148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator)1
These are my notes on the meeting of Maurice Schumann and Ambassador Lucet yesterday with the President. Needless to say, they will be closely held here.2
Schumann. The question at issue regarding NATO is not the alliance itself but only the form of the alliance. France will remain in the alliance.
The President hoped that nothing would be done to weaken the alliance. The basic views which the US held regarding NATO at the time of its formation still prevail and most of the other members agree. He regretted the stand which France is taking on NATO and hopes that French views will change. The French position will make the road more difficult for the US which is trying to help all over the world. Our governments do not always see matters alike and this is only natural, but he wished that General De Gaulle did not feel the way he does about working within the alliance. Apparently the General has charted his course. For its part the US is determined to remain steadfast in pursuit of NATO objectives. There will be need for reforming, re-grouping and re-evaluating. We hope that this can be done with a minimum of inconvenience and [Page 348] discomfort. The President said he always turns his cheek and never hits back. He did not feel that the US was in any way violating French sovereignty and if the French felt that we had, we would simply have to accept that this is their view.
Schumann said that the French never claimed that the US was violating French sovereignty. The French only want a new structure of the alliance, which would restore French sovereignty. There is no intention to weaken the alliance or to forget the common goal. He thought that France would become an even more efficient partner not only as illustrated by French support in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, but also by helping the West, especially the US, in reaching a better understanding with the East. No new alliance is envisaged. France might well be useful, for example, in achieving a solution of the German problem. In Schumann’s view there should be no loosening of the military alliance itself. He said that if cooperation is not extended to the nuclear field, it would not be effective. But there should be no loosening of military ties. In time this intention of the French would become clear.
The President referred to the letter which he had just sent to President De Gaulle and which Schumann had read.3 The President said that if it was simply a question of improving the NATO organization, that would be all right. But the French appear determined to go it alone and that would simply create more problems. The other 14 should see to it that NATO remains intact, if possible get even closer together and keep people from feeding on dissension.
Schumann said that collective action was one thing but integration was another.
(There was a brief discussion of a possible meeting of NATO parliamentarians in Paris in the Fall.)
Schumann said that the basic French commitment was covered in the NATO Treaty; and then made a vague observation to the fact that a good deal of cooperation was needed outside the NATO area.
Schumann said that he looked forward to a Franco-American summit meeting and invited the President to come to Paris.
The President replied that when De Gaulle was here for the Kennedy funeral he thought there would be an opportunity for the General to return to the United States some time later for talks but that he understood that the General did not feel able to do this for a reason which he never fully understood.
The President went on to point out that the French action would inevitably have a distressing effect on the American people. We were very close to the French whom we regarded as our friends, and anything [Page 349] like the current development of France’s pulling away from us and the other allies would certainly have repercussions in the United States. The President said that he personally would not add gasoline to the fire.
Schumann said that France was not adopting a course away from the US. But there is now a new France built on a new economic foundation of financial stability. The French appreciated America’s help during the war and through the Marshall Plan and through its initiative in creating NATO. But now France was more special and more important than it used to be.
The President welcomed the importance of our friends, but this was no reason for going it alone. We can still be important and act collectively.
Schumann, quoting the Animal Farm, observed that some are more equal than others.
The President said that what has made us important is our standing together.
Schumann replied that France would not leave its friends.
The President then pointed to the last sentence in his letter to President De Gaulle and asked Schumann to remember it: “As our old friend and ally her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role.”
Schumann said the President should not feel that there is any chance that French policy will change. It is “irretrievable.” Mitterand, the only possible opposition leader to De Gaulle, had in effect criticized the General for not going further by advocating the elimination of both the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact. He said that everybody in France feels that the time has come for a reappraisal of the alliance, even though everybody in France supports the alliance.
The President said that it is one thing to readjust, to adapt, to perfect, in order to meet conditions; but it was another to take a different road alone. The President said he has known how De Gaulle felt on certain organizational matters and such questions might be arranged. But there was no need to say the US was violating France’s sovereignty and must get out. This development could blow up the whole arrangement. He hoped that it will not. He hoped that France would come back. For the moment things will be very difficult. He watched this development taking place not in anger, but in sorrow. He hoped that nothing that he had done personally had contributed to it. It was a fait accompli before he came on the scene. The President said that he assumed De Gaulle speaks for the French people. He regretted the French action, but was helpless to do anything about it except to unite the 14.
[Page 350]Schumann then referred to General De Gaulle’s memorandum to Washington and London in 1958 regarding a NATO Directorate of three.4
The President said he recalled that. Certainly organizational improvements could be made in NATO to help in overcoming General De Gaulle’s distaste for present arrangements but drastic actions are not called for.
Schumann said that since France would remain in the alliance even after 1969 some adjustment would be inevitable.
The President said that whatever course France may take, and however distressing this course may be, he was convinced that the French people would be there when the chips were down. Schumann agreed. But, the President added, we shouldn’t have to suffer meanwhile. We ought to be able to get along in prosperity as well as in crisis. He asked Schumann to convey to his colleagues the high regard and affection of America for the people of France. He thanked General De Gaulle for sending us Ambassador Lucet although we were, of course, sorry to see Ambassador Alphand leave us. He thought that General De Gaulle had been good for France and the Free World even though we disagree with what he is doing.
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 216. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. In a memorandum to Rusk, March 23, summarizing the conversation, Leddy noted that it lasted about 30 minutes. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209)↩
- Memoranda of Schumann’s conversations with Ball on March 22, and with Rusk and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, all along similar lines are ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO.↩
- Document 146.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 82–83.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears the typed signature.↩