Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

163. Memorandum by Dean Acheson¹

Undated.

BROAD LINES OF APPROACH TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE IN NATO CRISIS

In approaching any negotiation it is important to understand clearly the relationship of the parties. Are they seeking a common object and sparring for compatible individual advantage—as in a horse trade? If so, bargaining is the avenue to agreement. If, however, one has taken a position from which it will not recede, and from which it cannot be forced to recede, there is small room for negotiation.

In the past weeks the French government has been at pains to demonstrate the latter is its attitude towards NATO. It will not discuss its decisions that French troops must be withdrawn from commitment to NATO command and French officers from service in NATO commands. Similarly its demands that all NATO and U.S. command headquarters and all U.S. troops, facilities and supplies must be withdrawn from France are not subject to negotiation. All that can be discussed are “practical measures” for carrying out these decisions, a deadline for which the French government has arbitrarily set. Even the French Ministry of Defense admits that so far as NATO facilities and headquarters are concerned these dates cannot be met.

The USG has responded that its troops and facilities will be withdrawn from French territory as soon as this can be done without prejudice to military security. There are no negotiations required about withdrawal.

The USG has offered to negotiate the amendment or cancellation of the agreements under which the facilities were established. It has not been thought compatible with the dignity of the USG to accept unilateral cancellation of agreements made for the life of NATO. Nor has acceptance of unilateral cancellation seemed appropriate when the GOF simultaneously offered to discuss new agreements about reentry into France in time of war. The French government has not answered the offer to negotiate the agreements. The draft aide-memoire submitted by you to the President² seeks to make the record clear on this important point, without haggling about our withdrawal.

What Can Be Negotiated and Its Importance

The impressive fact is how little of any real importance is open to negotiation in the France-NATO crisis.

The indisputable fact is that France wants everything French out of NATO, and everything NATO—especially everything American—out of France. This, if one may say so, poses a rather clear cut issue.

In the political field it is paralleled by another equally clear cut difference. As was made clear to Senator Church in Paris recently,³ the French government wants a European settlement by Europeans, i.e., by “the underlying reality of Europe … Russia in Eastern Europe and France, England and to a lesser extent Italy in Western Europe … the other countries of Europe were so much dust ….” The agreement would seek a “reunited Germany without nuclear arms and the withdrawal of foreign forces from such a Germany, including, of course, military forces of the United States.” To most Western Europeans simple mathematics makes this appear as Soviet domination of Europe. Our allies have not seen this issue of policy as a misunderstanding which can be talked out. The parties are not separated by details. They are poles apart.

The NATO Fourteen, to be sure, have matters which must be talked out with the French; but they are of relatively minor importance. How insistent will the French be in pushing a hurried evacuation of NATO establishments? In limiting NATO overflights? In pinching off the flow of oil across France? Is it in the interest of NATO to cloak the withdrawal of France from the Alliance? How valuable is French liaison with the NATO commands, and how much reliance can be placed on an agreement to use French facilities in time of conflict.

The matters which stand out from the mechanics of leaving France are:

1) The presence of French troops in Germany.

2) Allied overflights through French air space.

3) Continued transportation of oil across France.

4) Reentry rights into facilities in France in case of war.

There is also a matter which concerns chiefly the United States—the termination of valid bilateral agreements.

1) The presence of French troops in Germany

The presence of all foreign troops in Germany is governed by a series of agreements of 1954, one of which requires their being committed to NATO command in case of conflict. The French government has given notice of the cancellation of this commitment so far as their forces are concerned (two and one-third divisions and some air units) on July 1st.

Both the Germans and the other allies have seen the issues raised here by the French as primarily political rather than military. The Germans have accordingly informed the French, with the unanimous concurrence of the other thirteen allies, that the continued presence of French troops in Germany would be welcomed provided a new agreement was reached regarding their mission and their commitment to SACEUR command in the time of conflict. To make this specific the note proposed that the transfer of command take place when all other troops in Germany should have come under SACEUR’s command. This proposal was to resolve the ambiguity introduced by the French interpretation of the NAT as committing them to defend against “unprovoked” attack. Both French and German positions may be negotiable.

Despite dialectical form, the heart of the allied position is that unless troops in Germany are unequivocally there on a joint allied defense mission under the treaty, their status reverts to occupation forces in what General De Gaulle described to Senator Church as a defeated and divided country. The divisive effect of such a result is a net loss to the Alliance.

On the basis of current intelligence, the GOF is discussing this week whether or not to negotiate this matter. Apparently it would wish in any event to withdraw the troops after the February–March French elections. It may decide to do so during the summer.

2) Allied overflights through French air space

The right to conduct military overflights in France is of very substantial importance to us and the Alliance. Without the use of French air space NATO air communications between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean area are possible only by following a long and wasteful route over the Atlantic. The right to continue training flights over France is equally important, since air space over Germany, the UK and the Benelux countries is not as suited for such flights because of traffic congestion and recurrent bad weather. Aware of this, the French have reduced overflight agreements with the U.S. and other NATO countries to a month-to-month basis.

French need to overfly other NATO countries and to have access to information from the early warning system should provide the Alliance with strong bargaining position in negotiating continued overflight rights. Without such information and overflight rights the Force de Frappe would lose whatever credibility it now has.

However, reports of General De Gaulle’s discussion of this matter indicate he rules out the possibility of a Soviet attack on Europe, and hence regards of little immediate value French access to air defense information and foreign air space. Nevertheless, the situation itself puts some pressure on the GOF. To take an extreme position would be inconsistent with that of an ally. It would suggest more neutrality or hostility. This together with the keener appreciation of the situation held by the French military may maintain tolerable overflight rights.

3) Continued transportation of oil across France

The last French aide-memoire, while contemplating ending the flow of oil across France through our pipeline to U.S. forces in Germany, indicated some realization of the high-handedness of this action. It suggested France might not insist upon terminating use in one year. This action is so outrageous as to warrant a rather full and public exploration of the grounds put forward as justification for it and a claim for just compensation for the nationalization of the facility. The aide-memoire recently forwarded to the President lays the foundation for this.

4) Reentry rights into facilities in France in case of war

The GOF has offered to discuss this subject with the interesting qualification that it cover only situations in which both nations are at war. Since the only wars concerned are those which involve action under Article 5 of the NAT, the qualification indicates awareness of the possibility that the U.S. might be at war in Europe when France might not be. This qualification ought to be plumbed to see how firmly it is held and what it may mean.

If significance is attached to it, the value of reentry rights obtainable is much diminished. One would certainly not be justified in placing much reliance on them in planning for the security of our large forces in Germany. Nevertheless, they would be worth negotiating to have a framework of agreement regarding, and possibly custodial forces maintaining, some facilities which another French government might make really useful.

The exercise of negotiating the agreement, therefore, could well be worthwhile, as was the negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty. One can never tell when a document of this sort can come in handy. The United States would not be justified in making any concessions of importance to get it.

Dean Acheson ⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Attached to the source text are a transmittal memorandum from Acheson to Rusk, May 13, and a memorandum from Rusk to the President, also dated May 13, saying that the memorandum had been prepared at Rostow’s suggestion and that he and McNamara agreed that it formed a good basis for further guidance on negotiations with France over NATO.
2. This particular draft has not been further identified.
3. Senator Church’s conversation with De Gaulle on May 4 was summarized in telegram 7498 from Paris, May 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR W) His May 19 report to the President on his discussions with De Gaulle, Erhard, Wilson, and other European leaders is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, Vol. 3.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.