Office of the Historian

180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Germany1

Washington, June 27, 1966, 4:05 p.m.

2546. Paris for James and Crawford. Subject: US Nuclear Weapons for French forces in FRG. NATUS.

For Bonn: You should inform foreign office soonest of text of aide-memoire contained below as well as substance of oral message to accompany its delivery, the schedule of consultation and delivery as outlined, and instructions on nature statement Cleveland to make to Fourteen.

For Cleveland: You should inform Fourteen on June 29 of text of aide-memoire and oral message. You should recall that withdrawal of US weapons was foreseen in US aide-memoire of April 12,2 contents of which were discussed with the Fourteen prior to its delivery. In response to any inquiries as to effect of withdrawals on SACEUR’s nuclear capability you should reply that US does not propose to diminish this capability. Replacement of nuclear-capable French units in Germany will [Page 421] naturally have to be discussed among the Fourteen, although possibility should not be excluded that discussions on new role and mission of French forces will result in relationship to NATO such as to lead US to consider resumption atomic weapons support.

For Bohlen: 1. Following prior notice to FRG and to Fourteen as described above you should on June 30 deliver to Foreign office following aide-mémoire:

Begin text: The GOF has stated its intention to withdraw French forces in FRG from NATO command as of July 1, 1966. As the United States pointed out in its aide-memoire of April 12, 1966, if these forces are so withdrawn, the US-France-NATO Atomic Stockpile Agreement of September 6, 1960 will cease by its own terms to have application. The Government of France should also be aware that in this eventuality certain portions of the US-France Agreement for Cooperation in the Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems of July 27, 1961 also will cease by their own terms to apply on July 1. Therefore, assuming no new or interim arrangements will have been made by that time which would permit continued US atomic support for these forces, the practical measures which would necessarily have to be taken are as follows:

a.
The US nuclear weapons currently made available for possible wartime use by French forces in the FRG will cease to be so available and will be withdrawn.
b.
The transfer of US atomic information under the US-France Agreement of July 27, 1961, hitherto furnished in consideration of the assignment to NATO of French nuclear-capable forces will be suspended. These measures follow from those terms of the two aforementioned agreements which envisage commitment of French nuclear-capable forces to NATO. Accordingly, they do not reflect any intention on the part of the USG to terminate these agreements. The question of possible future United States support of French forces in the FRG will depend upon the role and mission of such forces and their relationship to NATO. With further regard to the Agreement of July 27, 1961, the USG, in the interest of the continuing fulfillment of the respective responsibilities of the two Governments under that Agreement, desires to arrange in the near future for a visit of a US Security Working Group to review the implementing procedures of the agencies responsible for the protection of documents and information provided under the Agreement. In order to facilitate such a survey, the USG requests the GOF to furnish to it a report through normal channels listing all unit holders of US atomic information as of June 30, 1966. End text.

2. You should inform the foreign office orally that details on the withdrawal of weapons will be made available to French Commanders through USCINCEUR and necessary cooperation worked out at that level. Further information on the Security survey will be provided [Page 422] French Government at their request. You may state, however, that similar surveys are made from time to time of other countries pursuant to relevant bilateral Agreements for Cooperation, and that in the case of France none has taken place since the review made in 1960 prior to the conclusion of the 1961 Agreement.

3. We envisage informing press of general substance of aide-memoire in low key manner after delivery, emphasizing points suggested for Cleveland presentation to Fourteen above. We would not propose to release text unless this subsequently proves to be necessary to correct possible misunderstandings. Press guidance will follow.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM); cleared by Schaetzel, McNaughton, Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker, WE, RPM, G/PM, and AEC; and approved by Ball. Repeated to the other NATO capitals.↩
  2. Document 154.↩