications facilities, or re-entry into any other facilities in event of war.

d) They willing to consult regarding possible re-entry into other facilities should new crisis arise.

e) Any re-entry into facilities will depend upon French national decision at time of crisis or in event of war, and no assurance can be given regarding French position in advance. It is apparent French wish to be in position to exercise option of avoiding any involvement.

9. Although De Gaulle is not likely to revive notion of withdrawing from North Atlantic Treaty prior to March 1967 elections, he will continue to disentangle France from any bilateral or multilateral military relationship with US in order to retain maximum flexibility in exploiting Viet Nam situation, enhance French role in Europe at expense of US, and ensure full French freedom of action in event Viet Nam conflict develops into general war. French relations with US in private sector will continue on normal basis with constantly expanding trade, travel and other relations. French will seek correct and friendly government relations on all strictly bilateral questions. In military field, US expects to complete its bilateral reentry discussions with French and submit report to Fourteen during next month.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel, Vest, and Getz; cleared in L/EUR and EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals.