Office of the Historian

167. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 20, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • President’s Conversation with Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium—NATO
[Page 393]

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S. Side:
    • The President
    • Ambassador Knight
    • Ambassador Symington
    • Mr. Rostow
    • Mr. Bator
    • Mr. Stoessel
    • Mr. Toumayan (interpreter)
  • Belgian Side:
    • Foreign Minister Harmel
    • Ambassador Scheyven
    • Viscount Davignon, Chief de Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

The President said he was delighted to welcome the Foreign Minister to the United States. He hoped he could reciprocate the hospitality which he had received in Belgium.2

The Foreign Minister said that it was a great privilege for him to salute the President on behalf of his country and he was greatly appreciative that the President had found it possible to receive him. He noted that he had had useful conversations with Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and other officials, which were very important in view of the preparations for the NATO Ministerial meeting to be held in Brussels in June.3

The Foreign Minister continued that he attached great importance to the President’s declaration of May 3 concerning relations with Europe.4 He believed that an integrated defense has been essential in the past and will remain so for the future. He hoped that it would be possible to have an integrated defense among the 15 partners of NATO, and he wished to stress the number 15. However, if this proved to be impossible, then the remaining 14 should continue to adhere to the concept of integration. The Alliance should be organized so as to be effective in an operational sense; if it were not, it would be simply a paper alliance and it might be better not to have it.

The Foreign Minister said that another thought expressed by the President on May 3, which was very close to the views of Belgium, was that the moment has come to develop, within as well as outside of the Alliance, humanitarian and cultural ties between Eastern and Western Europe. He was very happy to know that the President was thinking along these lines.

The President responded that he concurred heartily with what the Foreign Minister had said, and he welcomed the opportunity to reiterate his interest and deep concern regarding all developments in Europe. The President was glad that the Foreign Minister had such strong feelings about the necessity for the Allies to remain united on the basis of the 15 [Page 394] members, if possible, or of the 14 members in any case. The President hoped that the forthcoming Ministerial meeting in Brussels would be a fruitful one, and he knew that the Foreign Minister would play a leading role in its deliberations. The President emphasized the need in this critical stage for complete understanding and unity among the Allies.

The President said that he believed it was bad manners to speak harshly of De Gaulle or engage in an acrimonious exchange with him. However, this should not be construed by anyone as a lack of concern on his part with De Gaulle’s policies. This had been expressed in many ways and the American people today feel more strongly than ever about the need for unity.

The President deeply regretted the divisions and difficulties in the Alliance. We should not brood about these, however, and it was good that the 14 wished to join together in adversity. He hoped that a strengthening of the Alliance would result from the June meeting.

The President inquired as to the Foreign Minister’s thoughts concerning De Gaulle’s forthcoming visit to Moscow. He, himself, did not know what would come of it, although he doubted if the 14 would get much solace from the visit. The Foreign Minister replied that he had asked a number of European statesmen about De Gaulle’s motivations, but in vain. We shall see what happens. But in any case, he did not believe that external events should govern our acts in the Alliance. He felt it was our duty to solidify the Alliance and to seize the opportunity of the Brussels meeting for this purpose.

In response to the President’s inquiry as to his views concerning the question of French troops in Germany, the Foreign Minister said that the matter had been posed by the German note in very precise terms, but the recent French reply seemed to evade a response.5 He thought that the matter should be clearer by the time of the meeting in Brussels. The Foreign Minister commented that he would prefer to take up the problem of the Alliance in its entirety rather than focus on the presence or absence of French troops in Germany.

The President asked the Foreign Minister’s views regarding the relocation of SHAPE and the North Atlantic Council and wondered what popular and political reactions might be if these installations were located in Belgium.

The Foreign Minister responded that it would be well to consider the problem in the context of the overall situation of the Alliance. Moreover, before giving its answer, Belgium would wish to be assured that the other Allies were united in their views. He thought this could be confirmed [Page 395] at Brussels. In any case, his own belief was that the political and military organs of the Alliance should not be separated but should be located close together as they had been in France. This should hold true regardless of the country of location.

The Foreign Minister noted that he understood from Brosio, the Secretary General of the Council, that the Council was now looking in the direction of Benelux for a relocation site. It would be necessary for the Benelux countries to consider the technical as well as the political ramifications and this was already under way. Although the Benelux study had not been completed, the Foreign Minister could say that his view was that, if it appears it is the duty of the Benelux to accept the NATO installations, he could not see how the Benelux could fail to fulfill such a duty.

The Foreign Minister said the first results of the investigation into the reaction of public opinion in Belgium to the possibility of relocating the NATO installations in Belgium had been positive. So far as the political side is concerned, the Foreign Minister had consulted with the leaders of the majority and minority parties just before coming to the United States and their initial reactions had not been unfavorable.

The Foreign Minister noted that he had agreed to consult his Benelux colleagues before taking further action on this matter and he asked that the friends of Belgium “trust her” for the few remaining weeks prior to the Brussels meeting. He stressed that he did not wish to receive an official bid concerning the relocation of NATO installations before the Brussels conference.

In closing, the President once again mentioned his high regard for the Foreign Minister’s leadership. He said that he was dedicated to the preservation of peace and the security of the Alliance and he hoped that progress could be made at the Brussels meeting. He appreciated very much the Belgian attitude of cooperation and support, which was so important in the present difficult times.

  1. Source: Department of Sate, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel. The source text is labeled “Part I of II Parts.” A summary of the discussion, which was held at the White House, was transmitted to the NATO capitals in circular telegram 2292, May 21. (Ibid., POL 7 BEL)↩
  2. JOHNSON visited Belgium in November 1963.↩
  3. A summary of these conversations was transmitted to the NATO capitals in circular telegram 2297, May 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 BER)↩
  4. For text of Johnson’s statement on May 3, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 475–478.↩
  5. For texts of the May 3 German note, and the May 18 French reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 340–343.↩