Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

145. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 17, 1966, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NATO-France

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • George S. Vest, Deputy Director, EUR/RPM
• UK
  • Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador, Embassy of Great Britain
  • David Bendall, Counselor, Embassy of Great Britain

Sir Patrick said that Dean Acheson, at lunch on March 16, had mentioned his ideas about what should be done about the NATO-France situation, emphasizing that these were purely personal.² The Ambassador said he knew that Mr. Acheson was now advising the Department and would be interested in knowing to what extent the U.S. views parallel Mr. Acheson’s. By way of prelude, he emphasized that the UK was still anxious to get the work of a 14-nation planning group under way in Paris, especially now that the French seem to be acquiescent about letting the fourteen, so long as they were not formally organized, use International Staff services.

The Secretary said that Mr. Acheson was working closely with the Department and he was familiar with his ideas. He, himself, thought that the NAC could usefully carry on some work. Particularly the fourteen might: (a) do contingency thinking about French agreements with NATO itself; (b) consider if both SHAPE and NATO Headquarters should move and where, and, if so; (c) consider how to reduce the present NATO staff to make it more efficient (Sir Patrick interjected that the UK would certainly agree with that); and, (d) consult together on replies to the French aide-memoire.³

Mr. Ball explained that the U.S. is thinking along the lines of a very simple reply which would acknowledge the receipt of the aide-memoire, take the position that we do not interpret it as representing decisive action, and note that we are awaiting further clarification from France. Mr. Leddy thought we should seek to coordinate texts among the fourteen but not spend time trying to work out identical texts.

The Secretary said that the work which the NAC might do at this stage was less important than the hard studies which the major powers should undertake at once. The U.S., UK, Germany and Italy should study the major issues, should exchange views with one another, and then they would be in a position to provide leadership to the remaining members of the fourteen.

He thought Mr. Acheson’s comment was very much to the point that we are in fact losing France from the Alliance and must, therefore, search for ways to make the Alliance stronger. Among the areas of opportunity which open up, the first, he emphasized, is nuclear sharing. If De Gaulle comes forward with a nuclear guarantee for the European Allies, we should be in a position to move promptly to a nuclear sharing agreement to demonstrate a stronger Alliance. Some of the other areas which we need to study closely are: (a) Foreign exchange. We need to look at the offset problem against the general proposition that defense arrangements should not create unfair burdens. (b) Location of NATO Headquarters. (c) Attitude toward German reunification. In that connection, he called attention to the March 17 report from Paris that Zorin⁴ had said the Soviets are interested in a non-aggression treaty with the French and a reciprocal relaxation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could follow. This raised a question, he said, whether it was likely that Zorin would make such far-reaching remarks if there had been no prior contacts between France and the Soviets. (d) Status of the Standing Group and Military Committee. While looking at these, perhaps it was time to look into the idea of a Defense Minister or perhaps a Political Minister for NATO. (e) What about the practice of unanimity in NAC? How could NATO procedures be arranged to avoid a French veto? The Secretary said that we would be studying these and other questions of substance and hoped that all the major Allies would consider these matters so that together they could move them forward within the Alliance as a whole.

Sir Patrick said that London would be thinking hard about such questions and there was, he thought, general agreement about the need to approach the major problems in this manner. But, of course, the UK would want the fourteen to carry on their own work during the coming weeks. He recognized that the nuclear subject was touchy business. He did not disagree when the Secretary commented that Chalfont⁵ was probably right in his thinking that the West ought to act on the NATO nuclear problem and get it out of the way and then we might be in a position to make progress with the Soviets on non-proliferation.

Sir Patrick asked how the U.S. thought we should organize the necessary high-level consultation between the major Allies and asked if we had in mind ad hoc meetings. Mr. Ball said that we were thinking of continuing to operate on a bilateral basis with exchanges of papers. In the meantime, when he met with the NAC on Vietnam on March 29, he would discuss further with Shuckburgh the kind of work which the fourteen could properly carry forward. Mr. Leddy cautioned that as we go on, we must take care to disabuse the press that a triumvirate or quadrumvirate is developing. In that connection, he wondered whether the Ministers would tackle the major issues at the June Ministerial Meeting or maybe earlier. The Secretary thought some issues might not wait until June, but, at the same time, he did not favor having a meeting of Ministers before June.

In the course of a few remarks on the coming election, Sir Patrick said that the Government would firmly support NATO along the lines of the proposed declaration. The Secretary said he hoped that they would tone down criticisms of the Germans.

(The Secretary had to leave at this point.) Sir Patrick told the Under Secretary that if the British were to talk about the NATO nuclear problem, they would certainly want to talk about the offset problem at the same time. Mr. Ball said that one could be helpful to the other and he thought it useful to examine them together in a larger context.

Mr. Bendall said there was a fundamental policy decision on which the major powers needed to agree—what is to be the basic premise towards France—a hard exclusive policy or one which looked for ways to facilitate the maximum French association with NATO? Mr. Ball said we should try to avoid French bilateral arrangements. Mr. Leddy commented that the critical problem is the French forces in Germany. Of course, there are other considerations. He mentioned NADGE, and Sir Patrick added there would be the basic matter of security. Mr. Ball concluded that it would create a significant political disadvantage for us all if the French stayed in the FRG on a special basis; we are looking especially carefully at this question.

Sir Patrick said London would study these and other problems in the coming days and he hoped that the U.S. and UK would be in a position to exchange ideas and notes before long.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted on March 18 by Vest and approved in S and U on March 22. The conversation was held at the Department of State. A summary of it was transmitted to London in telegram 5480, March 18. (Ibid.)
2. A summary of the points made to Sir Patrick was sent to Rusk by Acheson on March 17. (Ibid.)
3. Document 142.
4. Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to France.
5. Lord Chalfont, British Minister of Disarmament.